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This thesis analyzes factors contributing to the recent trend of nations purchasing, 
leasing, or otherwise acquiring agricultural land abroad as a food production resource. 
These “large-scale land acquisitions” (LSLAs) have been studied extensively; however, 
scholars have mainly focused on LSLAs’ effects on “host” nations, providing only 
cursory explanations of “investor” nations’ motivations. This thesis corrects this 
deficiency in the literature by investigating drivers underlying the selection of a LSLA 
food security strategy. It conducts controlled comparisons of four case study nations, 
China, South Korea, India, and Saudi Arabia, which are diverse in terms of size, 
economics, politics, and other factors, but which all pursue food security LSLAs; it seeks 
to establish whether these nations share specific motivations for LSLAs, despite their 
differences, to determine the extent to which nations employing such a strategy, in 
general, share such motives. The first two chapters compare direct food security drivers 
of LSLAs in these states; the third examines if these nations share economic paradigms, 
to test if such paradigms act as an “underlying” stimulus of LSLAs. Regarding food 
security drivers, this thesis finds that all four face long-term rising and diversifying food 
product demand, limited production capacity, and reliance on food imports combined 
with a national preference for self-sufficiency; thus, LSLAs seem to be a method of 
reducing import dependence and securing access to food. Regarding economic outlook, 
this thesis finds that all four share an illiberal paradigm, consistent with these states’ 
aversion to markets. Given significant projected growth in world food demand, these 
findings could aid in predicting which nations might pursue such a policy in the future. 
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Ensuring access to and production of food is a major objective of nations, and 
national food security has been a critical challenge for states throughout history. Food 
security is a vital aspect of national security because if states fail to feed their populations, 
the outcomes are often revolutionary; one key example of this risk, according to many 
observers, is the fact that often “underlying the very real political aspirations” motivating 
the Arab Spring uprisings “was outrage at skyrocketing food prices.”1 Consequently, 
states are willing to go to great lengths to secure access to agricultural resources and 
other essential products demanded by their populations, frequently investing heavily in a 
diverse array of domestic and international food security strategies and agricultural 
production tactics.  
The challenges of food security were especially highlighted during the Global 
Food Crisis of 2007-2008, when food prices spiked considerably around the world; since 
then, prices have remained both high and volatile (see Figure 1).2 Largely concurrent 
with this crisis, a “new” strategy for securing access to agricultural resources rose to 
prominence, the purchase, lease, or acquisition by nations of large tracts of agricultural 
land in foreign countries, called “large-scale land acquisitions” (LSLAs). This strategy 
has been pursued by a highly diverse range of states, including China, South Korea, India, 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Libya, Kuwait, Singapore, and others, and has targeted land in 
                                                
1 T.A. Kiefer, "Energy Insecurity: The False Promise of Liquid Biofuels," Strategic Studies Quarterly 7, no. 
1 (Spring 2013): 133. 
2 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO Food Price Index, Rome, March 10, 2013. 
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often-underdeveloped nations in Southeast Asia, South America, Africa, and the Former 
Soviet Union.3 
Much of the academic literature on food security LSLAs has examined these land 
acquisitions’ negative or positive effects on “host” nations or local populations; this focus 
is warranted, as there is an abundance of legitimate questions (and consequent debate) 
over whether such strategies benefit or severely harm such populations. On one hand, 
LSLAs can provide investment and employment in “host states” while also increasing the 
overall production of food, potentially reducing global food prices.4 However, on the 
other hand, these acquisitions can displace local populations that rely on the land. Host 
governments often “desire…a quick fix to deep-seated problems” and, hence, “ask few 
questions when investors come calling;” in their enthusiasm for investment, host 
governments often “clear the land of existing inhabitants, and often don’t even ask for 
rent.”5 In one of many significant examples, Ethiopia utilized a “villigization” program to 
remove local tribes from land on which it “had granted a sixty-year concession on 25,000 
acres” to a Saudi Arabian company, Saudi Star.6 Consequently, these investments can 
“disregard users’ rights and further marginalize already vulnerable groups,” according to 
LSLAs’ detractors.7 
In light of LSLAs’ propensity to displace local populations in developing nations, 
academic literature has also focused on comparing LSLAs to prior efforts to secure 
resources that are traditionally considered deleterious for local populations, such as 
                                                
3 Fred Pearce, The Land Grabbers: The New Fight Over Who Owns the Earth (Boston: Beacon Press, 
2012), 29-38, 107-109, 129, 192, 202-205, 277. 
4 Smita Narula, "The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights, and the Politics of Food," Stanford Journal of 
International Law 49 no. 1 (Winter 2013): 101. 
5 Pearce, The Land Grabbers: The New Fight Over Who Owns the Earth, viii. 
6 Pearce, The Land Grabbers: The New Fight Over Who Owns the Earth, 4-5. 
7 Narula, "The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights, and the Politics of Food," 101. 
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colonialism. Scholars often connect LSLAs to 19th century and earlier attempts at “land 
acquisition by foreigners,” viewing LSLAs as simply “the most recent phenomenon” of 
“countries…looking to outsource food, feed, and fuel production to stabilize future 
supplies.”8 Due to this comparison with colonialism, scholars also link LSLAs with 
“mercantilism,” an economic doctrine closely associated with 19th century colonialism 
that promotes domestic production and exports over trade and imports; mercantilism also 
heavily favors using economic power as a tool for national and political power.9,10 Thus, 
if LSLAs are truly derived from mercantilist tendencies, there also appears to be a 
significant “economic ideology” factor driving LSLAs; however, this factor is only 
minimally addressed in the literature.  
 Despite extensive research examining numerous facets of LSLAs, scholars have 
generally provided limited analysis of the motivations of “investor” nations; they have 
instead tended to focus more on normative questions regarding the benefit, utility, or 
value of LSLAs to populations at the local and global level. Although studies do extend 
beyond normative questions, for example, to compare LSLAs to historical trends such as 
colonialism or mercantilism, investor nations’ goals, objectives, motivations, and 
domestic circumstances have not been thoroughly investigated by scholars; further, even 
when investor motivations are described, the literature does not offer an in-depth country-
by-country analysis. Moreover, most research tends to consider food security LSLAs as a 
response to the Global Food Crisis by wealthy and import-dependent nations. While this 
                                                
8 Alexandra Spieldoch and Sophia Murphy, "Agricultural Land Acquisitions: Implications for Food 
Security and Poverty Alleviation," In Land Grab: The Race for the World's Farmland, by Michael 
Kugelman and Susan L. Levenstein, 39-53 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, 2009), 40-41. 
9 Matias E. Margulis, Nora McKeon, and Saturnino M. Borras Jr., "Land Grabbing and Global Governance: 
Critical Perspectives," Globalizations 10 no. 1 (February 2013): 18. 
10 Eric Roll, A History of Economic Thought (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953), 62, 84. 
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narrative partially explains the LSLA trend, as the Global Food Crisis did contribute to 
and highlight food security challenges faced by many countries, it is only one of many 
explanations and does not, on its own, depict the myriad detailed, long-term food security 
and other conditions influencing investor nations. Considering only a single explanation 
simplifies the phenomenon and reduces predictive power for determining which countries 
may pursue this strategy in the future. 
In order to correct this deficiency in the literature, this thesis systematically 
investigates the specific motivations shared by the diverse range of investor nations. To 
do so, it conducts a controlled case study comparison of four nations that all pursue food 
security LSLAs but which otherwise differ in terms of economics, political systems, size, 
borders, regional location, and other factors; the nations selected for examination include 
China, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and India. The first two chapters examine and 
compare the direct food security motivations underlying the selection of a LSLA food 
security strategy by these nations, specifically comparing their food security concerns and 
objectives, current food security policies, and LSLA implementation methods to 
determine the extent of overlap among these countries. In light of the findings of these 
two chapters and the previously noted connections among LSLAs, colonialism, and 
mercantilism, the third chapter explores the national economic paradigms of these four 
states; it seeks to determine whether these countries share economic outlooks and 
whether such outlooks can be considered a “secondary” motivation of LSLAs. Through 
this analysis, this thesis establishes factors that, in general, appear to motivate nations to 
pursue food security LSLAs; the findings should improve the predictive power of current 
literature. 
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The first chapter seeks to determine if nations pursuing food security LSLAs share 
specific food security motivations and objectives potentially contributing to LSLAs; it 
also explores whether such countries’ food security strategies and LSLA implementation 
styles are similar, to ensure that these countries’ behaviors are actually comparable. This 
chapter hypothesizes that those nations employing food security LSLAs will share many 
parallels in motivations, objectives, and strategies. To test this hypothesis, the first 
chapter examines two nations as case studies that both pursue food security LSLAs but 
are otherwise vastly different, China and South Korea. It compares these states’ food 
security conditions, objectives, responses to food security challenges, and LSLA policies, 
and then examines whether the factors driving the use of food security LSLAs by these 
countries overlap. 
The first chapter finds significant similarities in the food security conditions, 
objectives, responses, and strategies of these countries. Both face drastically increasing 
and changing demand for food supplies driven by rising population growth, urbanization, 
increases in income resulting in consumption shifts to more agriculturally intensive 
products, and investment in biofuels that raises demand for a variety of crops. In addition, 
both have a limited supply base to produce agricultural commodities; each has low levels 
of arable land, decreasing endowments of such land based on urbanization, 
industrialization, and environmental degradation, a declining agricultural labor force, and 
plateauing crop yields. Further, these countries share a dependence on agricultural 
imports for many crops due to their food security conditions but have a national 
“wariness” of import markets; historically, both have established national targets for 
agricultural self-sufficiency and have developed long-term policies to promote this self-
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reliance or otherwise mitigate the perceived risks of agricultural import markets. Lastly, 
both nations implement LSLAs in a similar manner; each encourages domestic private or 
state-run firms to invest in the land acquisitions, buttressed by financial, diplomatic, or 
other support from the government, in hopes that the food produced through LSLAs will 
be made available to the home country in a crisis.  
The second chapter attempts to determine if the similar drivers of LSLAs found in 
the first chapter can be considered general among nations pursuing food security LSLAs. 
Although the first chapter establishes specific motivations in two highly disparate 
countries leading both to pursue LSLAs, given that both states are located in East Asia 
and could therefore share many region-based traits, more research was necessary to 
determine whether these findings are, in fact, general outside East Asia. Thus, the second 
chapter analyzes two additional case study nations, Saudi Arabia and India; like those of 
the first chapter, both nations pursue food security LSLAs but are otherwise nominally 
quite diverse. This chapter examines the food security concerns, objectives, responses, 
and strategies of these case study nations, according to the same template as the first 
chapter, and subsequently compares the findings for all four case study nations to 
determine if the results of the first chapter can be considered general (beyond the East 
Asian region). This chapter hypothesizes that the outcome of such an analysis will prove 
in the affirmative. 
The findings for the second chapter are essentially the same as those for the first 
chapter. Both India and Saudi Arabia face rapidly growing populations that are also 
urbanizing and rising in income; thus, demand for an ever-increasing variety of foods, as 
well as for food in general, is quickly expanding. Similar to China and South Korea, 
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Saudi Arabia and India also face low and falling levels of arable land combined with 
agricultural sustainability challenges. Additionally, Saudi Arabia and India depend on 
imports for a variety of food products, but they are also averse to import markets and 
have historically preferred self-sufficiency, when sustainable; they have likewise each 
implemented a range of policies to support self-sufficiency or to reduce the risks of 
import dependence. Finally, both share similar LSLA policies with China and South 
Korea; both encourage domestic firms to invest abroad, supported by diplomatic and 
financial resources from the government. Given the evident similarities in food security 
conditions among all four case study nations, it appears that these factors are general 
among nations pursuing LSLAs; this “generalizability” is further demonstrated by 
preliminary findings of these same parallels among other LSLA-pursuing nations 
(described within the second chapter), such as Qatar, Kuwait, and Singapore. 
Fundamentally, the first two chapters find specific food security conditions that 
motivate parallel behaviors and policies among extremely diverse nations. These results 
appear to be general among nations employing food security LSLAs and, thus, should 
provide insights for scholars and policymakers in predicting which nations are most 
likely to choose such a policy in the future. Given the potential effects of LSLAs, which 
can range from local investment and reduced global food prices to local displacement, 
food insecurity, and even political revolutions (for example Madagascar, as described in 
chapters one and two), understanding the direct food security motivations of nations 
pursuing LSLAs as well as being able to predict which nations might use such policies is 
critical; the value of this predictive power may rise in the future, since, by some estimates, 
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global food demand is expected to increase 100-110% by 2050, which could drive more 
countries to seek LSLAs.11 
While understanding the direct food security conditions that tend to motive LSLAs 
is valuable, policy responses to a given set of circumstances can vary greatly among 
countries, even if the circumstances themselves are the same for each country. Thus, in 
order to understand why a nation chooses a specific policy or strategy, it is vital to 
examine the “paradigm” or outlook of that country, which ultimately establishes a 
political environment delimiting the range of possible policy choices. In light of the 
connections noted in the literature among colonialism, mercantilism, and LSLAs, as well 
as the first two chapters’ findings regarding the preference for self-sufficiency and 
aversion to imports in LSLA-pursuing nations, it appears that the most valuable national 
paradigm through which LSLAs could be examined is political economics; since LSLAs 
appear to be a state economic intervention tool used to promote food production self-
reliance while circumventing import markets, it is likely that policymakers promoting 
such a strategy do not trust the “free” market and may subscribe to a common economic 
ideology or overall outlook. 
Therefore, the third chapter investigates the economic outlooks of the four case 
study nations previously examined to determine if there exist parallels among the 
outlooks of nations pursuing food security LSLAs; it hypothesizes that all four nations 
will subscribe to an economic outlook that is “illiberal,” “mercantilist,” or “nationalist” in 
nature, given LSLAs’ connection with colonialism and mercantilism. To conduct this 
analysis, this chapter explores the economic histories and current policies of each case 
                                                
11 David Tilman et al., "Global food demand and the sustainable intensification of agriculture," Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 108, no. 50 (December 2011): 20260. 
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study nation and subsequently compares the findings. While this chapter does not attempt 
to prove that economic outlook is a “direct” motivator LSLAs in the same capacity as 
food security concerns, it does seek to establish whether a national economic paradigm is 
shared among all nations pursuing such a strategy. A shared paradigm would indicate that 
all four have similar policy environments that could influence national decision-making 
and determine the type of policies that could be considered; this parallel would thus 
establish whether economic outlook could be considered a “secondary” motivator of 
LSLAs (with food security concerns as a “primary” motivator”). 
The third chapter confirms the hypothesis that LSLA-pursuing nations maintain a 
generally illiberal economic paradigm. All four nations demonstrate significant histories 
of economic illiberalism; China has been historically communist, India has been socialist, 
South Korea’s economic growth has been characterized by heavy state involvement, and 
Saudi Arabia has used oil revenues to achieve domestic and international political goals. 
Moreover, each of these nations retains numerous vestiges of its illiberal past, which 
carry through to modern policies. For example, all four allow a significant role in the 
economy for state-owned enterprises, utilize a range of trade and investment barriers to 
promote domestic industry and minimize foreign investment, pursue opaque sovereign 
wealth funds that can be used for geopolitical goals, and employ “mercantilist” resource 
security strategies, such as encouraging state-owned companies to purchase or acquire 
resources abroad (similar to LSLAs). Fundamentally, all adhere to an illiberal paradigm, 
encouraging the state to intervene in economic matters for national or political benefit; in 
light of these findings, it seems that, while the primary drivers are food security-based, 
economic illiberalism can be considered a general “secondary” motivation of LSLAs.  
 10 
In essence, the purpose of this thesis is to establish both primary and secondary 
conditions that, in general, motivate nations to pursue food security LSLAs. As described 
previously, it is structured in three chapters, with each exploring a slightly different 
aspect of the underlying drivers of LSLAs; because each chapter conducts a unique 
analysis and, therefore, calls on largely disparate bodies of literature, each chapter in the 
portfolio conducts its own review of the literature relevant to its investigation. This thesis 
ultimately achieves two fundamental goals. First, it contributes to the academic literature 
by correcting a deficiency in the research on LSLA investor nation motivations; second, 
given anticipated increases in world food demand, it addresses the tangible challenge of 
providing policymakers and scholars the ability to predict which nations might use a 
















 George Washington once stated, “I know of no pursuit in which more real and 
important service can be rendered to any country than by improving its agriculture.”12 
Feeding the population is a major national security challenge and objective for nations, 
and throughout time countries have implemented a wide range of plans to secure access 
to food and food-producing resources. Whether investing in agricultural development, 
subsidizing farmers, or directly expanding territory, governments frequently work to 
strengthen their state’s productive capacity in agriculture to ensure “food security.”  
In recent years, however, there has been significant growth of a “new” strategy 
for ensuring self-sufficient food production: government-supported purchases or long-
term leases of agricultural land. These land deals, known as large-scale land acquisitions, 
have occurred throughout the world sponsored by numerous investor countries; for 
example, claims have been made that China is poised to lease from Ukraine “three 
million hectares, an area equivalent to Belgium or Massachusetts” as part of a “50-year 
plan.”13 This strategy, criticized as “land grabbing,” is often cited for deleterious effects 
on local “host nation” populations, and is hence compared to 19th century colonialism.14 
According to much of the literature, the use of this new strategy appears to be related to 
attempts by import-dependent countries to hedge against the price volatility experienced 
acutely during the Global Food Crisis of 2007-2008. However, is this the full story? 
                                                
12 Robert Andrews, The Columbia Dictionary of Quotations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 
319. 
13 Alex Spillius, "China 'to rent five per cent of Ukraine'," The Telegraph, September 24, 2013. 
14 Spillius, "China 'to rent five per cent of Ukraine'." 
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The types of countries that invest in LSLAs for food security are wide-ranging; 
claims of “land grabbing” have been made against nations ranging from China and India 
to South Korea and the Gulf states.15 Due to the significant differences among these 
investor countries, this chapter seeks to determine if there are specific national factors 
shared by investor countries that lead to a strategy of LSLAs for food security purposes; 
if so, it will identify and examine these factors. Additionally, for those nations that utilize 
LSLAs, this chapter will investigate how LSLAs fit into the broader context of an overall 
national food security strategy. In order to conduct this analysis, this chapter will evaluate 
two widely different countries, China and South Korea (Korea), as case studies.  
Literature Review 
 
Throughout history, humanity has struggled with its inescapable need to consume 
resources scarce in nature. Though many resources are “scarce,” one of the most critical 
resources for survival and national stability is food. As populations grow and change, 
“food security” becomes a progressively more substantial challenge for nations, requiring 
increasingly innovative strategies. One recent national response to the food security issue, 
discussed at length in this chapter, is large-scale land acquisitions, which involve nations 
purchasing or leasing tracts of agricultural land abroad. In order to understand this 
practice, this section first explores the foundations, causes, and responses to the food and 
resource scarcity issue. After analyzing these, this section examines current literature on 
LSLAs and determines potential areas of future scholarly investigation.  
Food Scarcity Causes and Responses 
Academic literature generally agrees that the central driver of the concept of 
“scarcity” is human demand, coupled with some limit on world supply based on the 
                                                
15 Spillius, "China 'to rent five per cent of Ukraine'." 
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Earth’s endowment of a particular resource. As Homer-Dixon explains, “resource 
scarcity…is determined not just by absolute physical limits, but also by preferences, 
beliefs, and norms.”16 Additionally, as Daoud explains, “scarcity is a property that 
emerges in relation to human activity or social provisioning.”17 Based on this human 
demand-focused view of scarcity, many scholars of food and resource security evaluate 
the effects of population growth on scarcity.  
One of the earliest analyses of population growth and food scarcity is Thomas 
Malthus’ An Essay on the Principles of Population, written in 1789. Malthus postulates 
that because “population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio” and 
“subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio,” food scarcity provides “a strong and 
constantly operating check on population from the difficulty of subsistence.”18 Although 
Malthus’ argument is often criticized for failing to account for agricultural productivity 
increases through technology, it has remained central to the food security debate for 
future academic generations.19 Throughout the 20th century, neo-Malthusians have 
predicted shortages due to population growth;20 for example, Paul Ehrlich predicted “a 
minimum of ten million people…will starve to death during each year of the 1970s” due 
to overpopulation.21 Regardless of individual stances, it is generally agreed that 
population growth is a key component of food scarcity, especially since Malthusian fears 
                                                
16 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases," 
International Security 19 no. 2 (Summer 1994): 9. 
17 Adel Daoud, "Robbins and Malthus on Scarcity, Abundance, and Sufficiency: The Missing Sociocultural 
Element," The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 69 no. 4 (October 2010): 1207. 
18 Thomas R. Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 13. 
19 Charles H. Eccleston, "Peak Food?" Environmental Quality Management 101 no. 9 (Spring 2009): 10. 
20 Eccleston, "Peak Food?" 10. 
21 Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (Cutchogue: Buccaneer Books, 1968), 3. 
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continue to be cited by modern scholars including Siegenbeek van Heukelom, Daoud, 
and Verpoorten.22,23,24 
In conjunction with population growth, an additional cause of food demand and 
scarcity cited by many scholars is demographic and consumption changes. For example, 
as Naylor and Falcon explain, “a human population nearing 7 billion, coupled with 
increased incomes in many developing countries, has created greater demand for meat, 
vegetable oils, and other high-end food products.”25 Similarly, Gunasekera, Newth, and 
Finnigan argue, “if developing countries converge to the dietary patterns of developed 
countries, there will be a significant increase in the consumption of meat and dairy 
products.”26 The literature suggests that rising incomes shift national consumption tastes 
to dairy and meat;27 such trends increase food scarcity since cattle (and livestock) 
“[require] massive amounts of grain for feed.”28,29 
Lastly, scholars note environmental drivers of scarcity. For example, Homer-
Dixon cites human-based “environmental change” and “unequal distribution of resources” 
as causing scarcity, in addition to “population growth,” specifically for “renewable 
                                                
22 Tim Siegenbeek van Heukelom, "A Human Approach to Food Security: Land Grabs in the Limelight," 
Journal of Human Security 7 no. 1 (March 2011): 11. 
23 Daoud, "Robbins and Malthus on Scarcity, Abundance, and Sufficiency," 1208. 
24 Marijke Verpoorten, "Leave none to claim the land: A Malthusian catastrophe in Rwanda?" Journal of 
Peace Research 49 no. 4 (July 2012): 1. 
25 Rosamond L. Naylor and Walter P. Falcon, "Food Security in an Era of Economic Volatility," 
Population and Development Review 36 no. 4 (December 2010): 698. 
26 Don Gunasekera, David Newth, and John Finnigan, "Reconciling the Competing Demands in the 
Human-Earth System: Ensuring Food Security," Economic Papers 30 no. 3 (September 2011): 299. 
27 Gunasekera, Newth, and Finnigan, "Reconciling the Competing Demands in the Human-Earth System,” 
299. 
28 Xinhua Zhang, "How China, A Rising World Power Deals with Current Crisis and Challanges Facing the 
World," International Security Conference, Munich: Schoeler Consulting Group/Shanghai Vision 
Consultants Co., Ltd., 2009, 6. 
29 Donald L. Sparks, "Large Scale Land Acquisitions in Sub-Saharan Africa: The New Scramble," 
International Business & Economics Research Journal 11 no. 6 (June 2012): 687. 
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resources” such as “fresh water” and “fertile soils.”30 Many works, such as by Spieldoch 
and Murphy and by Dike and Dike have reiterated Homer-Dixon’s findings, for example 
regarding environmental change and degradation.31,32 Taken together, the factors of 
population growth, demographic and consumption shifts, environmental change or 
degradation, and the unequal distribution of resources appear to be the major drivers of 
food and resource scarcity.  
LSLAs are one response to resource security concerns; however, nations have 
utilized myriad strategies to secure access to food and other natural resources. 
Historically, according to several scholars, colonization was a major response to resource 
security concerns. As explained by Spieldoch and Murphy, “colonization of farmland by 
foreign settlers dates back thousands of years” and “the colonizers appropriated much of 
the most fertile land for themselves;”33 according to Cotula, “colonial administrators used 
their control over the land to open up Africa’s resources for settlers and companies.”34 
This literature suggests that nations acquiring land abroad for agricultural and resource 
security is not a new phenomenon. 
Additionally, three major interrelated mechanisms for “responding” to food 
security issues are demographic alterations, consumption changes, and expanded food 
production. One of the primary works advocating these methods is David Ricardo’s The 
Principles of Political Economy & Taxation, written in 1817 in part as a critique of 
Malthus’ prediction of population-induced famine. Ricardo argues, “it is only because the 
                                                
30 Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases," 8. 
31 Spieldoch and Murphy, "Agricultural Land Acquisitions," 45-46. 
32 Enwere Dike and Ngozi I. Dike, "Economics and Environmental Resources: Review," International 
Business Research 5 no. 12 (November 2012): 164-165. 
33 Spieldoch and Murphy, "Agricultural Land Acquisitions," 40. 
34 Lorenzo Cotula, The Great African Land Grab? Agricultural Investments and the Global Food System 
(New York/London: Zed Books, 2013), 17-18. 
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expenditure of the people takes [the form of larger families], that the market price of 
necessaries (food) exceeds the natural price, and that the quantity of food required is 
produced.”35 Fundamentally, Ricardo asserts that population and food production levels 
are directly related; when food becomes scarce, its price will rise and people will farm 
more or reproduce less.36 Much of the contemporary literature in support of LSLAs 
implements this reasoning; for example, Hallam contends that agricultural investment 
abroad based on domestic food demand could lead to “an increase in food supplies for the 
domestic market and for export.”37 Similarly, Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen assert, 
“investment in the agriculture of a developing country has the potential to raise 
productivity [and] meet the nutritional needs of the population.”38 
 Other national responses to food security concerns expressed in the literature 
include, according to Hallam, “the creation of regional food reserves, financial 
instruments to manage risk, bilateral agreements including counter-trade (barter 
arrangements), and the improvement of international food market information systems.”39 
Further, investment in agricultural technological advancements such as fertilizers may aid 
in assuaging food security concerns.40 Rosenberg, for example, argues, “one of the main 
economic consequences of scientific progress is to enlarge continually the range of 
                                                
35 David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy & Taxation (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1933), 
278. 
36 Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy & Taxation, 278. 
37 David Hallam, "International Investments in Agricultural Production," in Land Grab: The Race for the 
World's Farmland, by Michael Kugelman and Susan L. Levenstein (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, 2009), 33. 
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substitution possibilities which confront advanced industrial economies.”41 In sum, the 
academic literature demonstrates that there are many possible responses to the food and 
resource security issue, only one of which is the strategy of LSLAs. 
Large-Scale Land Acquisitions 
 Over the past half-decade, there has been significant growth in the practice of 
large-scale land acquisitions, characterized by Spieldoch and Murphy as “negotiations on 
the part of governments and private firms looking to sign agreements that would confer 
ownership of, or long-term leases on, land abroad.”42 In the case of leases, the duration, 
according to Cotula and Vermeulen, “ranges from short terms to 99 years.”43 These land 
deals, described throughout much of the literature as “land grabs,” have sparked 
significant controversy in the academic and non-academic community specifically over 
their scope and effects on local “host nation” populations.44 This section focuses on 
current controversies in the literature, then reviews the general drivers of LSLA strategies, 
and lastly illustrates LSLAs’ relation to past colonialism and modern economic liberalism. 
 One significant cause of controversy in the current scholarship involves the scope 
of LSLAs. Uncertainty regarding scope appears to be based on the fact that, according to 
Cotula, “most of the estimates of scale…are derived from varying combinations of two 
types of sources: international review mainly based on media and research reports…and 
systematic national inventories based on official government records.”45 At one end of 
the spectrum, media reports and those by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such 
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as Genetic Resources Action International (GRAIN), Oxfam, etc. tend to display larger 
estimates, especially since they may be produced “with the aim of promoting public 
accountability.”46 For example, Oxfam estimated in 2011 that “as many as 227 million 
hectares of land – an area the size of Western Europe – has been sold or leased since 
2001, mostly to international investors.”47 On the other hand, inventories of land deals by 
host nation governments “tend to be lower than [data] based on media reports;” according 
to Cotula, “in Mozambique, for example, media sources arrived at more than ten million 
hectares acquired between 2008 and 2010, while a national inventory for the period 2004-
09 calculated a figure closer to 2.7 million.”48 Other organizations have attempted to 
include more rigorous estimates, such as the “Land Matrix,” which cross-references 
“research papers and policy reports by international and local organisations and NGOs,” 
personal crowd-sourced information, “field-based research projects,” “official 
government records,” “company websites,” and “media reports.”49 The Land Matrix 
currently estimates that 31.9 million hectares (ha), 123,167 square miles, have been 
included in LSLAs.50  
 A second major question in the literature is the effect of LSLAs on local “host 
nation” populations. There tend to be two overarching viewpoints on this subject, based 
primarily on whether the benefits of LSLAs outweigh the costs. This viewpoint divide is 
well categorized by Narula, who states, “proponents [of LSLAs] argue that these 
investments can support economic development in host states while boosting global food 
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production,” however, “critics charge that these ‘land grabs’ disregard users’ rights and 
further marginalize already vulnerable groups.”51 Most scholars recognize the potential 
for either outcome and, therefore, argue for a variety of methods to increase benefits to 
local populations; such scholars include Cotula and Vermeulen, Narula, Telesetsky, and 
Siegenbeek van Heukelom.52,53,54,55 Cotula and Vermeulen assert that “greater 
transparency, effective regulation, skillfully negotiated contracts, and robust social and 
environmental impact assessments and management systems” must exist “to promote 
national and local development.”56 Similarly, Siegenbeek van Heukelom suggests, 
“investments in agricultural land should ultimately feature a clear ethical component 
aimed at emancipation, for instance, a reciprocity of rights.”57  
In contrast to LSLAs’ scope and host nation effects, scholars typically agree on 
the nations and actors involved. According to Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen, “the 
most common characteristics of foreign investors in the acquisition of land are capital-
rich, natural-resource poor Arab and East Asian governments and corporations.”58 Cotula 
and Vermeulen add to this analysis, asserting, “quantitative inventories suggest that key 
investor countries are located in Europe and Africa as well as the Gulf and South and 
East Asia.”59 Within this category, according to Sparks, “there are various types of buyers, 
including state-owned enterprises, sovereign wealth funds, foreign and domestic private 
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sector investors, and central government agencies.”60 Moreover, according to Cotula and 
Vermeulen, many states pursuing food security LSLAs are in the “Gulf and East [Asia]” 
and “heavily dependent on food imports.”61 Nations hosting LSLAs are often those with 
“cheap and abundant farmland, particularly in Africa,” though also in Southeast Asia and 
the Former Soviet Union.62,63,64 
There is also overall academic agreement about the general drivers of a LSLA 
strategy. As described by Borras Jr. and Franco, Spieldoch and Murphy, as well as others, 
there are fundamentally two interrelated drivers behind land grabbing: biofuel (such as 
corn and sugar-based ethanol or vegetable oil-based biodiesel) production and food 
security.65,66 In terms of biofuels, the literature agrees that there has been a recent upsurge 
in demand for biofuels, as well as for the agricultural land to produce them, due to 
“biofuels support policies that mandate a minimum market for the industry” and “demand 
for energy to fuel growth in emerging economies.”67,68 In terms of food security, there 
appears to be demand for agricultural investments from “resource-poor but cash rich” 
nations, especially those with “fast-growing populations” and dependency on 
“international markets for their food supply.”69,70 According to Spieldoch and Murphy, 
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“investing countries for the most part lack arable land and, especially, sufficient fresh 
water to grow what they need domestically.”71 Food security has also become an 
increasing concern since, according to Sparks and Eccleston, crop yields in recent years 
have been plateauing, which could potentially lead to a Malthusian-type crisis.72,73 These 
biofuel and food security issues are also extensively interconnected, according to Hojjat, 
because “both compete for the same inputs;” “200kg of maize” could either fill one gas 
tank with biofuel or “feed one person for a year.”74 
Research also concurs that a primary factor leading to the recent surge in LSLAs 
is the Global Food Crisis of 2007-2008. During this period, both oil and food prices 
increased greatly; according to Naylor and Falcon, “world prices (in dollars) of…wheat, 
rice, maize, and petroleum – roughly tripled in real terms during the first half of 2008.”75 
These price increases, according to Spieldoch and Murphy, “were the result of a 
combination of supply problems, protectionist moves by some of the main suppliers to 
world markets, and the new demand created by biofuels support policies.”76 These causes 
have been reiterated and expanded upon by additional scholars, for example Conceicao 
and Mendoza, who discuss the effects of financial speculation, high oil prices, 
government biofuel policies, and agricultural productivity.77 Further, the biofuel, food, 
and oil price increases appear directly related, since, according to scholars such as Naylor 
and Falcon, “petroleum prices also serve as a reference point for the profitability of 
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maize-based ethanol, and hence affect the demand for and price of maize.”78 Therefore, 
many nations investing in LSLAs appear to be trying to hedge against price volatility “in 
order to secure reliable food sources for their domestic populations.”79 Though the 
literature has not focused on investors on a country-by-country basis, the above analysis 
demonstrates that some of the factors that should cause countries to seek land abroad are: 
rising populations, reliance on imports for food, domestic crop yield stabilization, 
growing energy needs, biofuel production policies, and shifting or growing food needs.  
Lastly, while LSLAs have roots in colonialism, they also rely on modern liberal 
economic principles and institutions. Thus, many scholars, such as Margulis, McKeon, 
and Borras Jr., view LSLAs as “a unique world historical event that reveals a nascent 
shift in the global political economy,” and as a “de-territorialization and commodification 
of sovereign national territory.”80 The literature also sees these deals as differing from 
historic colonialism. According to Kugelman, “they are concluded on the basis of 
agreements instead of through the barrel of a gun” and involve “more government-led 
investment than in the past;”81 similarly, as described by Siegenbeek van Heukelom, 
LSLAs are “two-party deals between the investing company and the hosting government,” 
even if “other affected parties,” such as local inhabitants, are “absent in the majority of 
deals.”82 However, as explained by Margulis, McKeon, and Borras Jr., although LSLAs 
are “facilitated by the institutions and practices of neo-liberal globalization,” often they 
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are conducted for “‘security mercantilism’ that may have illiberal ends.”83 Hence, one 
possible trait of LSLA investor nations may be the use of liberal economic institutions 
and adherence to an “illiberal” national economic outlook. 
Shortcomings and Contributions 
 Most literature on LSLAs appears to focus on these investments’ key 
controversies. This focus results in an emphasis on host states, since the controversies are 
mainly centered on these locations; there is detailed analysis of LSLAs’ content and 
scope, local and global benefits and costs, and “colonial” or economic elements. 
However, few studies examine individual investor nations and the common traits that 
might motivate land investments abroad for food security. While scholars do offer 
cursory descriptions of some factors common to investor states, they do not provide in-
depth analyses of these nations or explain why they choose LSLAs over (or in 
conjunction with) other food security strategies. Thus, this chapter seeks to provide 
greater insights into common factors in investor states that may lead to the use of LSLAs 
as a food security strategy; to do so, it examines two nations as case studies that both use 
LSLAs but are otherwise relatively dissimilar, China and South Korea. 
Theory and Hypothesis 
This chapter hypothesizes that those countries utilizing LSLAs as a food security 
strategy share many common characteristics, specifically regarding their food security 
concerns and response strategies. Further, it hypothesizes that LSLAs play a supporting 
role in an overall food security strategy, and that among countries using LSLAs for food 
security these overall strategies are similar. By investigating this hypothesis, it attempts 
to identify which common national factors, specifically those concerning food and 
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agricultural resource constraints, might lead to the selection of LSLAs as a food security 
strategy. Thus, to test this hypothesis, this chapter analyzes two countries as case studies 
that have, on the surface, very different national circumstances but which both utilize 
LSLAs: China and South Korea.  
 As the Literature Review demonstrates, the food security concerns that may be 
shared, even by vastly dissimilar countries, might include population-based factors, diet 
and consumption changes, or environmental and land-based factors. These countries, 
regardless of their differences, will likely share similar natural resource or financial 
endowments and may be heavily dependent on food imports. Further, nations utilizing 
LSLAs may share similar overall food security strategies, within which LSLAs will 
likely play a significant but supporting role. Such strategies might include the use of food 
reserves, bilateral trade agreements, and technological investment in agriculture. Further, 
these countries may be likely to combine “realist” with “liberal” economic policies.  
Methodology 
 As discussed in the previous section, this chapter investigates which national 
factors lead countries to pursue a LSLA food security strategy. To determine this, it 
compares the food security concerns and responses of two countries as case studies that 
initially appear to have vastly different national characteristics but which both utilize 
LSLAs, China and South Korea. This chapter then examines the areas of overlap between 
these disparate countries and explores which mutual factors are most critical to the choice 
of a LSLA strategy. Given the different starting points of these countries, a controlled 
comparison of the areas of overlap, specifically those regarding food security concerns, 
 25 
should provide insights into the selection of LSLAs as a food security strategy. All main 
findings are as of November 2013. 
 This chapter selects China and South Korea as case studies because these states 
are significantly different by most measures but share their use of food security LSLAs. 
According to the CIA World Factbook, China is a “Communist State” with 
1,349,585,838 people and a total land area of 9,596,961 square kilometers.84 The country 
borders 14 states, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burma, India, Kazakhstan, North Korea, 
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Vietnam.85 It has a 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $12.61 trillion, a GDP growth rate of 7.8%, and a 
GDP per capita of $9,300, the 124th highest in the world.86 In contrast, South Korea is a 
“Republic” with 48,955,203 people (this estimate varies with World Bank data) and a 
total area of 99,720 square kilometers.87 South Korea borders one state, North Korea.88 It 
has a GDP of $1.64 trillion, a GDP growth rate of 2%, and a GDP per capita of $32,800, 
the world’s 43rd highest.89  
 Although these nations differ greatly in factors such as demographics, size, 
economics, geography, and politics, this chapter explores similarities in their food 
security concerns and strategies that lead to the use of LSLAs. Further, it compares these 
countries’ LSLA implementation methods to ensure that their LSLAs are actually similar. 
If the results demonstrate significant areas of overlap between Chinese and Korean food 
security concerns, strategies, and LSLA implementation, then the concerns and strategy 
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parallels should play a role in these states’ choice of food security LSLAs. If similarities 
cannot be established, then the choice of LSLAs may be driven by other factors. 
 Although this chapter tests commonalities between the food security concerns of 
vastly different countries to determine if these parallels result in similar policies, any 
results which demonstrate such parallels may not uncover all possible causes of LSLAs 
as a food security strategy. This chapter primarily serves to determine if common food 
security factors play a role in LSLAs, however, there may be additional factors beyond 
this chapter’s scope. For example, while the case study nations have been selected 
specifically for their apparent differences, there may be similarities between these nations 
not tested by this chapter that contribute to LSLAs, such as social, political, economic, or 
cultural parallels. Future research into such comparisons may be valuable in uncovering 
other causes of the LSLA phenomenon. 
 One key challenge this research faces is data availability, especially due to its case 
study-based methodology. This chapter individually analyzes countries’ conditions and 
policies; thus, availability of data may vary by nation, largely due to the extent of 
English-language sources in each state. This chapter seeks comprehensive data for every 
case study despite this challenge; however, the specific sources used for each may vary.  
Lastly, to define terms, food security concerns involve any major factors limiting 
access to food at the national level. As the Literature Review illustrates, these factors 
could include demand issues, such as population or diet patterns, or supply issues, such as 
global import market conditions or domestic endowments of land, water, or other 
agricultural resources. Food security strategies involve any national response to food 
supply limits or risks, such as imports, food reserve programs, trade agreements, or 
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LSLAs. Finally, LSLAs include any land deals conducted via a directed national effort to 
produce agricultural products within foreign countries for food security, regardless of 
whether these deals are operationally implemented by governments or private enterprise. 
Results 
 Despite considerable differences, China and South Korea have both pursued 
LSLA strategies to achieve greater security in food supply sources. Further, these nations 
have implemented their strategies in a similar manner, encouraging national companies to 
invest abroad in agricultural land and production. This section will cover, for each nation, 
the food security circumstances leading to the selection of a LSLA food security strategy 
and will then analyze how LSLAs fit within an overall food resource strategy context.  
China – Food Security Concerns 
 China faces a number of challenges and concerns regarding its food security. 
These challenges can fundamentally be divided into two categories, demand-based issues 
and supply-based issues. This section explores these categories of challenges, both of 
which contribute to China’s selection of specific food security strategies.  
 As discussed above, scarcity is largely based on human demand; likewise, rising 
or changing food demand is a major concern for China’s food security. China contains 
approximately 21% of the world’s people and its population projected to peak at 1.4 
billion by 2025 (a projection that may increase given China’s recent relaxation of its 
“One Child Policy”).90,91,92 Not only will these additional people need food, but also, due 
to projected rising incomes and the urbanization of “some 200 million rural residents” 
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over the next 15-20 years, consumption patterns within China will change to satisfy new 
diets.93 Over this period, for example, “a more meat-oriented diet will appear;” such a 
shift will require the production of “an additional 80 to 100 million tons of grain” for 
animal feed, since production of “one ton of poultry requires two tons of grain while one 
ton of pork requires four tons.”94,95 The trend of increasing meat-based demand has 
already been demonstrated over the 2000-2010 period, with higher income individuals in 
China eating “50 per cent more of pork, beef, mutton and poultry meats” and 
“significantly more dairy products and aquatic products.”96  
 Grain demand has also been driven up by biofuel production to satisfy Chinese 
fuel needs. According to Koizumi, “from 1990 to 2008, the market for passenger cars 
grew from 0.51 to 9.38 million” in China, now “the second-largest car market in the 
world;” China is now “the second-largest petroleum consumer in the world” after the 
U.S.97 To partially satisfy this demand, given its limited oil resources, China has become 
“the third-largest bioethanol-producing country,” mainly using corn and sometimes wheat 
as feedstock; it also produces biodiesel from vegetable oil or used cooking oil.98 The need 
for feedstock raises demand and, thus, prices of corn, wheat, and vegetable oil; further, 
these feedstock crops also compete with food crops for land and agricultural resources.99 
 China also faces significant supply-based challenges to its food security, which 
limit its agricultural productive capacity. First, although accounting for about a fifth of 
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the world’s population, China “has only 7-9% of the world’s arable land,” and its “arable 
land per person is well below the global average.”100 Further, “the area of China’s arable 
land has been decreasing for the past 50 years” due to environmental degradation, 
urbanization, and industrialization;101 according to the World Bank, China’s arable land 
area has decreased from approximately 122 million ha in 2004 to 111 million in 2011.102  
Beyond land availability, land-quality and capacity are also formidable concerns. 
Much of China’s arable land is “subject to environmental stresses such as drought” and, 
in fact, “only about 40% is classified as the highest grade (most suitable for crop 
production).”103 Further, crop yield increases have diminished as “new seed technology 
and modern farming practices…have run their course, and overuse of chemical inputs has 
led to deteriorating soils.”104 Moreover, irrigation is vital to China’s crop production, 
accounting for “75% of the country’s grain production” and “more than 60% of the 
country’s total water consumption,” making droughts and water scarcity significant 
challenges.105 This concern is critical, as China’s climate is disaster-prone; “China suffers 
from crop losses equal to about 10 per cent of the total grain output each year as a result 
of bad weather and spoilage.”106 
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Demographics are affecting agricultural productivity as well, since between 200 
and 300 million rural individuals will become urbanized by 2025-2030.107,108 Further, 
China’s farmers are aging as “more young people [are] leaving farming to work in 
cities.”109 These factors may diminish agricultural labor supply during a period of overall 
population growth.  
China – Food Security Responses: Imports  
In light of these food security concerns, one may wonder why China does not 
simply depend on agricultural import markets. However, China tends to have a reluctance, 
and to some extent an inability, to rely on these markets; in fact, Chinese agricultural 
policy targets a “grain self-sufficiency rate of above 95%.”110,111 One key reason for this 
import-aversion is based on national history; the massive famines under the “Great Leap 
Forward” are “still fresh in the collective memory of the present Chinese leadership.”112 
Moreover, China’s experience with 19th century semi-colonialism leads to a belief that 
the “[world] grain market is controlled by advanced nations, and once we have lost grain 
security, we are bound to be enslaved by them.”113 This view is somewhat valid, as only 
four firms dominate the global grain trade: ADM, Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus.114 
There are also structural reasons for China’s import aversion. First, China’s sheer 
size may be prohibitive to total import reliance. In 2010, “global grain trade” was 
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“approximately equivalent to 50 per cent of China’s total production (and 
consumption).”115 Further, if China were to reduce production of pork by 10%, “the 
amount of imports required to meet Chinese demand would be equivalent to 92 percent of 
total global pork trade.”116 Therefore, if China were to import only “10 per cent of its 
annual consumption, its import requirements would seriously [destabilize] world grain 
markets and drive up world inflation.”117  
Price volatility is also a major concern for China. Since the Global Food Crisis of 
2007-08, food prices have been high and volatile, as demonstrated by the below figure 
from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO):118 
Figure 1 
 
U.N. Food And Agriculture Organization – Food Price Index 1990-2013 
 
Given that some forecasts project global food demand to increase 100-110% by 
2050, this price volatility may continue;119 such a trend may be intensified by the fact that 
nations often impose export restrictions when food supplies are uncertain, as did “a 
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number of major producers” during the Food Crisis.120 Due to this potential volatility, 
exacerbated by China’s sheer size, China appears wary of relying on world food markets. 
 However, China does currently utilize import markets for some agricultural 
products and non-staple grains, an issue of importance given China’s projected 
consumption of meat and fuel. While China currently meets its 95% self-sufficiency 
target for staple or cereal grains, its self-sufficiency is only 88% when soybeans are 
included in the measure and, in fact, has a “soybean import dependency ratio” of 78.14 
(see Appendix 6); soybeans are used heavily as feed in the expanding livestock industry, 
and imports may rise from 58 million tons in 2010 to 90 million tons by 2030.121,122 
Further, China’s corn imports for livestock feed and biofuels are expected to increase 
from 3 million tons in 2012-2013 to 19.6 million tons in 2020, making China the world’s 
largest corn importer.123 Additionally, China is the “world’s largest importer” of oilseed 
and imports a variety of other agricultural commodities that compete for limited farmland 
with staple grains such as wheat and rice.124,125  
China – Food Security Responses: Self-Sufficiency Strategy 
 China is confronting a dilemma. The country faces rising food demand, limits on 
agricultural supply, a need to import non-staple crops (soy, oilseed, etc.) due to growth 
and urbanization, and a desire for self-sufficiency in staple crops. Moreover, it is wary of 
global agricultural import markets and potential price volatility. In light of these concerns, 
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China has developed a robust food security strategy, including the pursuit of overseas 
agriculture.  
 In response to its food security concerns and the Food Crisis, the Chinese 
government established the “National food security and long-term planning framework 
(2008-2020),” which addresses the challenges of rising consumer demand growth, 
decreasing arable land, water scarcity concerns, regional supply and demand, import 
dependence, grain yields, and global demand and supply disparities.126 To overcome 
these challenges, the plan sets four main objectives: improve grain productive capacity to 
reach 540 billion kg of grain by 2020 (from 500 billion kg in 2010), maintain the 95% 
food self-sufficiency rate, ensure a minimum of 120,000,000 ha of arable land by 2020, 
provide a secure level of grain reserves containing at least 70% wheat and rice, and 
improve grain distribution logistics.127 The plan offers six methods for achieving these 
objectives (paraphrased from translations): 
1. Increase food production capacity through protecting land and water 
resources, strengthening agricultural infrastructure, and improving crop 
yields through technological innovation.  
2. Encourage the production of non-grain resources such as grass for 
livestock consumption, aquaculture and fishing, and biofuel crop 
production.  
3. Strengthen international cooperation in agriculture, for example through 
domestic enterprises taking advantage of China’s ‘going out’ strategy and 
investing abroad.  
4. Improve the food distribution system in China by strengthening the market 
and intermediary organizations between farm production and cities. 
5. Improve the grain reserve and storage system to ensure national food 
supply during emergencies, to protect interests of farmers, and to solve 
regional supply imbalances. 
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6. Improve the food processing system.128,129 
 
The key principle underlying each element of China’s food security strategy is 
self-sufficient food stability; according to Baldwin and Bonarriva, China’s “domestic 
agricultural policy and trade policy” is built to realize “three overarching goals: stability 
of supplies, stability of prices, and stability of farmer incomes” with a preference for 
“domestic production if possible.”130 Thus, in addition to the above initiatives, China 
subsidizes “farmers involved in grain production” to encourage domestic agricultural 
employment and production.131 China also uses trade restrictions, including “tariff rate 
quotas” and nontariff measures such as “bans on U.S. beef,” to limit the “flow of 
imported agricultural goods.”132 
However, to lessen trade barrier risks on unavoidable imports, following its goal 
of agricultural “cooperation,” China has initiated several free trade agreements (FTAs); it 
has established FTAs with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
Pakistan, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru, Costa Rica, Iceland, and Switzerland, 
and is considering or negotiating FTAs with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 
Australia, Norway, India, Korea, and Japan.133 These FTAs often have a strong 
agricultural element, such as the “early harvest program…[requiring] all parties to 
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eliminate tariffs on eight categories of agricultural products” and to “[reduce] tariffs on 
such goods as sugar” and others “to less than 20%.”134 
China – Food Security Responses: Large-Scale Land Acquisitions 
 It is against the backdrop of a push for self-sufficiency coupled with rising 
demand for imported products that China has selected a LSLA food security strategy. 
China’s overseas agriculture strategy is derived primarily from two sources, the “Go 
Global” strategy to encourage overseas investment by domestic enterprises and the 
“National food security and long-term planning framework (2008-2020),” in which China 
promotes “international cooperation” in agriculture.135 China’s “Go Global” strategy was 
adopted in 2001 as the “first major drive by the government to encourage [domestic] 
investors to go abroad,” which removed “legal and administrative barriers” and created 
“generous incentives” for Chinese companies.136 This strategy is referenced initially in 
the food security “framework” plan and is further clarified by the “Implementing 
Opinions on Encouraging and Guiding Private Enterprises to Make Active Investment 
Abroad,” issued in 2012, which includes agriculture as a key industry in which “private 
enterprises are encouraged to invest abroad.”137  
 China’s overseas agriculture investment essentially takes two forms, which tend 
to overlap. First, Chinese private companies invest in “agricultural production” abroad 
such as “through joint ventures and contract farming as a way to bypass the dominance of 
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U.S. and European agribusiness traders.”138 This includes, for example, production of 
soybeans in Latin America, given China’s growing demand; one example of this, 
according to the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), is “in 2011 a 
mix of four private and state-owned Chinese enterprises were negotiating a US$7 billion 
agreement…to produce 6 million tons of soybeans a year for export to China.”139 This 
type of investment directly corresponds with the “Go Global” strategy discussed 
previously. The second method by which China invests in agriculture involves state-
sponsored investments in “land and water resources,” which can range from “aid and 
development cooperation” to “contract farming and joint ventures,” “technology 
demonstration,” and technological investment.140 According to Xinhua, China plans or 
has developed “more than 20 agricultural technology demonstration centers around the 
world, and will double the number of experts to be dispatched overseas;”141 such plans 
are valuable because, in China’s view, “the seed planted to feed the Chinese is also likely 
to feed people in other developing countries.”142  
 Regarding the scope of Chinese investment, numeric estimates vary, but 
investment content estimates are largely similar. The Land Matrix estimates 975,824 
hectares of deals for agricultural purposes involving 68 overall contracts, in locations 
ranging from Latin America to Africa and Southeast Asia (see Appendix 1).143 
Additionally, with only seven exceptions, each contract includes a corporate investor, 
although many of these may have ties to the Chinese state such as the “Shaanxi Land 
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Reclamation General Corporation,” “China National Corp for Overseas Economic Coop 
Laostar Development,” or the “China National Complete Plant Import & Export 
Corporation.”144 In contrast, the IISD estimates include “54 projects covering 4.8 million 
hectares,” in locations ranging from Southeast Asia to Africa, Latin America, and the 
Former Soviet Union.145 Similarly, with three exceptions, every investment included a 
corporate investor, albeit with potential ties to the Chinese state.146 
South Korea – Food Security Concerns 
 South Korea also faces substantial food security challenges. As with China, South 
Korea’s domestic food security concerns can be divided into demand and supply factors.  
 Population-wise, Korea is the 26th most populous nation, with 50,004,000 people 
as of 2012.147 Its population is expected to peak at 51,664,000 by 2030, a trend which 
will require the production of food for an additional 1.66 million people.148 Additionally, 
South Korea is “one of the fastest industrializing countries in the world;”149 according to 
the World Bank, Korea’s urban population is expected to grow from its current 2012 
level of 41,737,638, 83.5% of the population, to 44,032,000 by 2030, equivalent to 87.1% 
of the population.150 Although Korea’s gross urban population will peak in 2030, it is 
expected to grow in percentage terms through 2050 to 89.6% of the population.151 
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Given such trends, Korean diets will likely shift. According to Korean National 
Statistics, these trends have already established themselves over the past 20 years; over 
this period, rice consumption has declined while meat consumption has risen.152 In 1990, 
daily per capita rice consumption was 327.6 grams and beef, chicken, and pork 
consumption was 11.2 grams, 32.3 grams, and 11.0 grams, respectively; in 2010, daily 
per capita rice consumption was 199.6 grams and beef, chicken, and pork consumption 
was 24.1 grams, 52.9 grams, and 29.3 grams, respectively.153 According to the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), “recent trends” affecting Korean demand for food 
imports include the “globalization and Westernization of tastes,” “the high percentage of 
younger consumers with a growing taste for imported foods,” “an increasing number of 
working women and two income families who demand more convenience foods,” “the 
decline in per capita consumption of rice and the moving away from rice-based foods to 
wheat, corn, meat, and potato-based foods,” and “the spread of conventional ovens, 
microwaves, and refrigerators.”154 If such trends continue, they will place upward 
pressure on food demand. 
Given that Korea has experienced 50 years of economic growth and urbanization, 
many dietary shift trends are already well established since demand for animal products 
tends rise with “income growth especially in low income regions.”155 As stated by the 
CIA World Factbook, “in the 1960s, [Korean] GDP per capita was comparable with 
levels in the poorer countries of Africa and Asia… and [Korea] is currently the world's 
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12th largest economy.”156 Due to this growth, “increased demands for dairy and meat 
among an increasingly affluent population encouraged farmers to invest in livestock 
production,” hence requiring “feed imports.”157 Thus, for corn and soybeans, “the 
primary sources of feed for animal production,” demand has “risen steadily in the past 30 
years with dramatic increases of meat demand.”158 
Biofuels also drive agricultural demand. Korea is the tenth largest energy 
consumer, has few domestic energy sources, and is pursuing reduced greenhouse gas 
emissions, hoping to cut “emissions by 4 percent by 2020 compared to 2005 levels.”159,160 
Hence, Korea has raised its biofuel production, which usually requires corn for ethanol or 
oils (vegetable oil or used cooking oil) for biodiesel feedstock, from 200 barrels per day 
(B/D) in 2005 to 6,300 B/D in 2011.161 These trends may raise agricultural import 
demand, since in 2009 Korea used “300,000 kiloliters of biodiesel feedstock” of which 
“75-80 percent was imported soy and palm oil, while the remainder was mainly domestic 
recycled cooking oil.”162  
Korea also faces supply-based food security challenges. Korea has only 1,492,000 
ha of arable land as of 2011, an amount that has been falling since 2000 from 1,718,000 
ha.163 Further, Korea’s arable land per person amounts to only .029 ha per person 
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(compared with China, which amounts to .083 ha).164 Moreover, Korea’s grain crop 
yields have risen slightly over time, but have been relatively volatile; according to the 
World Bank, Korea’s kilogram per ha yield was 6,496.7 in 2004, down to 6,109.3 in 
2007, up to 7,265.0 in 2009, back down to 6,539.2 in 2010, and then 7,114.3 in 2012 
(compared with China, which in 2004 had a yield of 5,186.7 kg per ha, 5,447.5 kg in 
2009, 5,526.7 in 2010, and 5,837.5 in 2012).165  
Lastly, South Korea’s agricultural labor force and production capacity have 
decreased over time as the nation industrialized. In terms of the agricultural labor force, 
“the percentage of farmers in the total population has reduced from 50 percent in the 
1970s to 7 percent (or below) in the 2010s.”166 Moreover, according to the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, as the nation “became increasingly industrialized and labor 
costs rose, South Korean agriculture abandoned production of many crops, such as wheat, 
millet, sorghum, and cotton.”167 Therefore, in light of the above factors, South Korea has 
severely limited resources from which to produce crops domestically.  
South Korea – Food Security Responses: Imports and Self-Sufficiency 
 Given its food security conditions and lack of agricultural resources, Korea must 
rely on global markets. For cereal grains, as of “2007-09” (the most recent FAO data) 
Korea had a “cereal import dependency ratio” of 73.2, calculated as “Cereal 
imports/(cereal production + cereal import - cereal export)” (see Appendix 6 for 
comparison with other states).168 Korea is Asia’s “second biggest grain buyer” and the 
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world’s “second-largest importer of corn.”169,170 In addition, to support its “livestock, 
flour milling, and export-oriented industries of textile, garment, and leather goods,” 
Korea imports “large quantities of feed grains, soybeans, wheat, cotton, and hides.”171 
Overall, Korea depends on imports for approximately “60-70 percent” of its food needs 
(and some estimates are as high as 90 percent).172,173  
 Although Korea does rely on imports for its food supply, it is wary of 
international import markets and “has tried for more than four decades to strengthen its 
own agricultural production and avoid imports.”174 The two primary objectives of 
Korea’s “agricultural policy are self-sufficiency and parity between farm and urban 
household incomes,” and it has used “direct payments and import barriers” to realize 
these objectives.175 Although Korea’s self-sufficiency rates in “wheat, corn, and soybeans” 
are low at “0.5 percent, 1 percent, and 8.4 percent, respectively,” and overall grain self-
sufficiency stands at “26.7 percent,” the nation strives “to attain rice self-
sufficiency.”176,177 Further, South Korea has asserted that the country “aims to almost 
double its grain self-sufficiency ratio to 50 percent by 2030.”178  
 Korea’s desire for self-sufficiency seems primarily driven by fear of price 
volatility in the global market, given the country’s reliance on imports. Historically, 
Korea sustained a model of “subordination of agriculture and food policy to industrial 
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development policy…as long as food could be acquired cheaply overseas.”179 However, 
as illustrated sharply by the Food Crisis, “the world’s food supply is currently in 
transition from an era of persistent surpluses to one of chronic shortages and 
imbalances.”180 According to the Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI), Korean 
food imports will face a “global population [projected] to reach 9.1 billion by 2050,” 
causing “global demand for food [to] rise to 3 billion tons;” this demand will require 
“food production [to] increase by over 70 percent.”181  
 These challenges are exacerbated by fears of food “weaponization” through 
protectionist measures and by the grain import market’s structure. According to SERI, 
“with food producing countries hinting at ‘weaponizing’ food through export restrictions, 
it is now increasingly likely that food security among importing countries will be 
threatened.”182 To exemplify this possibility, SERI cites “Russia and Ukraine,” which in 
2010 “imposed restrictive measures on grain exports” as “anxiety over food supplies 
grew intense.”183 Moreover, the global grain market structure is a concern; given that 
“trading volumes are small in comparison to production volumes” and since the market 
has a “low ability to rapidly ramp up production to meet external demand,” “supply 
shortages” may occur.184 Such conditions are not helped by the fact that the “[world] 
grain market is subject to an oligopoly” of four firms through which “Korea brought in 
72.9% of its total import volume” or that Korean “grain buyers usually purchase on an as-
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needed basis at a fixed price through lowest-price public bids, rather than using the grain 
futures market or long-term supply contracts” to mitigate price risk.185  
Due to Korea’s wary import dependence, it has pursued several strategies to 
secure access to food products. One key strategy involves enacting FTAs which “can 
promote food security by augmenting Korean food supply” by minimizing or eliminating 
tariffs on or “weaponization” of agricultural imports.186 Currently, Korea has FTAs with 
Chile, Singapore, European FTA nations, ASEAN, India, the European Union, Peru, and 
the U.S.187 Further, the nation is planning FTAs with Turkey and Colombia, and 
negotiating FTAs with Canada, Mexico, the GCC, Australia, New Zealand, China, 
Vietnam, Indonesia, and Japan.188 
 Korea has employed many additional strategies to secure food access. It has 
developed food reserves, for example the “ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve,” 
a regional reserve with ASEAN nations, China, and Japan, to make “rice available during 
emergencies, stabilising the price of rice and improving farmers’ income and welfare.”189 
It has also created domestic reserves, such as the “Public Food Grain Stockholding 
Program” through which the “government will purchase domestic paddy rice during the 
harvest season (October-December) at the average market price and sell it during the 
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non-harvest periods at the prevailing domestic market price.”190 As of 2013, the program 
also allows “the government to purchase wheat and soybeans.”191 Furthermore, Korea 
subsidizes its rice farmers, paying “600,000 won per hectare (about $600 per hectare) 
each year,” and “[85%] of the difference” if the price of rice “falls below a target fixed in 
advance.”192 Lastly, Korea plans to invest “24.1 trillion won (54 trillion won including 
tax credits)” between 2008 and 2017 to “support the modernization of agricultural 
equipment and help find new growth engines through R&D and the seed industry.”193 
South Korea – Food Security Responses: Large-Scale Land Acquisitions 
 Given that Korea’s “grain self-sufficiency is very low and there’s limited room to 
boost production at home,” the nation has also established a substantial overseas 
agricultural development program to “ensure stable supplies.”194 Korea’s LSLA program 
was largely initiated in the wake of the Global Food Crisis, after which South Korea 
“developed a 10-year plan” to “[assist] companies to farm abroad.”195 This plan was 
developed in June 2008 primarily “to provide a framework for supporting overseas 
agricultural development” and consisted of two major goals: “1. Establishment of 
overseas trading companies who can secure commodities and stabilize prices through the 
futures market and 2. Support overseas agricultural production, processing and 
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logistics.”196 In 2012, the plan was updated and codified in law in the “Overseas 
Agricultural Development Promotion Act.”197 
 Regarding the first goal, Korea has attempted to “correct” its current process of 
purchasing food via major grain-trading firms on an “as-needed basis at a fixed price.”198 
It has done so by forming its own “grain trading firm in Chicago for direct importation,” 
called aT Grain Co., which can purchase grain on the futures market of the Chicago 
Board of Trade, “the single most important exchange for trading in agricultural 
commodities in the world.”199,200 This firm, “established by the state-run Korea Agro-
Fisheries Trade Corp” with a group of private companies, plans to supply “30% of 
Korea’s grain needs.”201 The government intends to develop similar firms in “Brazil, 
Russia and Ukraine.”202 
 The second goal of the overseas development plan is, essentially, Korea’s LSLA 
strategy. Through this objective, according to Vice Minister of Agriculture, Food and 
Rural Affairs, Yeo In-Hong, Korea plans “to secure 35% of domestic grain consumption” 
by 2021.203 Under the plan, the government supports “private business’ entry into the 
development of overseas agriculture through loans, investment research, information, and 
training.”204 These agricultural projects are conducted mainly through private Korean 
corporations, aided by the state-run “Korean Rural Community Corporation” through the 
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“Overseas Agricultural Development Service” program.205 This program provides 
“overseas agricultural development” loans to companies wishing to invest in agriculture 
abroad at 2-3% interest rates “repayable over 10 years with a 5 year grace period,” but 
requires “crops [to be] available to the Korean government in case of food shortages or 
crisis.”206 Although beyond the scope of this chapter’s analysis of food security LSLAs, 
Korea has also initiated similar programs for resource development in energy, minerals, 
fishery, and forestry.207  
In terms of Korean LSLA scope, numeric estimates again vary. According to Vice 
Minister Yeo In-Hong, the overseas agriculture program raised “the number of 
companies that entered overseas markets…from 35 in 2009 to 106 in 2012;” this growth 
increased “grain secured abroad” from “24,700 tons in 2009 to 218,000 tons in 2012.”208 
Moreover, according to an analysis of reports by the Korean Ministry of Food, 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (now the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Rural 
Affairs), as of 2011 this program had led to “85 projects in 20 different countries,” 
comprising “42,300 hectares.”209 
According to the Land Matrix, however, Korean LSLAs involve 17 different 
agricultural deals (forestry excluded) comprising 998,422 ha (see Appendix 2); this 
includes a 2009 690,000 ha deal with Sudan (the veracity of which is questioned by 
government data and the Lee and Müller study, which states, “only one investment case 
in Africa has been reported yet,” a failed attempt by the company Daewoo to acquire half 
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of Madagascar’s arable land).210,211 Moreover, only the Sudan deal involves direct 
acquisition by the Korean state; the rest are conducted via private enterprises and one 
“unknown investor.”212 Regardless of which estimates are correct, it appears that Korean 
LSLAs primarily involve private enterprises sponsored by the state to ensure access to 
food (and other) resources.  
Discussion 
 Despite their differences, China and South Korea share many parallels regarding 
food security concerns and responses, and both seem to use LSLAs for comparable 
reasons and in a similar manner. Thus, based on this chapter’s hypothesis, these similar 
conditions do appear to motivate the selection of LSLA food security strategies. This 
section analyzes the similarities between Chinese and Korean food security concerns and 
strategies, as described in the Results section, that contribute to a LSLA strategy.  
Food Security Concerns 
 Regarding food security concerns, both China and South Korea face drastically 
increasing and changing demand for food supplies. Both nations have growing and 
rapidly urbanizing populations, expected to peak between 2025 and 2030, which will 
require expanded food production. Further, both have populations that either have, or 
currently are, shifting their diets away from traditional staple grains to meat and dairy 
products, increasing demand for grains used in animal feed. Moreover, both nations have 
invested in biofuel production, raising demand for feedstock products such as corn for 
bioethanol or oils for biodiesel. If these trends continue, demand for many grains and 
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agricultural products in both countries can be projected to increase dramatically in 
coming years.  
 These projected increases in agricultural product demand are coupled, in both 
China and South Korea, with a limited supply base from which to produce these products. 
Both states possess minimal levels of arable land compared with the size of their 
populations, far below the world’s average of .2 ha per person.213 Further, arable land 
levels in both states are decreasing, due in part to urbanization and industrialization. 
While crop yields have risen in both nations over the last decade, research suggests that 
yields could level off as gains from technological innovation diminish.214,215 Lastly, both 
face a dwindling agricultural labor force from which to produce needed crops due to 
demographic and urbanization trends. 
Food Security Responses 
 In response to these similar concerns, both China and Korea have selected 
strikingly similar strategies to address their food security challenges. The core of these 
strategies, for both nations, appears based on a fundamental “wariness” of world import 
markets. Many of the shared strategies therefore, appear to be an attempt to satisfy rising 
demand for agricultural products while minimizing the danger of import dependence. 
 China and South Korea both rely on world import markets for certain products; 
although China tends to depend less on agricultural imports due to its ambitious cereals 
self-sufficiency target (see Appendix 6), both countries appear to share profound 
concerns about future dependency regardless of their “absolute” import reliance. 
Vulnerabilities to import markets in both countries were highlighted initially by the 
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volatility of international food prices experienced during the Global Food Crisis. 
However, both fear that these vulnerabilities could be worsened by projected future 
disparities between world food demand and supply, coupled with the oligopolistic 
structure of the world grain market and the possibility of export restrictions or “food 
weaponization” by food-producing nations.216 The “trigger event” of the Global Food 
Crisis appears to have prompted a change in attitudes towards food in both nations, such 
that both view the world food market as shifting from an “era of persistent surpluses to 
one of chronic shortages and imbalances.”217 
 In response to these concerns about global agricultural import markets, both 
China and South Korea have employed similar food security strategies. These strategies 
promote domestic agricultural self-sufficiency while reducing the dangers of necessary 
imports. Both countries have enacted national targets for “self-sufficiency” in grain and 
specific agricultural commodities, requiring that a certain percentage of these 
commodities be produced domestically. Further, both have made efforts to subsidize farm 
production, raise farmers’ incomes, create protectionist trade restrictions, develop 
reserves, and invest in agricultural infrastructure and technology. Lastly, both countries 
have worked towards international cooperation, such as through FTAs, to minimize the 
danger of importing commodities impossible to produce domestically. 
Large-Scale Land Acquisitions 
 In light of the comparable food security strategies implemented to address parallel 
concerns, both China and South Korea have implemented remarkably similar large-scale 
land acquisition strategies. Both nations utilize LSLAs to secure access to agricultural 
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resources in foreign nations; both also do so through state-sponsored efforts that 
nevertheless keep the government at arms’ length. In most cases, private or state-run 
corporations play the major role in acquiring farmland and agricultural resources abroad, 
sponsored or encouraged by the government. These projects are also usually categorized 
using “soft” terms such as overseas “development” or “aid,” creating a sense of mutual 
benefit for investor and target nations.  
 Governments may distance themselves from land deals for several reasons, 
including political ramifications and costs. As discussed in the Literature Review, many 
scholars describe negative effects of “land-grabs” on host nation inhabitants. Further, 
LSLAs can have significant political impacts within target nations; for example, an 
attempt by the South Korean company Daewoo Logistics to lease “1.3 million hectares in 
Madagascar,” about half of the country’s arable land, resulted in “riots and overthrowing 
of the Madagascan government.”218 While LSLAs’ political ramifications are beyond the 
scope of this analysis, China and Korea are likely keeping their land investments at arm’s 
length to distance themselves from negative outcomes while still reaping the food 
security benefits. Moreover, given that domestic companies mostly purchase the LSLAs, 
albeit with state subsidization, such a strategy may be a cheaper alternative for 
governments than direct investment. 
Analysis 
 This chapter hypothesized that those nations utilizing LSLAs as a food security 
strategy share many characteristics, specifically regarding their food security concerns 
and response strategies. Further, it hypothesized that LSLAs would play a supporting role 
in an overall food security strategy, which would be similar among countries utilizing 
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LSLAs for food security. To test this hypothesis, it analyzed two countries, China and 
South Korea, which both employ LSLAs but have substantial differences in factors 
ranging from population and size to political systems and national borders. This chapter 
postulated that areas of overlap between these countries regarding food security should 
provide insights into the national factors that lead to the selection of LSLAs as a food 
security strategy.  
 Based on the results of this research, it appears that countries sharing the LSLA 
strategy also share similar food security concerns and response approaches, specifically 
in the case studies of China and South Korea. Both countries face projected food demand 
increases coupled with limits to domestic productive capacity. Further, both are wary of 
global food import markets and consequently have specific goals and policies to raise 
domestic agricultural production. These countries rely on imports, when necessary, but 
have devised methods for circumventing market pitfalls, such as international 
cooperation and FTAs. Against this backdrop of national factor similarities, LSLAs 
appear to be a method of satisfying domestic demand while securing greater control over 
agricultural resource sources.  
While further case studies are beyond this chapter’s scope, the food security 
similarities shared by China and South Korea contributing to a LSLA strategy can likely 
be generalized to other nations. Saudi Arabia, for example, which also uses LSLAs 
according to Land Matrix data, has until recently held a “longstanding strategy of 
achieving wheat self-sufficiency… since the early 1990s,” even given its agricultural 
constraints.219,220 Though Saudi Arabia began phasing out domestic cultivation efforts in 
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2008, it replaced these efforts with “financial incentives” for “Saudi investors” “to invest 
in foreign countries that have comparative advantage in producing certain crops” and to 
“re-export their products back to Saudi Arabia.”221 Given the number of states using 
LSLAs and the similarities among them as described in the Literature Review, future 
research could determine the extent to which this chapter’s findings can be generalized. 
Specific nations valuable to test, based on their use of LSLAs and focus on self-
sufficiency, may be Saudi Arabia or India.222,223  
 This chapter’s results demonstrate that its hypothesis is correct that there are 
specific national factors that may lead to the use of LSLAs as a food security strategy. 
Further, while many individual works within the literature are correct, to an extent, by 
describing investor countries as “capital-rich, natural-resource poor,” “heavily dependent 
on food imports,” and investing abroad due to the Global Food Crisis, these descriptions 
are only part of the picture; in reality, LSLAs are implemented due to longer-term 
concerns regarding imports and self-sufficiency that were only initially highlighted by the 
Global Food Crisis.224,225 This analysis contributes to the existing literature by describing 
and examining these and additional factors that may lead to the implementation of 
LSLAs for food security purposes, and by determining how such a tactic fits within an 
overall food security strategy. 
                                                                                                                                            
220 United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service, Saudi Arabia Grain and Feed 
Annual, GAIN Report, Washington, D.C.: USDA FAS, 2013, 1. 
221 United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service, Saudi Arabia Grain and Feed 
Annual, 5. 
222 Land Matrix, Get the Detail: India, December 10, 2013, http://www.landmatrix.org/get-the-detail/by-
investor-country/india/?order_by=. 
223 United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, India, ERS Report, Washington, 
D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture, 2012. 
224 Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen, "Global Land Acquisition: neo-colonialism or development 
opportunity?" 273. 
225 Cotula and Vermeulen, "Deal or no deal: the outlook for agricultural land investment in Africa," 1235. 
 53 
 Finally, there are many areas of future potential research on the topic of LSLAs. 
Given that this chapter focused on comparing food security concerns and strategies of 
countries using LSLAs, additional analyses could examine other parallels’ contribution to 
LSLAs such as political, cultural, economic, or social factors. One specific factor noted 
in this chapter that could be tested is a nation’s level of economic “liberalness” and 
propensity for state intervention. Further, additional case studies such as Saudi Arabia 
could be studied to confirm if this chapter’s findings can be generalized to other nations. 
Lastly, scholars could investigate the political ramifications of LSLAs on either host or 
investor nations.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter sought to identify what national factors contribute to the 
implementation of LSLAs as part of a food security strategy, and how LSLAs fit within 
an overall food security strategy among those countries utilizing LSLAs. It approached 
this question by comparing the food security concerns and responses of two significantly 
different countries that currently use LSLAs, China and South Korea.  
 By examining the areas of overlap between China and South Korea, this chapter 
determined that countries choosing LSLAs appear to be those facing both projected 
increases in demand for food as well as limitations on food production to match this 
demand. These countries may be dependent on imports to varying degrees but will likely 
share concerns about relying on import markets and will strive for self-sufficiency. They 
can be expected to share similar food security strategies in light of these factors, 
specifically to increase domestic agricultural production and to minimize the “dangers” 
of import dependence; LSLAs will tend to be a supporting element of this overall strategy. 
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Based on this analysis, other nations to which these findings could be generalized include 
Saudi Arabia and India. 
 The insights of this chapter are valuable because they add clarification to the 
academic literature both on food security and “land-grabbing” issues. Additionally, they 
help to further explain why a nation would select a specific food security strategy. Given 
that nations choosing LSLAs can be dissimilar in many characteristics, such an 
explanation could aid both the academic and policymaking communities in understanding 
why these dissimilar nations might choose similar policies. Further, given projected 
increases in world demand for food, these insights may prove valuable in predicting 
which nations might be most likely to use a LSLA strategy in the future and will at the 



























 Food security is a critical national security concern, affected by myriad 
interrelated factors such as population growth, demographics, land area, and the 
environment. To ensure access to agricultural resources governments have developed a 
wide range of strategies, including colonialism, subsidizing domestic agriculture, trade 
protectionism, and economic integration. One such strategy, which has become prevalent 
in recent years, involves nations and national companies leasing or directly acquiring 
agricultural land abroad. 
 The first chapter examined the drivers of these acquisitions, called “large-scale 
land acquisitions;” it sought to determine if “investor” nations face specific food security 
conditions that contribute to their adoption of a LSLA food security strategy. Thus, it 
compared two seemingly dissimilar states that both use LSLAs, China and South Korea, 
and found numerous food security similarities between them that appear to lead to such a 
strategy.  
 Despite these parallels, further analysis is required to determine if these LSLA 
drivers apply generally, especially since a diverse range of nations use LSLAs.226 
Although China and Korea are largely dissimilar, both are located in East Asia and, hence, 
share similar histories, cultures, security concerns, and economic interests; these regional 
factors may lead to similar food security concerns, objectives, responses, and strategies. 
Thus, examining only East Asian states may not isolate general motivations of LSLAs 
from regional drivers.  
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 Therefore, this chapter seeks to “generalize” the first chapter’s findings by 
examining two additional nations that use LSLAs and are largely dissimilar, but that are 
outside East Asia, Saudi Arabia and India, to determine if the similar LSLA drivers found 
in China and Korea also exist in these states. In so doing, it seeks to establish whether 
states using LSLAs as a food security strategy, in general, share common traits 
motivating this strategy choice, thus confirming the explanatory power of the first 
chapter’s results. To test this hypothesis, it analyzes these countries’ food security 
concerns, objectives, and strategies, following the first chapter’s template, and then 
compares these food security conditions to the first chapter’s results. This chapter 
ultimately finds numerous parallels among all four states, indicating that the LSLA 
drivers found in the first chapter are general, not regional, trends. 
Literature Review  
The first chapter examined parallels in the food security conditions of China and 
Korea to determine if diverse nations that employ LSLAs share common motivations. 
While many similarities were found, it is possible that these parallels stem from specific 
East Asian factors and, thus, are not general beyond the region. To establish a foundation 
for testing the generalizability of the first chapter’s results, this section reviews causes of 
and responses to food scarcity from the first Literature Review. It then examines research 
on East Asian cultural, political, and economic traits that might result in similar food 
security strategies. 
Food Scarcity Causes and Responses 
 Academic literature generally agrees that scarcity is caused by human demand 
and physical supply restrictions. As Homer-Dixon explains, “scarcity…is determined not 
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just by absolute physical limits, but also by preferences, beliefs, and norms;”227 Daoud 
similarly states, “scarcity…emerges in relation to human activity or social 
provisioning.”228 Hence, many scholars analyze the effects of “population factors” on 
food and resource scarcity.  
These “population factors” primarily include population growth and 
demographics. In 1798, Malthus posited that since “population, when unchecked, 
increases in a geometrical ratio” and “subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio,” 
food scarcity provides “a strong and constantly operating check on population.”229 
Although Malthus fails to consider agricultural productivity, he underscores the risks of 
population growth, providing a foundation for both neo-Malthusians such as Ehrlich and 
for scarcity scholars including Siegenbeek van Heukelom, Daoud, and 
Verpoorten.230,231,232,233,234 Demographics are cited as another cause of scarcity; as Naylor 
and Falcon explain, “a human population nearing 7 billion, coupled with increased 
incomes in many developing countries, has created greater demand for meat, vegetable 
oils, and other high-end food products.”235 Sparks and Gunasekera, Newth, and Finnigan 
reiterate this sentiment.236,237  
 Environmental factors are also agreed upon as causes of scarcity, mainly by 
affecting resource supplies. Homer-Dixon cites human-based “environmental change” 
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and “unequal distribution of resources” as causing scarcity, specifically for “renewable 
resources” such as “fresh water” and “fertile soils;”238 many of these factors are restated 
by other scholars including Spieldoch and Murphy and by Dike and Dike.239,240 In sum, 
population growth, demographic trends, and the environment are major drivers of food 
and resource scarcity. 
States respond to food scarcity using many methods, in addition to LSLAs. 
Spieldoch and Murphy and Coluta depict colonization as one such response, to show 
LSLAs’ historical precedent;241,242 as Spieldoch and Murphy explain, “colonization of 
farmland by foreign settlers dates back thousands of years.”243 Incentive-based responses 
are championed by Ricardo, a 19th century critic of Malthus, who claims that population 
and scarcity are directly related; when food is limited, its price rises and people farm 
more or reproduce less.244 This argument underlies modern scarcity scholarship, such as 
by Hallam and by Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen.245,246 Scarcity can also be mitigated 
by market-based methods, such as, according to Hallam, “regional food reserves, 
financial instruments to manage risk, bilateral agreements including counter-trade (barter 
arrangements), and the improvement of international food market information 
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systems.”247 Lastly, scholars such as Rosenberg support farming technology investment 
to combat scarcity.248  
Large-Scale Land Acquisitions 
LSLAs, defined as “negotiations on the part of governments and private firms 
looking to sign agreements that would confer ownership of, or long-term leases on, land 
abroad,” have become a popular food security strategy over the past half-decade.249 Often 
described as “land grabs,” LSLAs have sparked controversy over their scope and effects 
on host nations, although there is general agreement on the nations involved and the 
drivers of LSLAs.250 
Debate over LSLAs primarily concerns scale and effects on host nation 
populations. Cotula attributes debates over scale to the fact that “most of the estimates” 
are based on “media and research reports…and systematic national inventories based on 
official government records.”251 The former usually display larger estimates, whereas the 
latter “tend to be lower.”252 The “Land Matrix” has assembled a more rigorous database, 
which cross-references data from “international and local organisations and NGOs,” 
crowd-sourcing, field research, “government records,” “company websites,” and the 
media;253 it estimates that 35.6 million hectares, 137,627 square miles, have been 
included in LSLAs.254  
Narula describes the two central views regarding LSLAs’ effects on host nations, 
explaining, “proponents argue that these investments can support economic development 
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in host states while boosting global food production,” however, “critics charge that these 
‘land grabs’ disregard users’ rights and further marginalize already vulnerable groups.”255 
Scholars such as Cotula and Vermeulen, Siegenbeek van Heukelom, Telesetsky, and 
Narula, recognize either outcome’s possibility and thus support methods to benefit 
locals.256,257,258,259 
There is mostly consensus on the nations involved in LSLAs and the core drivers 
of LSLAs. According to Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen, investors are typically 
“capital-rich, natural-resource poor Arab and East Asian governments and 
corporations.”260 Cotula and Vermeulen expand this view to include nations from Europe, 
Africa, and Southeast Asia.261 LSLA host nations are often those with “cheap and 
abundant farmland, particularly in Africa,” though also in Southeast Asia and within the 
Former Soviet Union.262,263,264  
The drivers of LSLAs include the related factors of biofuels and food 
security.265,266 In recent years, demand for biofuels, feedstock crops, and related farmland 
has risen due to “biofuels support policies” and “demand for energy to fuel growth in 
emerging economies.”267,268 Regarding food security, LSLA demand has mainly come 
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from “resource-poor but cash rich” nations, especially with “fast-growing populations,” 
dependency on “international markets for their food supply,” as well as limited “arable 
land” or “sufficient fresh water.”269,270,271 Both factors have been aggravated since, 
according to Sparks and Eccleston, crop yields have been plateauing.272,273 
The most crucial LSLA driver noted in the literature is the Global Food Crisis of 
2007-08, during which fuel (and hence biofuel) and food prices soared; as Naylor and 
Falcon describe, “wheat, rice, maize, and petroleum” prices “tripled in real terms during 
the first half of 2008.”274 The crisis was caused, according to Spieldoch and Murphy, by 
“supply problems,” “protectionist moves” by producers, and biofuel demand;275 
Conceicao and Mendoza expand on these causes, including financial speculation, high oil 
prices, and agricultural productivity.276 Thus, states are thought to use LSLAs “to secure 
reliable food sources” and hedge against food price volatility.277  
Finally, while LSLAs have roots in colonialism, they are also unique; Margulis, 
McKeon, and Borras Jr. portray LSLAs as “a unique world historical event that reveals a 
nascent shift in the global political economy,” and as a “de-territorialization and 
commodification of sovereign national territory.”278 Further, although LSLAs are 
“facilitated by the institutions and practices of neo-liberal globalization,” they are often 
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based on “security mercantilism” and “may have illiberal ends.”279 Hence, nations 
seeking LSLAs may adhere to an “illiberal” economic outlook, while using or exploiting 
liberal institutions. 
East Asian Cultural and Economic Similarities 
 The first chapter observed strong parallels between Chinese and South Korean 
food security conditions and strategies, suggesting that states using LSLAs share 
common drivers. However, these drivers may be based on factors specific to East Asia, 
and would thus not be general trends. This section explores academic research examining 
parallels in East Asian nations’ cultures, economics, and politics that may motivate 
similar food security strategies.  
 A key advocate of cultural traits specific to East Asia is Lee Kuan Yew, former 
prime minister of Singapore. According to Yew, “people develop different characteristics 
when they have evolved for thousands of years separately…particularly in their 
neurological development, and their cultural values.”280 He asserts that East Asia is 
“fortunate” to have a “cultural backdrop” of “thrift, hard work, filial piety, [family 
loyalty], and…respect for scholarship and learning.”281 Yew’s emphasis on intrinsic 
“Asian values” is controversial; according to Jenco, “‘Asian Values’ discourse 
was…condemned for its instrumentalism and lack of cultural authenticity.”282  
Lew’s view of “Asian values,” albeit controversial, has stimulated considerable 
scholarly analysis. Thompson, for example, portrays “‘Asian values’ as a doctrine of 
developmentalism” claiming, “until prosperity is achieved, democracy remains an 
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unaffordable luxury.”283 He further explains, “although thoroughly discredited 
internationally, ‘Asian values’ face a more complex fate at the domestic level,” especially 
since “authoritarian advocates” can claim that “only a ‘disciplined’ (that is, authoritarian) 
regime” will “promote fast economic growth.”284 More recent scholarship has revived the 
debate; Parfitt and Wysocki argue that Asian values are not “intrinsic and unchanging” 
but “can be seen as influencing behaviours, which create outcomes.”285 They assert that 
the region “is characterised by values of community and social organisation together with 
hard work” and “Asian development reflects the influence of such values,” for example 
through “a much more economically activist role to the so-called developmental state.”286 
Finally, beyond “Asian values,” scholars suggest that history and culture 
distinctly contribute to East Asian geopolitics. Moore argues that “unresolved old 
security issues,” such as territorial or Cold War disputes, “daunting new security issues,” 
such as “rising China” and resource conflicts, growing “nationalism,” unsettled enmity 
with Japan, a “cultural proclivity for ‘face politics,’” and a “trust/social capital deficit” 
are “obstacles to greater Northeast Asian regional cooperation.”287 Overall, the literature 
implies that cultural or historical factors do, at the very least, influence the actions or 
perceptions of Asian nations. 
There is also extensive literature on East Asian economic and political similarities. 
This research is embodied in the concept of an East Asian development model, often 
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called the “Developmental State” (DS).288 Initial descriptions of such a model focused on 
parallels among Japan, Taiwan, and Korea; Kuznets portrays this model as involving 
“high investment ratios, small public sectors, export orientation, labor-market 
competition, and government intervention in economic matters.”289 More recent theorists 
expand on this definition; Stubbs proposes “four conditions…crucial to the formation of a 
DS in East Asia,” including “a weak society…unable to [resist]” a “strong state,” “ideas 
circulating within the society or region [promoting]…the DS,” and a DS-supporting 
“security” and “economic environment.”290  
China is often included in more recent analyses of East Asian models, albeit with 
some debate. As Stubbs explains, “China appears to have some relevance for discussions 
of…the DS” since “state authority structures in China appear to mirror the many types of 
DS…in the rest of East Asia.”291 Kim likewise asserts, “it seems to be now ‘generally 
accepted’ that the success of the East Asian tigers,” including “China as a tiger still 
waking up,” “was largely a result of the crucial role played by the state.”292 Similarly, 
Kwon and Kang propose an “East Asian model,” including China, based on three 
elements, “policy-augmented human capital,” “political stability,” and a claim that 
“democracy is not necessarily a precondition of economic growth.”293 In contrast, 
however, Hayashi depicts “serious obstacles to…the [DS] in China,” specifically 
“economic decentralization” and “the lack of coordination in policymaking…between 
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central government and local government.”294 Parfitt and Wysocki support this view, 
arguing, “the Chinese state and the [DSs] of Asia have quite different origins and 
different approaches to governance.”295 
Regardless of whether China is considered a DS, most East Asian development 
scholars emphasize the state’s primacy in promoting economic growth. According to 
Parfitt and Wysocki, “neither [China nor East Asian DSs] conceive the economy as a 
field of conflict between individual entrepreneurs, regarding it as an area where state 
guidance is necessary.”296 Likewise, as described by Breslin while discussing Chinese 
development, “a strong state controlling economic activity…sounds somewhat familiar–
not least to students of development in other parts of Asia.”297 Numerous additional 
scholars have echoed this view of East Asia’s propensity for state-led economic growth, 
including Kennedy, Hayashi, Kim, Stubbs, and Wong.298,299,300,301,302  
 Scholars also tend to agree that East Asian states share similar resource security 
policies. As Lee explains, “energy relations in Northeast Asia [have] been essentially 
competitive, reflecting the region’s economic and geopolitical constraints;”303 he cites 
Cold War-based “political and security environments,” uncertain “political trust,” 
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“historical antipathy” as well as “unilateral pursuit of energy supply and development.”304 
Dent also describes this unilateralism, asserting, “energy diplomacy objectives of East 
Asian states are still predominantly subordinated to national interests rather than those of 
the regional or other multilateral collective.”305  
Lastly, scholars often describe East Asian resource security goals as “mercantilist” 
or striving for “self-sufficiency.” As Dent explains, “due to the region’s developmental 
statist and socialist market traditions,” East Asian states tend to use “mercantilist 
approaches to energy diplomacy” such that they “seek to extend control…over foreign 
sources of energy.”306 Likewise, Wilson argues that the region “[shares] a strong 
mercantilist preference to import resources from nationally-controlled suppliers,” using 
“interventionist financial assistance policies to ensure their firms” can “compete with 
third parties;”307 East Asian nations will even “compromise broader reputational concerns 
in their quest for resource security.”308 He asserts that East Asia promotes “mercantilist 
self-reliance,” doubting “the liberal belief that international markets provide the best 
guarantee of resource security.”309 Barclay and Smith reiterate these points, depicting 
East Asia as trying “to maintain food self-sufficiency” and “[developing] infrastructure 
for resource extraction/production and transport in resource-extracting countries” for 
“purported [altruistic]” purposes.310,311  
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Shortcomings and Contributions 
 Most studies on LSLAs focus on “host” nations; scholars analyze the content and 
scope of LSLA deals, the benefits and costs to local populations, and LSLAs’ links to 
colonialism. However, the literature offers only a limited overview of investor nations’ 
motivations for seeking food security LSLAs. While the first chapter discovered common 
food security conditions driving LSLAs in China and Korea, the general nature of these 
drivers is called into question by the abundance of scholarship describing cultural, 
political, historical, and economic traits specific to East Asia. Thus, to generalize the first 
chapter’s observations and ensure that regional factors are not their cause, this chapter 
examines two additional case study nations outside East Asia that use LSLAs, Saudi 
Arabia and India. 
Theory and Hypothesis 
 This chapter hypothesizes that the results from the first chapter, which found that 
China and South Korea share specific food security concerns and objectives contributing 
to their mutual use of a LSLA food security strategy, are generalizable among countries 
using LSLAs. More specifically, it postulates that states using food security LSLAs share 
common food security concerns and response strategies, regardless of region, culture, 
government, or location. Since the first chapter established common food security factors 
motivating LSLAs in East Asia, this chapter tests if states outside this region that use 
LSLAs share such factors.  
 As the Literature Review describes, East Asia shares many attributes, such as 
value systems, development models, histories, and resource security policies promoting 
self-sufficiency and mercantilism. These traits appear supportive of food security LSLAs; 
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hence, the similarities found between China and Korea motivating LSLAs could be due 
to regional factors, instead of indicating a general trend. Thus, to test this chapter’s 
hypothesis, this analysis examines the food security concerns, objectives, and strategies 
of two states as case studies that are dissimilar, outside East Asia, and employ LSLAs, 
Saudi Arabia and India. 
 The first chapter found common food security traits between two nominally 
different states that both use LSLAs, China and Korea. Regarding food security concerns, 
it found that both nations face drastically increasing and changing demand for food based 
on population growth, urbanization, rising incomes, and biofuel investment, as well as 
limits to agricultural production and supply based on low and decreasing arable land per 
person, plateauing crop yields, and a dwindling agricultural labor force. In terms of food 
security objectives, both rely on imports but are “wary” of this reliance, preferring self-
sufficiency; during the Global Food Crisis of 2007-08, both countries’ experiences 
highlighted vulnerabilities to food imports, exacerbated by projected future disparities 
between world food demand and supply, the oligopolistic world grain market structure, 
and food-producing nations’ export restrictions. Lastly, both employ LSLA food security 
strategies to secure food resources in foreign nations in a comparable manner, by 
financially incenting private companies to invest in agriculture abroad; they also publicly 
minimize the government’s role, classifying LSLAs as “development aid” and as helpful 
to host nations. This chapter examines whether Saudi Arabia and India share these traits.  
Methodology 
As previously described, this chapter seeks to determine if the first chapter’s 
findings are generalizable outside East Asia, among states using a LSLA food security 
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strategy. To do so, it investigates the food security conditions and strategies of Saudi 
Arabia and India to establish whether they are similar to those of the countries analyzed 
in the first chapter, China and South Korea; it also compares these countries’ LSLA 
implementation methods to confirm whether similar food security conditions, in general, 
result in similar LSLA strategies. Hence, this chapter first analyzes the food security 
concerns, objectives, strategies, and LSLAs of Saudi Arabia and India individually. It 
then compares these characteristics with those found in the first chapter to examine 
overlap, thus determining the extent to which these attributes are generalizable outside 
East Asia. If the results demonstrate significant parallels in these attributes among all four 
countries, then the drivers found to lead to similar LSLA strategies in the first chapter can 
be considered generalizable outside East Asia. If parallels cannot be found, then it is 
likely that the first chapter’s results are not general; thus, “East Asian” factors 
presumably explain these results. All key findings are as of May 2014. 
 Saudi Arabia and India have been selected for analysis because these nations are 
outside the East Asian region, are dissimilar from each other as well as China and Korea, 
and use LSLAs as a food security strategy. According to the CIA World Factbook, Saudi 
Arabia is a “Monarchy” located in the “Middle East,” with a population of 27,345,986, 
and a land area of 2,149,690 square kilometers.312 The Kingdom borders seven states, 
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and Yemen.313 Economically, it has a GDP 
of $927.8 billion, a GDP growth rate of 3.6%, and a GDP per capita of $31,300, the 44th 
highest worldwide.314 India is a “Federal Republic,” regionally in “South Asia,” with a 
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population of 1,236,344,631 and land area of 3,287,263 square kilometers.315 It borders 
six states, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, China, Nepal, and Pakistan.316 The country has a 
GDP of $4.962 trillion, a GDP growth rate of 3.8%, and a GDP per capita of $4,000, the 
168th highest.317 
 Saudi Arabia and India have also been selected as a representative sample of 
nations pursuing LSLAs as part of an overall food security strategy. As Appendix 5 
shows, China, Korea, Saudi Arabia, and India are all among the top 15 states using 
LSLAs, making them key actors in the LSLA trend.318 Moreover, only food security 
LSLAs are within this study’s scope, not other types used by some “top 15” nations such 
as those based on “renewable fuel” or “investment opportunities” for firms and 
governments.319 Thus, each selected nation has been chosen based on its active use of 
LSLAs as a national food security strategy.  
Based on these criteria, many nations have been excluded from analysis. 
European states must be excluded, since they “[lack] policies directly concerned with 
foreign land acquisition for agriculture.”320 Likewise, U.S. LSLAs are driven by “mainly 
private equity and hedge funds…financing agribusiness companies,” making them 
irrelevant for examining national food security LSLAs;321 this is also true for Canadian 
LSLAs, initiated primarily by “companies, universities, pension funds, banks and 
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insurance companies.”322 Similarly, South Africa does not appear to use food security 
LSLAs, as its investments usually involve “commercial farmers…negotiating access to 
farmland beyond national boundaries” to counter “growing barriers to accessing farmland 
at home.”323 Finally, other “top 15” countries such as Malaysia, Viet Nam, and Thailand, 
are unrepresentative, as their land deals are mainly for not food-specific crops.324,325,326 
 Among “top 18” LSLA nations, those using food security LSLAs are China, 
Singapore, India, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Japan.327,328,329,330 Outside the 
top 18, numerous other nations have pursued food security LSLAs, such as Qatar, 
Bangladesh, Kuwait, and Oman.331,332,333,334 Saudi Arabia and India, along with China 
and Korea, are illustrative of this group; they are major investors in LSLAs, exemplify 
the range of official “institutionalization” of LSLA food security strategies, and are 
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located in diverse regions.335 Thus, these four nations are valuable case studies to 
represent this group of states. 
 As noted in the previous chapter, one difficulty inherent in this study is data 
availability. This chapter examines the conditions and policies of multiple nations and, 
thus, the availability of information in each nation may not be uniform, especially if 
English-language sources vary. As in the first chapter, this chapter attempts to correct for 
any data limits; however, the specific sources used for each nation differ to some extent.  
 Finally, to clarify and reiterate definitions, food security concerns involve any 
major factors limiting national access to food. These can include demand factors, such as 
population or diet trends, or supply factors, including import conditions or endowments 
of land and water. Food security objectives involve national food security goals, indicated 
by policies or statements targeting production self-sufficiency, overseas investment, or 
food price stability. Food security strategies include any state-led response to food 
security concerns, such as imports, food reserve programs, trade agreements, or LSLAs. 
Lastly, LSLAs include any land deals conducted as part of a national effort to produce 
agricultural products abroad to enhance state food security and secure food resources, 
regardless of whether governments or companies are the “primary” investors. 
Results 
 The first chapter’s results suggest that the similar food security conditions in 
China and Korea are key factors leading to the pursuit of LSLAs. However, to determine 
if these findings are generalizable beyond East Asia, this section examines the food 
security concerns, objectives, and strategies of two additional nations, Saudi Arabia and 
India; both use LSLAs, differ from each other as well as China and Korea, and are 
                                                
335 Woertz, "The Governance of Gulf Agro-Investments," 88. 
 73 
outside East Asia. This section describes food security traits motivating the choice of 
LSLA strategies by both Saudi Arabia and India, and illustrates how LSLAs fit within 
overarching national food security objectives.  
Saudi Arabia – Food Security Concerns 
 As a desert nation, Saudi Arabia faces immense challenges in securing and 
producing adequate food supplies. As with the previously analyzed nations, these 
challenges contribute to Saudi Arabia’s selection of a LSLA food security strategy and 
can be divided into two categories, demand and supply-based concerns.  
 Regarding demand-based concerns, one key issue for Saudi Arabia is population 
growth. Saudi Arabia’s population “has grown from 5 million in 1970 to 26 million in 
2010” and is currently “[growing] at a rate of 2.6% per annum.”336 Although this total 
population level is low compared to many countries, its growth rate is relatively high; for 
comparison, according to World Bank data, the Saudi population growth rate outstrips 
both China and Korea’s rate of 0.5% (even if this data notes only a “1.9%” Saudi growth 
rate).337 The Saudi population is expected to reach 40.388 million people by 2050 and 
peak at 41.253 million by 2061.338 These trends “will drive future growth in [food] 
demand” and require securing food resources to support an additional 15 million people 
over the next 40-50 years.339  
 Demographics also affect Saudi food demand. The nation “urbanized over a very 
short timescale” and currently, “more than 80% of the population lives in urban areas,” 
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increasing “at…2% per annum;” this trend is critical because “the urban population is 
dependent upon the agri-food supply chain for all of its food requirements.”340 Further, 
the median age is 26.4 and 46.9% of Saudis are under 25 (and 70 percent are younger 
than 30), which affects food needs because “young Saudis are quick to adopt new dietary 
trends,” and “the young population continues to grow at a rate that outpaces [food] 
production.”341,342,343  
Additionally, Saudi GDP per capita is rising, from $10,854 in 2004 to $25,136 in 
2012; since “middle and high income families” in Saudi Arabia tend to “substitute rice 
with other higher value food items such as meat, vegetables and fruits,” demand for such 
foods, as well as livestock feed, is expected to grow as incomes increase.344,345 Further, 
due to a rising population and “higher disposable income,” an “increased number of retail 
outlets” have led to “growth in the Saudi retail food sectors.”346 Lastly, expansions in 
“workforce participation” and youth population are anticipated to raise “processed and 
fast food industry” demand.347 These trends will cause major diet shifts, requiring more 
food and livestock feed production.  
Saudi Arabia also faces severe food supply constraints. Despite having a low 
population relative to other nations, “only about 2 percent of the country’s enormous land 
                                                
340 Farrelly & Mitchell, Agri-Food Policy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 3. 
341 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook - Saudi Arabia.  
342 United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service, Saudi Arabia Exporter Guide 
Annual, GAIN Report, Washington, D.C.: USDA FAS, 2013, 11. 
343 Thomas W. Lippman, "Saudi Arabia's Quest for ‘Food Security’," Middle Easy Policy 17, no. 1 (Spring 
2010): 90. 
344 The World Bank, World Bank DataBank - World Development Indicators, March 17, 2014, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/chart.aspx. 
345 United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service, Saudi Arabia Grain and Feed 
Annual, GAIN Report, Washington, D.C.: USDA FAS, 2014, 15. 
346 United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service, Saudi Arabia Exporter Guide 
Annual, 2. 
347 Alpen Capital, GCC Food Industry, Industry Report, Doha: Alpen Capital Investment Banking, 2013, 
60. 
 75 
mass is arable, even with extensive irrigation and farming technology.”348 Consequently, 
Saudi Arabia has only 0.11 hectares of arable land per capita, which, while higher than 
China and Korea, is much less than the world average of 0.2 hectares per person.349 
Moreover, according to the World Bank, the country’s arable land has been decreasing, 
from 3.5 million ha in 2004 to 3.11 in 2011.350  
Agricultural input limits also restrict production. Saudi land requires “major 
irrigation” to sustain agriculture; for example, Saudi wheat and barley crops are “100 
percent irrigated.”351,352 Further, since the country has “no permanent rivers or lakes and 
very little rainfall,” it relies on “aquifers…vast underground sources of water;”353 as of 
2008, “81% of [Saudi] water came from fossil aquifers,” which “[are] not renewable” via 
“rainfall or other sources,” unlike “shallow, alluvial/fluvial aquifers,” which can undergo 
“recharge events.”354,355 This reliance on “deep fossil aquifers” limits food production 
because Saudi “water is like the country’s oil – when it is used up, it is gone.”356,357 
Hence, irrigation diminishes freshwater supplies, which must be supplemented by 
“desalinization,” “dams…to capture surface water after frequent flash floods,” and 
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“shallow aquifers” that can only be used “when there has been sufficient recharge to 
allow water use without fully depleting the resource or [changing] water quality.”358,359 
The government’s resultant “strong concern over the depletion of…non-renewable water 
reserves” has led to efforts to reduce wheat, barley, and “cattle feed” production.360,361 
Thus, “scarcity of water and fertile soil” creates “major [cultivation] constraints” at the 
same time that the country is facing food demand growth.362  
Saudi Arabia – Food Security Responses: Imports and Self-Sufficiency 
Due to limited food security resources and rising food demand, Saudi Arabia 
relies on imports for “most of its food products (around 60% from over 150 
countries).”363 Some estimates claim that Saudi reliance on imports is even greater; 
according to the USDA, “Saudi Arabia depends on imports to meet about 80 percent of 
its food needs” and, based on FAO data, the country has an “import dependency ratio” of 
82.9 for cereals, 92.84 for “pulses,” and 107.56 for vegetable oils (suggesting the nation 
exports more than it produces, supplemented by imports) (see Appendix 6).364,365 This 
reliance is exacerbated by the fact that many “food industries” in Saudi Arabia “cannot 
function without…imported raw materials.”366 The nation is “the largest importer of 
agricultural products” in the GCC and its imports are expected to increase; the country’s 
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food product imports were $21.7 billion in 2012, and are “expected to exceed $35 billion 
annually by 2020.”367 Saudi 2011 barley imports “[accounted] for more than 40% of the 
annual barley trade,” its rice imports are “more than three times the level of China’s,” and 
its poultry imports are “only one-fifth less than the total poultry imports into the EU.”368 
Despite Saudi reliance on imports, the nation has historically been averse to 
import dependency for food. Starting in “the early 1990s” the country established a 
“longstanding strategy of achieving wheat self-sufficiency,” and ultimately attained “self-
sufficiency in wheat and poultry,” as well as potatoes, eggs, milk, and dates, and 
“impressive harvests of figs, grapes, and citrus fruits, [and]…olive oil.”369,370,371 These 
efforts were meant largely “to reduce the dependence on oil and to 
encourage…development,” “reduce food import costs,” and to “provide employment,” 
thus “keeping village and farm populations in place.”372,373  
Saudi self-sufficiency efforts are also based on the country’s geopolitical history. 
During both World Wars, the Gulf “region was at the mercy of respective world powers 
for crucial food imports” and during “the 1970s, the US threatened to use the ‘food 
weapon’ in retaliation” to “the Arab oil boycott.”374 Although the U.S. did not execute its 
threat, “the mere threat of a food embargo was enough to worry Gulf policymakers,” 
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including those in Saudi Arabia.375 Thus, Saudi policymakers promote domestic 
production, when possible. 
However, despite this wariness of agricultural import markets, food self-
sufficiency has been considered unsustainable in recent years, largely due to the finite 
nature of Saudi water resources; consequently, Saudi Arabia has been reducing domestic 
agricultural production to “conserve its water,” resulting in rising imports.376 The country 
developed a policy “to phase-out wheat cultivation by 2016” and “[rely] on imports to 
satisfy the Kingdom’s wheat requirements;” it has also worked to end production of other 
highly irrigated crops, thus “[terminating] its barley production subsidy program in 2003” 
after “two decades of commercial barley production.”377 Saudi Arabia has continued to 
invest in domestic agriculture, but “is changing the mix of crops and products it will 
support to emphasize those that consume less fresh water;” for example, “vegetable 
production is shifting from open fields, where water evaporates, to greenhouses.”378 
In light of Saudi import circumstances, the Global Food Crisis of 2007-08 raised 
major food security concerns and “evoked memories of threatened food supplies.”379 
Unlike many countries, Saudi Arabia seemed well-positioned for the crisis given “the 
amount of cash per unit of population at its disposal;” however, despite Saudi “oil wealth,” 
the country faced “export restrictions imposed by food suppliers such as Argentina, 
Russia, India, and Vietnam.”380,381 Thus, although “oil revenues” should have “ensured 
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that imports remained affordable,” export restrictions “have become a very serious 
concern;”382 during the crisis, “food-driven inflation imposed real hardship on the 
millions of Saudis who live below the official poverty line,” which “became a political 
issue, to the extent that there are political issues in the kingdom.”383 These issues will 
likely worsen as global food demand may rise 100-110% by 2050 and “competition for 
commodities is…being stoked by [crop] conversion to biofuel production” worldwide, 
potentially leading to continued price volatility, high import costs, and export 
restrictions.384,385 
In light of Saudi concerns over import markets, the nation has developed 
numerous strategies to ensure access to food resources. After the “[Global Food Crisis], 
Gulf states,” including Saudi Arabia, “have taken a more vocal role in advocating for the 
interest of food importers at the multilateral level;” for example, they “have backed 
proposals by Japan and Switzerland at the WTO to discipline export restrictions” and 
potential “food weaponization.”386 Additionally, the country is striving to “diversify its 
sources for importing wheat and…not rely on a particular supplier” in order to “guard 
against shortages of wheat supply in the world markets” and import “at best prices.”387 
Further, Saudi Arabia has also developed FTAs to limit potential restrictions on imports 
and, for example, is a member of the GCC and Pan-Arab FTA;388 the GCC itself, in turn, 
has entered or initiated FTAs, “with Arab Countries,” the EU, China, Pakistan, India, 
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Turkey, MERCOSUR, EFTA, Japan, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and 
ASEAN.389  
Moreover, in 2010, Saudi Arabia “announced plans to increase its strategic 
reserves of wheat from six months to 12 months of consumption by 2016,” through the 
government-based “Grain Silos and Flour Mills Organization” (GSMFO), responsible for 
“logistics and stocking in wheat.”390 Although this effort has resulted in “Saudi milling 
wheat imports” rising “58 percent” between “2012/13” and “2013/14,” this grain will be 
stored in “several new wheat silos…under construction” that will raise “GSFMO wheat 
storage capacity to about 3.7 million [metric tons] by the end of 2015.”391 Lastly, while 
Saudi Arabia does not disseminate “barley imports and stock” data, the USDA estimates 
its “strategic barley reserves” can support “three months of…consumption.”392 Hence, the 
nation is developing improved strategic food reserves, which may offer relief during food 
supply crises. 
Saudi Arabia – Food Security Responses: Large-Scale Land Acquisitions 
Saudi Arabia faces considerable food security challenges; it has a rising 
population, changing dietary trends, and severe limits to domestic agricultural production, 
coupled with both an increasing dependency on and historical aversion to world import 
markets. It also has developed overall food security strategies that “exemplify mistrust in 
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the reliability of markets” and “[reflect] a strategy of security mercantilism.”393 Against 
this backdrop, Saudi Arabia has implemented, as part of its food security strategy, a 
substantial LSLA program.  
The Saudi LSLA program was initiated “in January 2009” “to facilitate land 
leases and investment opportunities for the Saudi private sector by political support and 
co-financing.”394 Named “the King Abdullah Initiative for Saudi Agricultural Investment 
Abroad” (KAISAIA), the program is designed “to support investment by private sector 
Saudi companies in agricultural projects abroad,” so that agricultural goods “would be 
exported, in whole or in part, to Saudi Arabia.”395 Some of these goods are earmarked “to 
establish…‘a strategic reserve for basic food commodities,’ including rice, wheat, and 
barley.”396 KAISAIA was developed, essentially, as a “long-term attempt to deal with 
future food price volatility,” and will sponsor many “investment arrangements, including 
joint ventures, contract agreements and outgrower schemes.”397 
KAISAIA is “a public-private partnership,” led by “the Saudi Company for 
Agricultural Investment and Animal Production,” and supported by a “capital investment 
of $800 million.”398 Fundamentally, KAISAIA involves the government “[negotiating] 
agreements with host countries setting the terms of investment and specifying the 
conditions under which the host country could cut off exports in emergencies” and 
“[offering] aid to the host countries to build roads and other infrastructure projects 
needed to facilitate farm development,” while “providing financial incentives to 
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encourage Saudi investors” to “invest overseas;” regarding the investment itself, “private 
companies” would “lease the land, hire local workers, provide equipment and fertilizer, 
and move the crops to market.”399,400 According to Dr. Saad Esa, Director of KAISAIA, 
Saudi Arabia “[lends] to private companies on an interest-free basis and [supports] them 
with the required facilities and logistics to invest in agriculture abroad.”401 Overall, the 
Saudi government requires the “maximum government share” to be “60% in the 
financing of projects.”402 
Regarding food security, KAISAIA “target countries must allow at least 50% of 
the crops for export back to Saudi Arabia,” and the Kingdom plans to “sign framework 
agreements” with target states, such as “Bilateral Investment Treaties,” “to protect these 
investments from the negative impact of political instability, civil wars, unrest and 
strikes.”403,404 According to Dr. Esa, “wheat, barley, corn, sorghum, soyabeans, rice, 
sugar, oilseed, green fodder, livestock and fisheries” as well as “dairy products” are the 
“targeted commodities.”405 In addition, the Saudi government does consider, or at least 
describe, KAISAIA as a method to “increase global food production and provide an 
example of responsible international investment in agriculture,” since the leftover “50 per 
cent [of crops will be] available to the country of origin.”406  
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Quantitative estimates of Saudi LSLA scope vary; however, investment content 
appears similar across reports. The Land Matrix estimates that Saudi Arabia has acquired 
1,568,218 ha of agricultural land in 11 locations ranging from the Middle East to Eastern 
Europe, Africa, and South America through 21 overall contracts, each including a 
corporate investor (see Appendix 3).407 These findings are generally supported by Dr. Esa, 
except for land investments in South America, Turkey, and some African countries; 
according to Dr. Esa, the Saudi government has “identified 31 countries for potential 
investment and negotiated the relevant agreements such as double taxation with them” 
and “has already invested in Sudan, Ethiopia, Ukraine and Australia.”408 In contrast, a 
Georgetown University study asserts that, as of 2012, the country had invested in 
1,713,357 ha of land through 16 deals in 14 countries, including “Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Senegal, South Sudan, Russia, Philippines, Argentina, Egypt, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, 
Niger (Suspended by host in 2009), Pakistan, [and] Zambia,” only some of which are 
noted by the Land Matrix and Dr. Esa.409 
India – Food Security Concerns 
India also faces extensive food security and agricultural resource concerns. As 
with Saudi Arabia, this section examines these issues from both a demand and supply 
standpoint.  
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India has the world’s second largest population, at 1,236,686,732 as of 2012, 
surpassed only by China.410 India’s population is growing at 1.3% per year, a massive 
rate for its population size, and is expected to peak at 1,644,750,000 in 2065; in fact, by 
2030, India is expected to exceed China, with 1,476,378,000 people.411,412 This projected 
growth will require India to ensure food supplies for 400 million more people over the 
next 50 years. 
India also faces demographic trends increasing food demand. India’s GDP per 
capita has risen considerably, from $457.30 in 2000 to $1,489.20 in 2012.413 The country 
is also rapidly urbanizing at a rate of 2.4% per year, and India’s urban population has 
risen from “27.7 percent of the total in 2000 to 31.7 percent in 2012;”414 by some 
projections, this level will reach 50.4% by 2040 and 55.9% by 2050.415 Despite India’s 
“preponderance of vegetarianism…[limiting] its demand for meat and feedgrains,” due to 
rising incomes, urbanization, and economic development, India faces a “changing 
national [diet];” specifically, India faces rising demand for “vegetable oils, sugars, 
sweeteners, animal products (including meat and dairy), and fruits” and falling demand 
for “rice and wheat.”416 Urbanization is vital to this shift, since “urban dwellers have 
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higher average incomes and different food consumption patterns than their rural 
counterparts,” “[consuming] fewer staples, such as grains, [and] more food overall.”417 
Finally, biofuel demand raises India’s agriculture production requirements, 
although the effect of this factor is somewhat limited. India is the fifth largest oil 
consumer, using “petroleum products to meet 95% of its transportation energy needs,” 
and has become “increasingly reliant on imports to meet this demand.”418,419 Thus, in 
2001, the country “initiated biofuel production…to reduce its dependence on imported oil 
and thus improve energy security,” which, as codified in a 2009 policy, “envisages 20% 
blending of both biodiesel and bioethanol by 2017.”420 However, given biofuel 
production’s tendency to conflict with food production, India “requires…feedstock [to 
be] grown on marginal lands, unsuitable for [agriculture].”421 According to Guntilake et 
al., “if about 32 million hectares of waste lands can be cultivated as oilseed plantations, 
together with modest productivity improvements,” the “national petroleum diesel 
requirement in 2017 is attainable;” however, “at the current level of productivity, the 
bioethanol target cannot be met without compromising food production.”422 Further, 
rising biofuel demand inherently places “additional pressure on land and other resources, 
such as water;” thus, even if only non-agricultural lands are used for biofuel, they may 
still burden Indian agricultural production.423 
                                                
417 Baldwin and Bonarriva, "Feeding the Dragon and the Elephant,” 5. 
418 U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics, March 17, 2014, 
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=79&pid=79&aid=2.  
419 Herath Gunatilake, David Roland-Holst, and Guntur Sugiyarto, "Energy security for India: Biofuels, 
energy efficiency and food productivity," Energy Policy 65 (2014): 761. 
420 Gunatilake, Roland-Holst, and Sugiyarto, "Energy security for India,” 762. 
421 Gunatilake, Roland-Holst, and Sugiyarto, "Energy security for India,” 762. 
422 Gunatilake, Roland-Holst, and Sugiyarto, "Energy security for India,” 762. 
423 N.H. Ravindranath et al., "Biofuel production and implications for land use, food production and 
environment in India," Energy Policy 39 (2011): 5740. 
 86 
India also faces stark agricultural supply restrictions. Nominally, India has 
abundant arable land, 157,350,000 ha, “second only to the [U.S.].”424,425 However, given 
India’s large population, the country has only 0.1 ha per person, less than Saudi Arabia 
and half the world’s average.426 India’s levels of arable land have also been falling, since 
in 2000 India had 162,717,000 ha total and 0.2 ha per person. Further, Indian land is less 
productive than other nations’, since “only 42 percent of [Indian] arable land” is 
“equipped for irrigation,” India has fewer agricultural workers than other states such as 
China, and India uses less fertilizer.427 Thus, India’s “cereal yield” (kilograms/ha) is 
2,953.6, which is lower than Saudi Arabia (5,166.2 kg/ha), China (5,837.5 kg/ha), and 
South Korea (7,114.3 kg/ha).428 
India’s supply limits are exacerbated by land and demographic-based conditions. 
According to the USDA, in India “unscientific irrigation practices and over-exploitation 
of ground water are increasingly causing water table depletion and soil salinity,” 
temperature rises of “one-degree Celsius…can result in a 3-to-7 percent decrease in grain 
yield,” and about “three-fourths” of “Indian wheat [faces] the threat of the dreaded wheat 
rust Ug99.”429 Further, “current [Indian] rice production techniques…have serious 
environmental implications and cannot sustain projected food demand,” rice is often 
“produced in coastal regions…susceptible to a rise in sea level,” and “monsoon rains” 
can “decide the planting and productivity of coarse grain crops” as well as “pulses.”430 
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Moreover, falling crop “productivity growth has been particularly acute in India” since 
“expenditures on input support programs and migrant farm labor payments have crowded 
out public funding for agricultural research, extension services, irrigation, and other rural 
infrastructure projects that would support agricultural sustainability.”431 Lastly, the farm 
“workforce has been declining” and “between 2004-05 and 2009-10, 23 million workers 
left agriculture;” hence, India may have reduced agricultural labor to produce food 
products.432 
India – Food Security Responses: Imports and Self-Sufficiency 
Despite rising demand and limits to domestic supply, India maintains a 
longstanding wariness to and avoidance of import markets. In agricultural policy, “India 
has pursued a policy of food self-sufficiency,” especially in “its major food staples: rice 
and wheat,” “since it gained independence in 1947.”433 Much of this drive for self-
sufficiency is based on historical food insecurity; from 1875 to 1919, “one of the worst 
strings of famines in recorded history” occurred in India, “with an estimated death toll of 
between 15 and 30 million people.”434 Subsequently, India suffered the “Bengal Famine 
of 1943-4,” which “killed over two million people out of a population of around 60 
million.”435 This history led to “a policy of food control, including over food prices and 
distribution of foodgrain, more particularly to the vulnerable sections of the community;” 
after gaining independence, “large numbers of programs were started with the objectives 
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to win freedom from foreign bread and [achieve] self-sufficiency.”436 Thus, “the goal of 
maintaining self-sufficiency in important food grains is a national political issue;” even 
today, the country’s “agricultural policies seek to: a) attain a higher level of food self-
sufficiency; b) ensure remunerative prices to farmers; and c) maintain affordable prices to 
consumers.”437,438 
India has been relatively successful in staple grain self-sufficiency, attaining a 0.5 
“cereal import dependency ratio” (see Appendix 6).439 In rice and wheat, this “goal has 
been achieved,” “by developing and adopting high-yielding varieties, expanding 
irrigation, and increasing fertilizer use-all aided by supportive output price and input 
subsidy policies.”440 To encourage “domestic production,” India also employs “subsidies 
on the purchase and use of fertilizer, seeds, fuel, irrigation water,” “minimum support 
prices,” and “high import tariffs on foreign agri-food products.”441 Thus, India imports 
little wheat (2,940 tonnes in 2013), rice (700 tonnes in 2013), milk & cream (5,340 
tonnes in 2013), and vegetable or animal fats (1,160 tonnes in 2013).442 Further, 
according to the USDA, “India currently does not import corn or other coarse grains” 
(including “millet, sorghum, or barley”), rice has not imported since 2008, and “imports 
of wheat…have been precluded due to subsidized sales of wheat” (these facts somewhat 
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conflict with official Indian statistics).443 Overall, “India’s domestic agricultural 
production currently supplies nearly 97% of its food demand.”444 
However, while India has remained self-sufficient in certain agricultural products, 
especially staples, the country’s shifting demographics, changing demand, and required 
trade liberalization under the World Trade Organization (WTO), have caused India to 
rely on imports for many goods. Currently, “India’s major agri-food imports include 
vegetable oil, pulses, fruits and nuts;”445 according to Indian national statistics, in 2013 
India imported 11,012,730 tonnes of vegetable oils, 3,837,560 tonnes of pulses, 892,160 
tonnes of cashew nuts (fruit was tracked by value, not weight).446 Moreover, the nation is 
now the “world's leading buyer of edible oils,” and is the “world’s largest producer, 
consumer and importer of pulses.”447,448 Hence, as of 2010, India had “import dependency 
ratios” of 14.3 for “pulses” and 46.85 for “vegetable oils,” which is incongruous with its 
drive for self-sufficiency.449 
Demographics largely drive these imports, “since as countries develop 
economically and urbanize, traditional diets heavy in staples (such as grains and tubers) 
gradually shift to more meats, vegetable oils, dairy, aquatic products, fruits, vegetables, 
and processed foods.”450 Thus, wheat, pulse, vegetable oil, and non-beef meat demand is 
expected to grow, and, according to “food and agriculture minister, Sharad Pawar,” India 
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will “remain import dependent [in] pulses and edible oils” until 2020.451,452 However, 
India is promoting domestic production, for example, “[boosting pulse] output through 
diversion of land to pulse cultivation,” using “sharply higher” minimum price supports, 
and raising the “refined edible oil” import duty to 10 percent.453,454 
India has also been required to partially open its economy as a WTO member, 
raising its import reliance. After joining the WTO in 1995, “India had to revamp its 
policy of import substitution to an open economy with export-oriented growth in 
agriculture.”455,456 This change especially affected edible oils, for which “import 
dependency” grew “from 15.2 per cent of the total edible oil consumption in 1995-96 to 
52.6 per cent in 2009-10.”457 Moreover, imports of “pulses, spices, cotton, [and] wood 
products” have also risen considerably.458 
Despite reliance on imports for certain goods and required economic integration, 
India’s agricultural policies continue to emphasize consumer protection and “domestic 
price stability at relatively low price levels.”459 Hence, India employs many strategies to 
ensure self-sufficiency and price stability; although the country “has replaced quantitative 
restrictions on imports of all agri-food products with import tariffs” due to WTO rules, 
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“average tariff protection for agricultural products in 2010 was 33.2%.”460 In response to 
food price shocks, India frequently “[adjusts] tariffs substantially to balance competing 
producer and consumer interests while complying with its WTO commitments.”461 India 
also uses “border measures such as tariffs, quotas, and non-tariff measures” as well as 
“domestic subsidies to inputs, outputs, transportation, storage, and consumption,” thus 
“[protecting] domestic producers from import competition, [managing] domestic price 
levels, and [guaranteeing] domestic supply.”462 India also responds to “estimated 
[shortfalls] in domestic production” with “export controls” to prevent rising prices.463  
Beyond trade barriers, India employs numerous strategies for ensuring food 
security. India has a longstanding “grain reserve” system, which “purchases grain from 
farmers at a Minimum Support Price” and transports it “from the states with excess 
production to states” with “deficits.”464 It has also signed or is presently negotiating 34 
free trade agreements, which can protect against trade restrictions in the event of a food 
crisis.465 Therefore, India uses a combination of economic integration and protectionism 
to ensure food security. 
Due to India’s self-sufficiency and price-stability goals, the Global Food Crisis 
provoked considerable food security worries and relatively extreme responses. Thus, 
when food prices “[peaked] in May-June of 2008,” food exports, “most notably of 
common rice and wheat, were halted while imports of several food items were 
liberalized;” for example “tariffs on edible oils” were reduced “from almost 80 percent in 
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2006/7 to zero in 2007/8.”466 These efforts “to ensure abundant food supplies” and curb 
“food inflation” were, at first, effective; India suffered “less than ten percent” food 
inflation “in 2008/09, while in most of the developing countries of the region, food prices 
[rose] more than 20 percent.”467 However, “due to one of the severest droughts since 
1972/73” in India, “food prices surged in 2009/10;”468 hence, from 2008 to 2014, annual 
“average food inflation rose sharply to 10.3 [percent],” which has continued despite post-
crisis “moderation in global food prices.”469 Further, as “protein, fruits and vegetables” 
demand grew over this period, India’s “supply response has not been adequate,” 
exacerbating food inflation.470 
India – Food Security Responses: Large-Scale Land Acquisitions 
Due to India’s rising food demand and food inflation, the risks of food crises, and 
a drive for self-sufficiency and price stability, the nation has enacted a LSLA food 
security strategy. While its LSLA efforts are similar to those of other states, for example 
encouraging private investment in overseas agriculture, India is more cautious in these 
efforts, which are not codified in official government policy. Nevertheless, Indian LSLAs 
are supported by government entities and state officials have endorsed official LSLA 
policy actions.  
India’s LSLA efforts became a serious government initiative following the Global 
Food Crisis, “as a long-term answer to keep prices of farm products under control.”471 
After the “food price hikes of 2008, the Indian government established a Working Group 
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on agricultural production,” which recommended that “Indian companies…be 
encouraged to buy lands in foreign countries for producing pulses and oilseeds under 
long term supply contracts to Indian canalising agencies.”472,473 Further, India’s “Ministry 
of External Affairs suggested that the purchase or lease of overseas land for cultivation 
by firms should be supported with new policy incentives, lifting restrictions on outward 
foreign direct investment.”474 The government’s initial LSLA strategy involved a “grand 
plan” for “acquisition of large tracts of land in neighbouring countries like Myanmar and 
far off places like Paraguay,” Canada, Australia, and Africa.475  
Eventually, however, India’s explicit strategy grew ambiguous. In 2012, reports 
appeared suggesting “the government has decided to throw its might behind private 
purchases of farm land overseas to ensure food security for India;” they claimed, “the 
agriculture ministry…sought views from other ministries on an institutional mechanism 
to extend sovereign support to [Indian companies’] acquisition of farmland abroad that 
could include guaranteed [crop] buyback.”476 However, “agriculture secretary PK Basu” 
contradicted these reports, asserting, “the proposal is in a nascent stage,” “there is a 
debate going on whether the government should get into it or not,” and the government 
had only “asked the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade to conduct a study.”477 
Additionally, on the same day as this report, “Agriculture Minister Sharad Pawar” 
stated, “the Indian government has no plans to buy farmland abroad or help private 
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companies do so.”478 However, Pawar’s aversion contradicts a previous statement in 
which he “made it clear that while the government would not invest in buying land 
abroad, his ministry would act as a facilitator ‘if the private players show interest in 
this.’”479 Moreover, even government research organizations such as the “Indian Institute 
of Pulses Research” (IIPR) exhibited support for the “innovative idea” “of leasing land 
abroad for growing pulses and [bringing] the produce back to India;” the IIPR report 
supporting this initiative was praised by Minister Pawar as “a pragmatic assessment of 
the agricultural production and food demand scenario by the year 2050.”480  
Despite India’s ambiguous public claims, as recently as 2014, according to the 
USDA, the Indian government is “encouraging Indian companies to explore opportunities 
to produce [crops such as] pulses overseas.”481 While India has no formal LSLA policy, 
the Land Matrix documents 36 Indian agricultural land deals abroad covering 927,266 ha, 
excluding four of “unknown size” (see Appendix 4).482 Although Indian companies 
execute the deals, the state “plays a prominent role…implementing reforms that facilitate 
direct foreign investments and providing trade diplomacy assistance and credit lines 
through the Exim Bank.”483  
The Indian Export Import Bank (Exim), with trade diplomacy support from the 
Indian government, provides substantial assistance to companies investing in agriculture 
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abroad and is a key facilitator of India’s LSLA strategy. The Exim Bank provides two 
services contributing to LSLAs, “overseas investment finance” and “lines of credit.”484 
Regarding the former, the bank offers “finance for Indian [companies’] equity 
participation in the overseas Joint Venture (JV)/ Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS).”485 
The agriculture industry is clearly supported by this service; the example on the bank’s 
website is “‘Advanta Semillas,’ a company producing hybrid seeds of sunflower, corn, 
sorghum, etc.,” with facilities in Argentina, Australia, and Thailand, which was acquired 
by Mumbai-based “United Phosphorous, with support from the Exim Bank.”486 
The Exim Bank also provides lines of credit (LoCs) to “foreign governments,” 
“national or regional development banks,” “overseas financial institutions,” “commercial 
banks abroad,” and “other suitable overseas entities.”487 These LoCs “enable buyers in 
[foreign] countries to import developmental and infrastructure projects, equipment, goods 
and services (such as farming) from India,” facilitating Indian private investment.488 
Moreover, “as a rule, goods and services for minimum 75% value of the contracts 
covered under these [LoCs] must be sourced from India,” so, therefore, “Indian foreign 
investors stand ready to win concessions and contracts for agricultural development in the 
form of foreign direct investment.”489,490 As of January 2014, the Exim Bank had initiated 
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over 20 LoCs to develop agricultural industries in a range of nations, mostly in Africa.491 
LoCs also often overlap with Indian LSLAs; states with both Indian LSLAs and LoCs 
include Tanzania, Cambodia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, 
and Ghana, and to an extent Kenya, Brazil, Zambia (these three LoCs are not specifically 
for agriculture, but may nevertheless support agricultural investment).492,493 In fact, the 
only Indian LSLA host nations that do not concurrently have LoCs are Uganda, Indonesia, 
and Malaysia.494,495 
One key example of the Exim Bank and Indian trade diplomacy facilitating 
LSLAs is India’s investment in Ethiopia. Ethiopia received “[$65 million] for rural 
electrification” in 2006, $640 million “in 2007 to [revitalize the] state-run sugar industry,” 
and “at least four tranches of funding, ranging from [$90 million] to [$200 million]” from 
2007 to 2011.496 Ethiopia “exports agricultural…products, such as tanned sheepskins, 
dried legumes, oil seeds, and ginger to India,” many of which are products contributing to 
India’s import dependency.497 Further, “Ethiopia has agreed that 85% of the Indian 
financing for sugar production” “should be used to hire Indian companies;” India also 
faces rising sugar demand and import reliance.498 Moreover, 14 Indian LSLAs are in 
Ethiopia, comprising 285,912 ha, many for crops vital to India such as cereals, oil seeds, 
rice, pulses, and sugar.499 Indian trade diplomacy protects these deals, such as through “a 
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bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement” and a “Duty Free Tariff 
Preference Scheme for Less Developed Countries,” which Ethiopia “was among the first” 
to join.500  
Lastly, India promotes “outward FDI” for Indian companies, which facilitates 
land acquisition and overseas agriculture investment.501 Initially, “rules for outward FDI 
began to be liberalized in the 2000s,” and in 2003 the Indian government enacted 
“liberalisation measures” allowing “Indian corporates” and “registered [partnerships]…to 
undertake agricultural activities” overseas.502 Additionally, in May 2011, India “further 
increased the limit within which Indian companies are allowed to invest abroad;”503 the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) allowed “Indian companies” to make “financial 
commitments in overseas ventures up to 400 per cent of their net worth.”504 Although the 
RBI curtailed this expansion to 100 percent in August 2013, it relaxed this limit to 400 
percent again in September 2013.505 This promotion of overseas investment has “been 
crucial [for] Indian agricultural companies investing in foreign agricultural land.”506  
Although India has no explicit LSLA policy, it clearly strives to secure 
agricultural resources abroad, specifically by encouraging investment by private firms. 
Further, India has strongly considered codifying these efforts in official policy and, even 
if it has not yet done so, state officials and research organizations have promoted such a 
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policy. Thus, despite official policy, India has, in practice, developed an implicit LSLA 
strategy, which operates similar to other nations’ and secures access to the agricultural 
resources India demands. 
Discussion 
 In the first chapter, numerous similarities were found between China and Korea’s 
food security concerns, objectives, and strategies, which appear to contribute to their 
mutual use of LSLAs. However, given the nations’ location, their parallels may have 
been due to regional factors instead of general trends. Nevertheless, by analyzing these 
same food security conditions in Saudi Arabia and India, it appears that these states share 
considerable similarities with China and Korea; thus, based on the second chapter’s 
hypothesis, the first chapter’s findings are likely generalizable. This section compares 
similarities in the food security traits found in the first chapter with those of Saudi Arabia 
and India. 
Food Security Concerns 
 As the first chapter describes, China and Korea must contend with rising and 
shifting food demand due to urbanization, population growth and change, and increasing 
incomes. This chapter found that these are also key trends in Saudi Arabia and India; both 
face growing populations, rising incomes, and rapid urbanization, which increase long-
term food demand and shift diets away from traditional staple foods. Further, although 
Saudi Arabia is an exception due to its oil resources, India, China, and South Korea all 
invest in biofuels, raising demand for “feedstock” such as corn for ethanol or edible oils 
for biodiesel; while India aims to produce such crops on non-farm lands, such production 
may nonetheless strain agricultural resources and raise feedstock demand. Thus, these 
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states face strikingly similar food demand concerns, requiring future access to greater and 
more varied food resources. 
Additionally, all four countries face substantial agricultural supply constraints. 
Each has a steadily decreasing level of arable land per person, already well below the 
world’s average.507,508 Further, these countries all contend with agricultural sustainability 
difficulties due to environmental challenges, demographic trends, and, as the Literature 
Review describes, plateauing crop yields.509,510 Lastly, a decreasing agricultural labor 
force exacerbates food security concerns in India, China, and South Korea, although this 
is less of a challenge for Saudi Arabia. While specific supply constraints are somewhat 
different for each nation, notably Saudi Arabia’s non-renewable water limits and India’s 
risk of monsoons and temperature change, all face stark agricultural production limits, 
especially in terms of meeting rising domestic demand. 
Food Security Responses 
 Due to these food security concerns, Saudi Arabia and India have implemented 
responses that closely mirror those of China and Korea. Most notably, all four countries 
share an aversion to world agricultural import markets, based on national experiences, 
histories, past colonialism, or desire for independence. Therefore, as with China and 
Korea, many of Saudi Arabia and India’s food security goals and strategies seem driven 
by a desire to satisfy rising demand for agricultural products while avoiding import 
markets, when practicable.  
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 Despite this aversion, all four nations do depend on imports for specific 
agricultural products; while each country relies on imports to varying “absolute” degrees 
and for different products (for examples, see appendix 6), each faces some level of 
dependency, intensified by projected future demand and changing demographics. 
However, in large part due to the Global Food Crisis, these nations have exhibited 
significant vulnerabilities to import markets; Saudi Arabia realized that its oil wealth is 
not sufficient to secure food supplies and India faced high and unrelenting food price 
inflation. These vulnerabilities have been exacerbated by fears of “food weaponization,” 
prompting each country to limit or advocate against export restrictions (at least 
concerning other countries employing them).511 Therefore, all four states appear to have 
been significantly influenced by the Global Food Crisis, particularly in terms of 
prompting national worries about import dependence and longer-term food insecurity. 
 In reacting to these worries, all four countries have implemented comparable 
response strategies. Specifically, they attempt to promote self-sufficiency and lessen 
reliance on imports, or at least mitigate the dangers of this dependency. For example, 
each has engaged in FTAs, developed strategic grain reserves, or attempted self-
sufficiency in production of certain agricultural goods such as staple grains; although 
total self-sufficiency became unsustainable in the case of Saudi Arabia, its current 
reliance on imports seems due to necessity, not a desire for economic liberalism. 
Additionally, for the most part, each country has subsidized grain production, raised 
farmers’ incomes, and used trade protectionism or other “mercantilist” measures to 
ensure domestic supplies.512 Finally, despite aversion to imports, all four countries have 
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engaged in international cooperation, through WTO or FTA agreements, to secure access 
to commodities difficult to procure domestically.  
Large-Scale Land Acquisitions 
 In light of the similar food security concerns, objectives, and strategies shared by 
Saudi Arabia, China, India, and Korea, it is not surprising that they employ markedly 
similar LSLA food security strategies. All four use this strategy to secure food resources 
abroad, while distancing the state’s role in the process by conducting LSLAs through 
private firms. While the Saudi policy is more institutionalized than India’s, and China 
and Korea fall in between, each state gives private enterprise the lead, encouraging 
investment financially or through supportive regulation.513 Further, all nations promote 
the benefits available to target nations through these investments, classifying LSLAs as 
“development” or “aid.” 
 As the first chapter describes, governments likely distance themselves from 
LSLAs for a number of reasons, specifically political ramifications and costs. LSLAs are 
disparagingly called “land grabs” in academic and activist literature, and are criticized for 
harming local populations; thus, LSLAs can have appreciable political effects on host 
nations.514 For example, an attempt by South Korean company Daewoo Logistics to lease 
“1.3 million hectares in Madagascar,” about half of the country’s arable land, resulted in 
“riots and overthrowing of the Madagascan government.”515 India faced a similar scandal 
in 2008 when Karuturi Global, an Indian company, “leased 300,000 hectares (ha) of land 
in southern Ethiopia” to “[become] the world’s largest food producer.”516 This “made 
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international headlines” and prompted the Ethiopian government to “[take] control of 
land allocation from the regional governments,” “[subject] potential investors to greater 
scrutiny and [lease] out land in incremental plots of 5,000 to 10,000 ha rather than vast 
tracts.”517 Therefore, as described previously, nations may distance themselves from 
LSLAs to mitigate geopolitical or media ramifications. Moreover, since financial costs of 
LSLAs fall primarily on corporations, this strategy is likely cheaper for governments than 
direct investment.  
Analysis 
 The first chapter found common food security conditions in two dissimilar 
countries, China and South Korea, that appear to contribute to these countries’ use of 
food security LSLAs, and that LSLAs in these countries are used to support a broader 
food security strategy. This second chapter hypothesized that the first chapter’s findings 
are generalizable to nations beyond East Asia, to all nations utilizing LSLAs for food 
security purposes. To test this hypothesis, it analyzed two diverse countries that both use 
LSLAs but are outside East Asia, Saudi Arabia and India. By determining if these nations 
share the traits contributing to LSLA strategies in China and South Korea, this chapter 
intended to establish the extent to which these motivations are generalizable. 
 The results of this study demonstrate that Saudi Arabia and India share many food 
security concerns, objectives, and response approaches with China and South Korea. 
Each faces rapidly growing and changing populations, contributing to projected increases 
and shifts in domestic food demand, coupled with limits to agricultural production 
capacity. These nations are wary of imports and support policies promoting agricultural 
self-sufficiency; when necessary, they rely on imports, but work to mitigate the risks of 
                                                
517 The Hindu, "Karuturi debacle prompts Ethiopia to review land policy." 
 103 
import markets through international trade agreements. As described in the first chapter, 
in China and South Korea LSLAs seem to be yet another method of satisfying domestic 
demand while securing greater self-sufficient control over agricultural resource sources; 
this also appears to be the case for Saudi Arabia and India. 
 This chapter’s results support the hypothesis that the food security factors 
contributing to LSLA strategies in China and South Korea are generalizable to nations 
outside East Asia. While China and South Korea may share many region-based factors 
such as state-led growth, security concerns, or similar histories, these similarities do not 
limit the applicability of the first chapter’s results or diminish the food security 
conditions that might motivate a LSLA food security strategy. Therefore, it appears to be 
a generalizable trend that states demonstrating rapid and long-term rising food demand 
for a growing variety of products, limited agricultural supply capacity, a wariness of 
import markets, a dependency on agricultural imports, and strategies promoting 
agricultural self-sufficiency are most likely to choose a LSLA food security strategy.  
However, the similarities described in the Literature Review regarding the East 
Asian propensity for “a strong mercantilist preference to import resources from 
nationally-controlled suppliers,” using “interventionist financial assistance policies to 
ensure their firms” can “compete with third parties,” may still provide wisdom regarding 
LSLAs, since both Saudi Arabia and India also share such a propensity.518 According to 
Woertz, Saudi Arabian food security strategies “exemplify mistrust in the reliability of 
markets” and “[reflect] a strategy of security mercantilism;”519 similarly, India is known 
for using protectionist food security strategies, for example, “[adjusting] tariffs 
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substantially to balance competing producer and consumer interests.”520 Thus, an 
additional generalizable trait that may lead to a LSLA strategy is an overall mercantilist 
economic outlook in regards to agriculture. Although this characteristic is shared among 
many East Asian countries, it is also shared by other countries throughout the world and, 
combined with the previously described food security factors, likely contributes to 
LSLAs.  
This topic offers many areas of future research. While these first two chapters 
have established general food security conditions leading to LSLAs, they have not 
examined cases in which a nation faces these conditions but does not choose LSLAs. 
Hence, future research could determine whether such cases exist, and, if so, why LSLAs 
do not occur. Such research may explain why the food security conditions examined in 
these chapters lead to LSLAs and why states might forego this strategy. Additionally, 
other elements of LSLA-pursuing nations, such as national economic outlook, political 
structure, etc., could be explored to determine if such factors also contribute to or 
motivate the use of food security LSLAs. Lastly, given that water use and availability 
appear to be major food security factors in many of these nations, the role of water or 
other agricultural inputs in influencing food security conditions or LSLAs could be more 
thoroughly examined by future scholars. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter sought to generalize the findings from the first chapter of this thesis 
by examining whether these results applied to two diverse nations located outside the 
East Asian region, Saudi Arabia and India. By comparing these nations’ food security 
concerns, objectives, and strategies with each other and with the findings from the 
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previous chapter, it determined that the first chapter’s findings were generalizable and 
that “East Asian” factors were not their cause.  
 Therefore, in any region, it appears that countries choosing LSLAs are those that 
face rapid and long-term increasing demand for food, demand for a growing variety of 
agricultural products, and severe limitations on food production to meet this demand. 
These countries likely have a dependency on imports for certain food products but also a 
strong aversion to global import markets and implement strategies to the mitigate risks of 
this dependency. Further, they will institute policies that promote self-sufficiency in 
agriculture, including economic support for domestic agriculture and trade restrictions. In 
light of these overall goals and aversions, these countries will likely pursue LSLAs as one 
supporting component of an overarching food security strategy, to minimize import risks 
and secure access to domestically demanded agricultural resources. 
 This chapter’s insights contribute to the academic literature on both food security 
and “land grabbing,” examining the factors encouraging investor nations to pursue a 
LSLA food security strategy. This chapter clarifies why nations enact specific food 
security strategies, especially since nations that select similar food security strategies 
(such as LSLAs) may possess dissimilar attributes. Moreover, given that this chapter 
determined the generalizable nature of the first chapter’s findings, these findings are now 
more applicable and have increased explanatory power regarding nations’ selection of 
food security strategies. This explanatory or predictive power may be especially valuable 
in upcoming years, since projected rising food demand may contribute to future food 







The first two chapters of this thesis sought to determine whether there are specific 
food security conditions, interests, and objectives that motivate nations to pursue LSLAs 
as a food security strategy. The results of these chapters indicated that there are, in fact, 
significant food security drivers that directly prompt nations to encourage domestic 
companies to acquire farmland abroad to secure access to agricultural resources. 
However, a further question remains: would any country that faces these food security 
conditions pursue such a strategy, or are there additional, “secondary” motivations 
underlying LSLAs? 
Policy decisions never occur in a vacuum; they occur via policymakers influenced 
by culture, history, experience, incentives, and ideology. Thus, a nation’s paradigm 
defines the range of policies that are possible to select in response to a given set of 
conditions. Consequently, while any given policy choice might be directly driven by 
specific “triggers,” there are likely “secondary” motivations of that choice, based on a 
country’s national outlook. 
The first two chapters determined the food security “triggers” that lead nations to 
pursue LSLAs. However, these chapters also found that LSLAs are often compared with 
mercantilism or colonialism in the literature, and that they are often implemented as an 
attempt to circumvent agricultural import markets. Moreover, the countries pursuing 
them all strive for agricultural self-sufficiency, preferring independence to reliance on 
other states. Since these characteristics appear indicative of an aversion to liberal 
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economic markets, one “secondary motivation” of LSLAs could be a nation’s 
overarching economic outlook.  
Therefore, this chapter examines the economic outlooks of nations pursuing food 
security LSLAs, as indicated by national economic history and current policy choices, to 
determine if these states share economic paradigms. Specifically, it analyzes the 
economic outlooks of the four nations studied in the first two chapters, since these states 
are proven to share similar LSLA strategies and food security “triggers.” This chapter 
seeks to establish whether economic outlook can be considered a secondary motivation of 
food security LSLAs, setting the stage for this policy choice; further, if these nations do 
share an economic outlook, it seeks to determine whether this outlook appears “illiberal” 
or “mercantilist” in nature, which would be consistent with LSLAs’ description in the 
literature. This chapter ultimately finds that these states do share an illiberal and 
nationalist economic outlook, as each has a significant history of illiberalism that carries 
through to modern-day economic policies; these findings indicate that an illiberal 
economic outlook is one secondary motivation of LSLAs. 
Literature Review 
 The first two chapters determined specific food security factors that, in general, 
contribute to nations’ selection of LSLAs as a food security strategy. However, in light of 
LSLAs’ connection to national efforts at agricultural self-sufficiency, avoidance of 
international import markets, and a fundamental “mistrust in the reliability of markets,” it 
appears that nations pursuing LSLAs may be driven not just by similar food security 
concerns, but also by specific economic outlooks and tendencies.521 Moreover, given the 
similarities described in the second chapter’s Literature Review regarding East Asian 
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tendencies toward state-led growth, market intervention, and mercantilist-reminiscent 
natural resource competition, it is possible that other LSLA-pursuing nations share these 
traits or an overarching “illiberal” economic paradigm. To provide a foundation for 
analyzing LSLA nations’ economic outlooks, this section examines academic literature 
describing LSLAs as a form of mercantilism and colonialism. It then analyzes 
mercantilism and colonialism within the larger context of economic illiberalism in order 
to explore the potential economic similarities shared by LSLA-pursuing nations. 
Large-Scale Land Acquisitions, Colonialism, and Mercantilism 
 There is a large body of literature comparing LSLAs to colonialism, due to the 
clear similarities between the two as national efforts to acquire foreign land. For instance, 
in describing LSLAs, Cotula explains, “far from being a new phenomenon, large land 
deals have a long history in Africa” and “during colonialism, settlers and colonial 
companies took millions of hectares.”522 Similarly, Spieldoch and Murphy assert “land 
acquisition by foreigners is not a new phenomenon” since “colonization of farmland by 
foreign settlers dates back thousands of years” and “the 19th century saw a huge wave of 
colonization by European powers;” they view LSLAs as simply “the most recent 
phenomenon,” comprised of “countries…looking to outsource food, feed, and fuel 
production to stabilize future supplies.”523 Scholars and researchers such as Margulis, 
McKeon, and Borras Jr., McMichael, Pearce, and Kugelman reiterate LSLAs’ colonial 
“historical precedent.”524,525,526,527 
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  However, many scholars also view LSLAs as a distinct trend, even if these 
scholars recognize concurrently colonialism’s precedent to and similarities with LSLAs. 
For example, Margulis, McKeon, and Borras Jr. understand “the recent wave of land 
grabs [as] distinct from previous eras,” since this wave “occurs in a world of sovereign 
states exercising territorial control at least formally.”528 Likewise, Kugelman argues, 
“today’s overseas land investments differ from their [colonial] predecessors in significant 
ways;” specifically, “their scale is much larger,” “they emphasize staples instead of cash 
crops,” “they are concluded on the basis of agreements instead of through the barrel of a 
gun,” and, lastly, “they are spearhead by more government-led investment than in the 
past.”529  
 Historically, colonialism has been closely linked with the economic doctrine of 
mercantilism (which is defined and described more thoroughly in the following section). 
For example, O’Brien describes “the mercantilist age of imperialism” from 1415 to 1815, 
during which “colonization and commerce with other continents [transformed] the 
Netherlands and England into successful market economies.”530 Likewise, Roll depicts 
mercantilism as a doctrine that places “the building-up of nation-states…in the forefront” 
of economic development, which “uses monetary, protectionist, and other economic 
devices…as instruments to this end;” hence, as Roll explains, “the value of colonies” 
under mercantilism “depended on their ability to act as exclusive markets for the 
manufactures of the mother country, to supply in exchange raw materials and other 
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produces which would otherwise have to be bought from foreign countries, and to form a 
reservoir for cheap labor.”531 
 Due to the link between mercantilism and colonialism, scholars have also 
compared LSLAs with mercantilism or attributed LSLAs to mercantilist economic 
attitudes. McMichael, for example, explains that modern “land grabbing entails a direct 
‘security mercantilism,’” which involves “[overriding] the multilateral trading system 
governed by WTO rules, substituting direct access to productive land for food…rather 
than relying on market access.”532 Margulis, McKeon, and Borras Jr. support this 
viewpoint, maintaining that although “today’s land grabs are facilitated by the institutions 
and practices of neoliberal globalization,” they are motivated by “‘security mercantilism’ 
that may have illiberal ends.”533 Numerous additional scholars such as Dixon and Nally 
reiterate and support LSLAs’ link to mercantilism.534,535  
Mercantilism and Economic Illiberalism 
 Given that LSLAs are often compared to colonialism and, likewise, to 
mercantilism, it appears possible that nations pursuing food security LSLAs may adhere 
to a common economic outlook. Hence, this section provides an overview of 
mercantilism and explores literature describing the range of economic paradigms to 
which LSLA nations may adhere. 
 In essence, mercantilism is considered the “economic thought and practice in 
Europe from about 1500 to 1750,” which “[viewed] both power and wealth as legitimate 
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goals of national policy;” mercantilist states “believed that a state could use the gold and 
silver it accumulated to increase its power,” and thus “took all necessary measures to 
accumulate gold by increasing their exports and decreasing their imports.”536 According 
to Bulut, mercantilism developed for European states “to achieve several aims 
simultaneously,” including “[consolidating] the power of the central governments, 
[regulating] the rapidly increasing industrial and trade sectors, and [accumulating] 
wealth.”537 Therefore, according to Roll, “state intervention” in the economy “was an 
essential part of mercantilist doctrine,” which led mercantilists to “[clothe] their views in 
the garb of a policy designed to strengthen the nation.”538 Lastly, as Buzan explains, 
mercantilism is characterized as a system “in which economic and individual interests 
were subordinated to the pursuit of state power.”539  
Despite mercantilism’s development in early-modern Europe, many modern 
scholars, according to Cohn, “refer to some states today as being ‘neomercantilist’” or 
mercantilist, in essence “[using] mercantilism as a general term in reference to realist 
thought and practice in [International Political Economy studies].”540 Such modern-day 
“mercantilist” or “realist” states take many forms, ranging from autarkic to protectionist 
or even fully “open” (and, according to Buzan, can even “combine” these economic 
traits), however, they are all characterized by diverging from the position of economic 
liberalism.541,542 Thus, realists “give priority to politics over economics and generally 
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view ‘the economy as a creature of the state;’” contrarily, liberals “tend to view 
economics and politics as separate and autonomous,” asserting “that governments should 
not interfere in economic transactions and that their role should be limited to creating an 
open environment in which individuals and private firms can freely express their 
economic preferences.”543  
Fundamentally, the critical link between modern and historical “mercantilist states” 
is based on the role of the state in the economy and the purpose of national economic 
development. As depicted by Gilson and Milhaupt, liberals believe that “the individual 
company is the unit whose value [should be] maximized” whereas modern mercantilists 
view “the country [as] the unit whose value is to be maximized, with a corresponding 
increase in the role of the national government as a direct participant in and coordinator 
of the effort.”544 Thus, modern mercantilism can essentially be depicted as a form of 
“economic nationalism,” which is described by Gilpin as an overarching doctrine that 
believes “economic activities are and should be subordinate to the goal of state building 
and the interests of the state.”545 
There is a large body of scholarship analyzing economic nationalism. Nakano 
provides a thorough overview of the “aim” and “policy” of economic nationalism, as 
compared to liberalism; according to him, “economic nationalists aim at establishing, 
maintaining, and enhancing the (economic and political) power of the nation” and, 
therefore, “believe that an active role for the state may be required for economic 
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development” but will also “in principle adopt any kinds of policies, including ‘liberal’ 
ones, so long as these contribute” to national power.546 In contrast, he views “the primary 
aim of liberal economic policy [as] economic efficiency and the welfare of individuals” 
and, thus, “liberals in principle advocate free markets and minimal state intervention.”547 
Moreover, as described by Harlen, unlike liberals, “Economic Nationalists frequently 
regard trade negatively…and favor economic protectionism,” especially for 
“economically weak nations.”548 Likewise, Isaacs-Martin characterizes economic 
nationalism as viewing “the state [as] instrumental in utilising its resources and 
distributing the benefits to its citizens equally to strengthen the nation.”549 In contrast to 
Harlen’s argument, however, Isaacs-Martin cautions, “economic nationalism should not 
be confused with protectionism” since it might, at times, be “in the state’s best 
interest…to support free trade,” and instead argues that economic nationalism “strives to 
eliminate foreign control and centralise ownership.”550 To synthesize these views, while 
economic nationalism can support diverse, sometimes contrasting, beliefs or tenets, 
overall it rejects liberalism (yet may utilize liberal practices), supports state-led economic 
development, and provides a greater role for government economic intervention. 
According to the literature, economic nationalism and even modern mercantilism 
can be described using a variety of terms and divided into numerous subcategories. For 
instance, according to studies by Gilpin, Buzan, as well as Guerrieri and Padoan, 
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mercantilist states may be considered “benign” or “malevolent.”551,552,553 As described by 
Guerrieri and Padoan, “benign mercantilism aims to protect domestic welfare and 
stability” whereas “malevolent mercantilism tries to increase state power.”554 However, 
in describing the Soviet Union as an example, Buzan asserts, “it makes no 
difference…whether the Soviet Union is considered to be militaristic and expansionist or 
defensive and benign” since it “is a constant in the analytical distinction between 
contemporary liberal and mercantilist international economic systems.”555 In sum, 
regardless of the “type” of mercantilism, all mercantilist states fundamentally differ in 
outlook from liberal ones. 
An additional characterization of economic nationalism noted in the literature is 
“state capitalism.” Bremmer, a seminal scholar in the study of state capitalism, describes 
this form of capitalism as “a system in which the state functions as the leading economic 
actor and uses markets primarily for political gain.”556 He depicts state capitalism as led 
by “four primary actors: national oil companies, state-owned enterprises, privately owned 
national champions, and sovereign wealth funds,” and as mainly implemented by 
“emerging-market countries” with “histories of heavy state involvement in their 
economies.”557 Beeson and Islam reiterate Bremmer’s view of state capitalists as having a 
history of intervention, describing “the determination of economic structures and 
relationships” as having “an inherent ‘institutional logic’” or “institutional inertia [that] 
                                                
551 Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 234-235. 
552 Buzan, "Economic structure and international security: the limits of the liberal case," 608. 
553 Paolo Guerrieri and Pier Carlo Padoan, "Neomercantilism and international economic stability," 
International Organization 40, no. 1 (Winter 1986): 29. 
554 Guerrieri and Padoan, "Neomercantilism and international economic stability," 29. 
555 Buzan, "Economic structure and international security: the limits of the liberal case," 612. 
556 Ian Bremmer, "State Capitalism Comes of Age," Foreign Affairs, May/June 2009: 2. 
557 Bremmer, "State Capitalism Comes of Age,” 2, 5. 
 115 
will inhibit change.”558 Other scholars, such as Apeldoorn, Graaff, and Overbeek, have 
expanded upon these analyses, describing “statist capitalism” as a system in which “the 
state tends to go beyond what is normally deemed to be the essence of capitalism.”559 
They assert that this system is “associated with the strategies of developing states seeking 
to catch up with…the power of the West,” ranging from “rentier strategies,” which focus 
on “maximizing income derived from the possession of natural resources,” to 
“developmentalist strategies,” which “[constitute] investment-driven industrialization” 
efforts.560  
One key component of state capitalism described in the literature is the possibility 
for state-led intervention to take advantage of the free market liberal system. For example, 
Aligica and Tarko depict state capitalism as “[using] the free market system–for instance 
free rides the relatively liberal global trade system–to get rich and influential” and then 
“[using] influence and power for objectives that could end up undermining the very 
system of free markets.”561 Likewise, McNally portrays state capitalism as “a political 
economy in which the state directs and controls key productive forces in an economy, yet 
employs capitalist practices such as market competitive pressures.”562 This is supported 
by Apeldoorn, Graaff, and Overbeek, who state, “whereas earlier the ‘statist’ catch-up 
with the West involved a mercantilist and protectionist strategy in which the country’s 
own industries were shielded from global competition, the statist capitalists of today have 
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opened up to the world economy” and are “playing along with the (neo-)liberal rules of 
the game.”563  
 This body of literature demonstrates fundamental similarities among non-liberal 
economic systems and outlooks. Although non-liberal systems have the propensity to be 
either protectionist or open and can utilize a wide range of strategies, all use the economy 
in an essentially nationalist manner to “maximize” the “value” of the state instead of the 
individual.564 Moreover, non-liberal outlooks share an aversion to key tenets of the liberal 
doctrine, despite having a tendency to exploit liberal economic tools when such tools will 
improve the position of the state. Since LSLAs are often based on an aversion to import 
markets and consist of state-led efforts to control key national resources for state 
development, it appears likely that countries employing LSLAs may adhere to an 
economic paradigm that is in some form economically nationalist and non-liberal.  
Shortcomings and Contributions 
 As described in the first two chapters, most of the academic literature on LSLAs 
focuses primarily on the content of land deals, the effects of LSLAs on host nation 
populations, and the scope of land investments. The literature also focuses, to an extent, 
on the “first-degree,” motivations of investor nations, for instance, the Global Food Crisis 
of 2007-2008. However, the literature is significantly lacking regarding more complex or 
deep-rooted investor nation motivations, such as long-term food security concerns or 
overarching economic paradigms. While scholars do note the links between LSLAs and 
colonialism or mercantilism, they do not expand upon these links to reveal connections 
between LSLAs and economic outlook similarities among major investor nations. This 
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chapter, therefore, seeks to provide greater insights into potential commonalities among 
investor nations’ overarching economic outlooks, due to their mutual use of LSLAs. To 
research these parallels, this chapter will analyze the economic outlooks of the four 
nations examined as case studies in the first two chapters, China, South Korea, Saudi 
Arabia, and India.  
Theory and Hypothesis 
 This chapter hypothesizes that countries utilizing LSLAs as a food security 
strategy will share overarching economic outlooks and tendencies. Specifically, it 
postulates that these nations will share an overall economically “illiberal” or economic 
nationalist paradigm, although the “form” of illiberalism (protectionism, state-capitalism, 
etc.) may vary by country. Fundamentally, this chapter tests the extent to which states 
pursuing food security LSLAs may be motivated (in an indirect, policy environment 
sense) by illiberal economic outlooks and an attempt to “maximize” the “value” of the 
state over the individual.565 
 As the Literature Review describes, LSLAs have frequently been linked to 
colonialism and, hence, to mercantilism. Since mercantilism is often considered the 
foundational economically nationalist outlook, it appears likely that states pursuing 
LSLAs adhere to such illiberal views in other areas of economics and development, 
which would thus be indicative of an overall illiberal view. Moreover, modern illiberal or 
economically nationalist states often strive for goals that coincide with those of LSLAs, 
such as avoiding or circumventing markets, protecting domestic companies or consumers, 
manipulating “liberal” markets for national gain, and relying on state intervention to 
direct national economic efforts.  
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 Nations adhering to an illiberal economic outlook might support a wide variety of 
economic policies or have disparate economic tendencies; for example, one illiberal state 
might support protectionist tariffs to develop domestic industries whereas another might 
open to free trade but engage in substantial state intervention. However, all illiberal states 
“reject” liberal doctrine, to some extent, and utilize economic policy in a nationalist, 
state-centric (as opposed to individualistic or “free trade”) manner. Therefore, to test this 
chapter’s hypothesis, this analysis examines illiberal economic policies or tendencies in 
each of the nations studied in the first two chapters, to determine the extent of “economic 
nationalism” in these states.  
Methodology 
 This chapter examines the economic outlooks and tendencies of countries 
pursuing LSLAs as a food security strategy, to determine the extent to which these 
outlooks and tendencies adhere to an illiberal, economic nationalist paradigm. To analyze 
this, it compares the illiberal policies and tendencies of the nations investigated as case 
studies in the previous two chapters, China, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and India. It then 
determines areas of overlap, which should provide insights into whether economic 
illiberalism, nationalism, and mercantilism underlie food security LSLAs. If the results 
demonstrate that each country utilizes economic policy in a significantly nationalist or 
illiberal manner (for instance, heavy state intervention, an abundance of state-owned 
enterprises, nationalized natural resources, state-centric development policies, tariff or 
trade barrier protections for domestic industries, mercantilist export support, or 
significant investment in opaque sovereign wealth funds), then it is likely that nations 
pursuing LSLAs share an overarching illiberal economic outlook. If such economic 
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parallels cannot be found, then it is likely that economic outlook is not a general 
secondary motivator of LSLAs. All primary findings are as of June 2014. 
 The previous two chapters comprehensively analyzed the food security 
motivations, circumstances, and conditions of China, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and 
China, as well as their LSLA styles; thus, these countries have also been selected for 
examination in this chapter. Since the previous two chapters confirmed that these nations 
share food security conditions and LSLA styles, these factors will be controlled for in an 
analysis of economic paradigms; to select other nations that pursue LSLAs might leave 
this study vulnerable to the critique that, despite any results demonstrating economic 
outlook similarities, these nations might not share food security conditions or LSLA 
styles. Moreover, the previous two Methodology sections identified vast fundamental 
political, regional, demographic, and economic disparities among the case study nations, 
which supported the generalizable nature of the previous chapters’ findings regarding 
food security conditions and LSLAs; therefore, analyzing these states in the current 
chapter should also reveal generalizable trends in terms of economic paradigms, given 
the diverse nature of the sample.  
As described in the previous two chapters, case study-based research can be 
subject to data availability difficulties. Similar to the previous chapters, this study 
individually analyzes disparate countries’ histories and policies; it is therefore possible 
that available information may vary by nation, especially if there are limited English-
language sources in each state on a particular topic. This chapter utilizes a diverse range 
of sources to correct for this difficulty; however, the specific sources used for each 
country may vary in some respects. 
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 Finally, to define and clarify terms, liberalism is a doctrine “[emphasizing] the 
importance of the free market and private property and [seeking] to limit the 
government’s role in economic affairs.”566 Moreover, using Gilson and Milhaupt’s 
definition, liberalism attempts to “maximize” the “value” of the company or individual, 
instead of the state.567 In contrast, economic nationalism, modern mercantilism, or 
illiberalism will be considered doctrines that essentially attempt to “maximize” the 
country’s value, using a wide variety of specific economic tools.568 Further, such views 
will “give priority to politics over economics and generally view ‘the economy as a 
creature of the state.’”569 Although some illiberal views may encourage the use of “liberal” 
economic tools, such as reducing trade barriers, these views will be considered illiberal if 
such tools are utilized in a state-centric attempt to increase national power, security, or 
stability, or if they are implemented within the context of a wide range of illiberal tools 
(such as protectionism, state intervention, etc.).  
Results 
 The first two chapters established general food security conditions that motivate 
nations to pursue a LSLA food security strategy. However, it is likely that there are 
additional, “secondary” motivations that drive countries to pursue such a strategy, such as 
national economic outlook. Given LSLAs’ comparison in academic literature to illiberal 
economic outlooks and strategies, such as mercantilism and colonialism, this chapter 
seeks to determine if states pursuing LSLAs adhere to an illiberal economic paradigm in 
other national efforts. This section, therefore, examines to what extent China, South 
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Korea, Saudi Arabia, and India exhibit illiberal or nationalist economic histories and 
current policies.  
China 
 China has a long history of using economic nationalist or illiberal strategies. At its 
founding in 1949, China “installed a socialist economy both in industry and (after mid-
1950s) agriculture, and the private sector was minimal and operated in minute scale and 
under the shadows.”570 However, after the death of Mao Zedong, China began to 
“liberalize” its economy; “after 1978, small private enterprises were permitted, the 
agricultural sector was partly de-collectivised, and special economic zones were 
established in order to boost exports and attract foreign capital.”571 This liberalization 
continued as China “coined the notion of a ‘socialist market economy’” in 1992 and 
joined the World Trade Organization in 2001; consequently, “scores of [small and 
medium enterprises] were privatized, the import licensing and quota system relaxed, 
tariffs considerably reduced, new industrial segments opened up for foreign investment, 
and export-supporting measures [were] created.”572 
 Thus, on the surface, China appears economically liberal by many measures; the 
country utilizes many of “the essential elements of capitalism,” for example, by 
“[promoting] calculating capitalists, a free market, [and] wage labor.”573 However, in 
reality, the nation “shows a total involvement of the state in the economy and complete 
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synchronization of a party-government-military-economic regime.”574 Further, China’s 
liberalization process was fundamentally designed by the state to achieve national interest 
objectives and has been primarily state-led. To mitigate “economic stagnation,” the state 
created “cycles of induced reforms…where each small step at liberalization created 
pressures for further liberalization;” China “[retained] control” over liberalization by, for 
example, employing “top-down Leninist incentives focused on economic performance” 
to “[encourage] local governments to compete vigorously for investment capital.”575 
Moreover, given that the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has “more than 80 
million members,” the CCP “pervades the private sector as well as every level of 
government,” allowing the state to exert economic control; as Freeman Jr. describes, “in 
China, the invisible hand is a [CCP] cadre.”576 
China’s state-led development has contributed to what has been designated as the 
“China model.” According to Zhao, this model involves “[copying] successful elements 
of liberal economic policy by opening up much of the economy to foreign and domestic 
investment, allowing labor flexibility, keeping the tax and regulatory burden low, and 
creating a first-class infrastructure through a combination of private sector and state 
spending.”577 However, this development strategy “is led by a strong and pro-
development state, capable of shaping national consensus and ensuring overall political 
and macroeconomic stability in which to pursue wide-ranging reforms;” the model 
“[emphasizes] economic growth as an overarching national goal and political stability as 
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a pre-condition for modernization.”578 As summarized by Breslin, the China model is 
based on a “commitment to doing whatever it takes to promote growth while maintaining 
political stability.”579  
Despite nominal liberalization, the state maintains control over the economy 
through a variety of means, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs), trade barriers, 
government support, intervention and planning, and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). 
Regarding SOEs, “while state firms retreated from the most competitive and least 
profitable sectors” during liberalization, they continue to control “critical industries” such 
as “oil, gas, and mining,” “metals, steel, and petrochemicals,” “essential network 
industries in telecommunications, transportation, and utilities,” as well as “all major 
banking and financial institutions.”580  
SOEs in China continue to “compete with other enterprises in the marketplace” 
but SOE leaders “answer to the dictates of the state.”581 Further, China’s “‘free’ market is 
asymmetric in favour of” SOEs “in accessing loans and resources…and operating in both 
domestic and foreign markets,” SOE employees have “only limited bargaining rights 
while enjoying security similar to…employees in the bureaucracy,” and “some [SOEs] 
become ‘national champions’ as the state restricts their competitors and encourages their 
mergers and acquisitions.”582 Moreover, China uses these SOEs to achieve national 
objectives, such as “to secure ever-increasing supplies of foreign oil;” for instance, China 
“has encouraged the three major Chinese national oil companies (NOCs)…to establish an 
ambitious internationalization strategy,” and, “as a result of 18 years of expansion in 
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overseas activities, by 2010 Chinese oil companies had stakes in more than 200 projects 
in about 50 countries.”583 
China also utilizes numerous trade barriers to promote domestic enterprise. This is 
especially the case in innovative or technological fields, for which China “[manipulates] 
currency, markets, standards, [intellectual property] rights, and so forth to gain an unfair 
advantage favoring their technology exports in international trade.”584 China also 
exercises a range of import bans, for example on “used goods” and “remanufacturing 
process inputs,” tariffs, such as “on narrow body aircraft,” and “export restraints,” 
including “export quotas, export licensing, minimum export prices, [and] export duties” 
primarily on “raw material inputs where [China] holds the leverage of being among the 
world’s leading producers.”585 Further, China has “attempted to manage the export of 
many primary, intermediate and downstream products by raising or lowering the value-
added tax rebate available upon export,” at times “[reinforced]…by imposing or 
retracting export duties.”586  
Additionally, China uses protectionist measures to defend “domestic industries;” 
it often applies “restrictive investment regimes…in numerous manufacturing sectors” and 
in “service sectors, such as financial services, telecommunications services and express 
delivery.”587 Moreover, “discriminatory regulatory processes” are used to “frustrate 
efforts of U.S. suppliers” in industries such as “services;” these processes include 
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“informal bans on entry and expansion, various restrictions on the cross-border supply of 
services, [and] overly burdensome licensing and operating requirements.”588 Lastly, the 
country is considered “among the least transparent and predictable of the world’s major 
markets for agricultural products,” due to regulators’ “selective [market] intervention.”589 
Beyond pure trade barriers, the Chinese state plays a prominent role in supporting, 
intervening in, and planning the Chinese economy. For example, China “[provides] a 
range of injurious subsidies,” specifically for export-promotion, to support “its domestic 
industries.”590 Further, CCP “Cadres stimulate the growth of production, employment, 
and civic pride” by offering “Chinese entrepreneurs,” at home or abroad, “exemptions 
from government regulations and licensing regimes, cheap loans, free land, political 
protection, and security from labor unrest.”591 These cadres often “play the economic role 
that fund managers and other investors do elsewhere,” however, they also command “the 
power of the layers of the government and party apparatuses they represent,” adding a 
“political twist” to economic management.592 The state also targets “economically and 
strategically important” industries for development through the “Strategic Emerging 
Industries” initiative, including “energy-saving and environmental protection,” “new 
generation information technology,” “biotechnology,” “high-end equipment 
manufacturing,” “new energy,” “new materials,” and “new-energy vehicles.”593  
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Lastly, China employs illiberal financial controls and SWFs, which contribute to 
the state’s “direct control of vital economic capital.”594 In China, “all major banks are 
under the control of a vice premier at the State Council” and, as of 2010, “about four-
fifths of the assets in the banking system are controlled by 17 institutions, whose leaders 
are all appointed.”595 Moreover, “China is expanding its SWFs;” Chinese SWF expansion 
began “in 2007 with the establishment of the China Investment Corporation with assets 
of $200 billion” and, in recent years, China has developed “at least three” more.596 These 
SWFs are considered worrisome because China “[provides] very little public information 
about their investment strategies and holdings;” thus, they could “help domestic 
companies secure technology or other expertise from a portfolio company even if that 
transfer reduces the portfolio company's value,” since “the loss to the portfolio company 
[would be] shared by all owners, while the benefit from the transfer [would accrue] 
entirely to the SWF and its government.”597 
South Korea 
South Korea also has had a long history of state-led economic development 
focusing on national interest objectives. South Korea began a significantly state-directed 
economic development plan “in 1962 when the newly launched Park Chung-Hee military 
regime, which seized power through a military coup in 1961, initiated the ‘Five Year 
Economic Development Plan.’”598 The Park government implemented an economic 
development strategy to increase exports, through which “domestic firms imported raw 
                                                
594 Lin, "Capitalism in China: A Centrally Managed Capitalism (CMC) and Its Future," 77. 
595 Lin, "Capitalism in China: A Centrally Managed Capitalism (CMC) and Its Future," 77. 
596 Lin, "Capitalism in China: A Centrally Managed Capitalism (CMC) and Its Future," 77. 
597 Gilson and Milhaupt, "Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance," 352-354. 
598 Jongseok Lee, Iain Clacher, and Kevin Keasey, "Industrial policy as an engine of economic growth: A 
framework of analysis and evidence from South Korea (1960-96)," Business History 54, no. 5 (August 
2012): 727. 
 127 
materials or half-finished goods and exported finished goods cheaply;” to do so, the 
government “established several [SOEs]” and provided “incentives,” such as cheap loans, 
“to exporting firms.”599 In essence, the goal of this development strategy was “economic 
development through rapid industrialization,” which was to be guided by “three powerful 
agencies (the Economic Planning Board, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the 
Ministry of Finance).”600 
Beginning “in 1973,” the Park government decided to “strategically promote six 
heavy and chemical industries;” these industries included “steel, non-ferrous metals, 
machinery (including car manufacturing), electronics, ship building and petrochemicals,” 
and “strong [state] support” was offered “to these sectors” in terms of loans, tax 
incentives, competition limits, “restrictions on foreign ownership,” and establishment of 
SOEs.601 To further support “targeted” industries, “only the government” was permitted 
to “access foreign borrowing and allocate the credit;” the state “also strictly regulated the 
labor sector, compressing wage levels and banning labor unions.”602 Moreover, starting in 
1980, “policies” were enacted “to manage competition more actively,” which essentially 
“provided a tailored support package including subsidized loans, tax exemptions and 
fixed term exemptions from anti-trust laws” for industries deemed “re-enforceable;” 
industries designated as such included “car manufacturing, construction vehicles, diesel 
engines and heavy electric equipment” and, thus, Korea “banned new entrants to these 
markets until 1989.”603  
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This development method, historically used by South Korea as well as Japan, 
Taiwan, and Singapore, has been called the “developmental state” model, the “success” 
of which is attributed to “the crucial role played by the state.”604 The core tenets of this 
model, as described by Kim, involve “export-oriented industrialization,” state 
commitment to “protecting, subsidizing, and disciplining” “[selected] promising 
industries and sectors,” a state with “strong capacity to implement and sustain ‘big push’ 
programmes” as well as “an ability to insulate itself from particular interests in society,” 
and “linkages between economic planners in the state and business sectors in society.”605 
Further illustrating this model’s state-centric and political nature, Stubbs explains that the 
DS is primarily based on “a weak society which is unable to offer any concerted 
resistance to the rise of a relatively strong state,” “ideas circulating within the 
society…that [promote] the concept of the DS,” and supportive “regional security” and 
economic circumstances.606 This model is frequently characterized as being linked to 
“nationalism (neo-) mercantilism, economic transformation, rapid industrialization, 
performance legitimacy or some amalgam of a number of these ideas.”607 
South Korea eventually began a process of liberalization, starting in the 1980s, 
“as neoliberal-minded technocrats and U.S. pressures for financial and trade market 
opening converged;” hence, throughout the 1980s, “the Chun Doo Hwan regime opened 
the financial market to attract foreign capital to finance a current account deficit.”608 
Further, due to student protests for “political democracy,” worker efforts to promote 
“economic democracy,” and “pressure to liberalise the economy…from abroad,” 
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“economic liberalisation” was pursued, “[reducing] state intervention” as well as 
“[moving] toward welfare-oriented policies.”609 This push toward liberalization shifted 
the “priorities of the state,” leading to “restructuring within the economic ministries,” 
“greater openness to direct foreign investments and imports,” and “economic growth 
[changing] from being the sole, primary goal, to one of many goals of the state.”610 
Moreover, democracy protests in 1986-87 led to democratic elections in December 1987, 
ending “nearly two decades of authoritarian rule.”611 Subsequently, from 1993 to 1998, 
the “Kim Young Sam government” bolstered liberalization by “[adopting] a 
comprehensive financial liberalization process” and by pushing for Korean membership 
in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).612 
Despite economic and political liberalization since the 1980s, Korea has, in many 
ways, retained its illiberal economic outlook. Although Korea no longer follows the DS 
model explicitly, according to Wong as of 2004, “the developmentally oriented state 
continues to play important roles in East Asia’s economic, social, and political 
development” and “the developmental states in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China 
continue to experiment with industrial policies, R&D policies, social welfare reforms, 
and economic policy.”613 Further, “the neo-mercantilist ideas that underpinned the DS 
and its policies became deeply embedded in the formal institutions and informal practices 
of government,” and these beliefs “continue to have their adherents in key locations in 
the bureaucracy.”614 Thus, many illiberal facets of the DS still remain in Korea and are 
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evident in the country’s SOEs, trade barriers, state support for the telecommunications 
industry, resource security policies, and SWFs. 
SOEs remain a large component of the Korean economy. According to an OECD 
report, as of 2009 (the most recent OECD data) Korea had 56 “enterprises majority-
owned by the central level of government,” accounting for 120,655 employees.615 The 
Korean SOE sector is valued at $177.6 billion, “the highest valuation of a national SOE 
sector among reporting countries.”616 However, even these data may underestimate the 
true count of Korean SOEs, as a report sponsored by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
noted, as of 2010, 22 formal SOEs, 79 “quasi government agencies,” and 185 “other 
public institutions,” totaling 286; the only difference in these categories is that, “if the 
revenue an institution generates on its own exceeds 50% of the total revenue, it is 
classified as an SOE.”617 As of 2014, the Strategy and Finance ministry cited the 
existence of 302 “public institutions.”618 
The SOE sector includes a wide variety of firms, often used for national strategic 
objectives; for instance, the Korea National Oil Company “was established to support the 
stability of [the] national economy by securing energy supply against oil crisis through 
the strategic petroleum stockpiling and petroleum development,” and the Korean 
Development Bank (KDB) was designed to “develop Korean industries and the national 
economy” in “its role as a government-run bank.”619,620 Further, despite prior attempts to 
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“privatize…state-owned industries, including the KDB,” “draft legislation introduced by 
the majority party late in 2013 could reverse some privatization plans, including the 
privatization of KDB.”621 
Korea also exercises illiberal trade barriers and investment restrictions to protect 
domestic industries, even despite recent FTAs such as with the U.S.622 For example, the 
nation has required excessive “verification” on specific goods to determine country of 
“origin,” quality, or security, and has restricted foreign investment in a range of industries, 
including GPS navigation, cloud computing, credit and debit cards, restaurants, express 
shipping, and medical devices.623 The country retains severe “quotas” on foreign media, 
which, for instance, require “that any movie screen show domestic films at least 73 days 
per year,” that “foreign programs may not exceed 20 percent of terrestrial television or 
radio broadcast time,” and that foreign music is limited “to 40 percent of all music 
content.”624 Further, “Korea prohibits foreign investment in rice and barley farming,” 
“imposes a 50 percent foreign equity limitation on meat wholesaling,” “limits foreign 
investment in electric power generation, distribution, and sales to 50 percent,” “restricts 
foreign investment in the areas of news agency services and publishing and printing,” and 
does not allow foreign investment “in terrestrial broadcast television operations.”625 
Lastly, for non-FTA countries, “Korea’s tariffs on imported agricultural goods average 
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54 percent” and “its average tariff on non-agricultural goods is more than twice that of 
the United States,” at 6.6%.626 
The Korean state also provides considerable support to specific domestic 
industries, especially telecommunications (telecoms). Within this industry, the nation 
often “[engineers] market outcomes through the use of ceilings on dominant firms’ 
market share, by promoting mergers among smaller operators and by supporting marginal 
firms through cheap access to bandwidth/[licenses]” as well as “through the use of 
guaranteed minimal market shares.”627 Further, the state “is primarily focused upon 
promoting the interests of domestic manufacturers” and “effectively ‘manages’ the 
development of markets;” thus, the government “maintains close relations with certain 
service providers,” encouraging them to provide “services using newly emerging 
technologies in return for privileged access to spectrum resources.”628 The state also often 
enacts “regulatory standards” that “delay the entry of foreign technologies to the 
domestic market, giving domestic firms a grace period in which to adapt.”629 Hence, 
Korean telecoms reflect “active ‘management’ of markets to support the development of 
indigenous industrial capacity in a major strategic industry,” which “conforms almost 
perfectly with the developmental state ideal.”630 
Korea also pursues mercantilist resource security policies. In 2004, Korea 
launched “both a National Energy Plan and an Overseas Resource Development Plan,” 
which “sought to promote investment by national firms in new resource projects in 
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overseas countries;” these policies “provide governmental assistance to national firms to 
acquire ownership, and ultimately control, of overseas resource projects.”631 Thus, 
Korean “state-owned financial institutions” are encouraged to “extend discounted loans 
to national firms…investing in foreign resource projects.”632 In light of this support, “in 
the oil and gas sector alone, Korea’s oil companies have launched twelve new overseas 
projects…since state financial support was made available,” and four Korean investments 
in iron ore have “[been] made with the support of concessionary state finance.”633 
Moreover, “diplomacy” also “[supports] overseas investment” and Korea has “[drafted] 
regulations to ensure that proceeds from state-supported overseas investment are 
repatriated and reinvested.”634 Such policies reveal “a strong mercantilist preference to 
import resources from nationally-controlled suppliers.”635 
Finally, South Korea utilizes SWFs, specifically the Korea Investment 
Corporation (KIC).636 According to the fund’s annual report, the KIC “was established in 
2005 to preserve and enhance the long-term purchasing power of Korea’s sovereign 
wealth through efficient management of public funds in the international financial 
markets” and “as of the end of 2012, total assets under management stood at USD 57.0 
billion.”637 The KIC started with $20 billion, which was initially invested “in traditional 
asset classes such as stocks and bonds;” over time, “the scope of investment has been 
broadened to include inflation-linked bonds and commodities as well as private equity, 
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real estate and hedge funds” as well as “emerging markets.”638 Moreover, 3.2 percent of 
holdings have been invested in “special investments,” which include “resource 
development, energy, new technologies, etc.”639  
Despite these public disclosures, according to Kim, the KIC “shows how an SWF 
can be operated in a way that favors bureaucrats and politicians,” as “its CEOs and 
Auditors are often appointed from the ranks of bureaucrats, the level of disclosure is kept 
to a minimum, and some senior positions were terminated during the first year of the new 
presidency.”640 Further, the KIC annual report explains that the “KIC adheres to the basic 
principles of acting in good faith and enhancing shareholder value in the long term when 
exercising voting rights” and “has drawn up related procedures to ensure voting rights are 
exercised appropriately;”641 however, “KIC does not disclose its proxy voting guidelines, 
nor its related procedures.”642 Moreover, the fund has “made several cross-border 
acquisitions in the energy sector,” which “may help prevent Korea from suffering from 
future oil shocks.”643 Thus, the KIC appears to be part investment fund, part supporter of 
national economic strategy. 
Saudi Arabia 
 Saudi Arabia is one of the clearest examples of economic nationalism and 
illiberalism, largly due to the Saudi “non-representative,” “absolute monarchy” system of 
government, which causes economic actors to “closely associate themselves with the 
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powerful elites” and removes any “effective dissent.”644 Saudi Arabia has maintained this 
system since its founding in 1932, and “one of [the] male descendants” of the founder 
“rules the country today, as required by the country’s 1992 Basic Law.”645 The country 
also is considered one of the founders of state capitalism; according to Bremmer, “state 
capitalism began to take shape during the 1973 oil crisis, when the members of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) agreed to cut oil production 
in response to the United States’ support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War.”646 Thus, “the 
world’s most important commodity became a geopolitical weapon;”647 as described by 
Friedberg, the 1970s oil embargo demonstrates a significant use of “economic statecraft” 
and an attempt “to use…control over scarce resources to influence the policies of the 
comparatively strong and wealthy.”648  
 The Saudi system is also considered illiberal due to its vast oil resources and 
“rentier state” economic and political model. This model is typified by a “state [that] is 
largely dislocated from the national economy…because of large income from exports of 
oil, gas, or other ‘rents’” and, hence, does not need “to tax the local economy to finance 
its activities.”649 States that adhere to this model are “not under pressure to develop an 
efficient economic basis for the country, but can rather rest on distributing (or allocating) 
the revenues [they accrue] from rents.”650 Further, such nations’ vast “financial resources” 
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both “[support] the coercive apparatus of the state” and “[sustain] massive social welfare 
programs,” essentially reflecting “the logic of ‘no taxation, no representation.’”651 Saudi 
Arabia exemplifies this model, since, as of 2012, it “was the world’s largest producer and 
exporter of total petroleum liquids,” “the world’s largest holder of crude oil reserves, and 
the world’s second largest crude oil producer.”652 Moreover, “petroleum exports 
accounted for almost 90 percent of total Saudi export revenues in 2011,” and oil 
contributed 75% of state income.653,654  
The rentier state system in Saudi Arabia was stronger, in line with peaking oil 
prices, during the 1970s, when “oil sector government together accounted for 65% of 
Saudi economic activity and government drove 63% of total investment in physical assets 
— a rate otherwise only reached in socialist economies.”655 During this time, “the state’s 
reach extended to virtually all Saudis,” as “heavily subsidized public utilities, state 
employment, and free education and healthcare guaranteed the comforts of middle class 
life for increasing numbers of nationals.”656 However, despite some attempts at economic 
reform, this system continues today;657 according to Hertog, “state employment of 
nationals remains high — by some [estimates] twice as high as private employment — 
public services remain subsidized, and networks of princely patronage are still an 
essential feature of daily life,” while “organized politics remains largely absent.”658 
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In light of its illiberal rentier state model, the Saudi state intervenes, controls, or 
supports a large proportion of the economy, exemplified by the country’s state-owned oil 
resources, development goals, trade barriers, corporate governance structures, and SWFs. 
Regarding the country’s oil, these vast resources have been under total government 
control since the 1970s and 1980s, when the “industry shifted…from one primarily 
controlled by foreign oil companies…to being under the control of the Saudi royal 
family;” further, “by 1992, the House of Saud owned all mineral resources within the 
territorial boundaries of the state,” such that “all decisions about oil policy are made by 
the royal family.”659  
This government control is under the auspices of “the Saudi Arabian Oil 
Company or Saudi ARAMCO,” “the state-owned oil company of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia,” which has its “broadest policy and objectives” determined by the government’s 
“Supreme Council for Petroleum and Minerals Affairs.”660,661 Moreover, Saudi Arabia 
“systematically restricts its [oil] production” such that “its spare capacity is much larger 
than the aggregate spare capacity of the rest of the world’s producers;” this fact is critical 
because Saudi ARAMCO “accounts for more than a tenth of global oil production and a 
fifth of total proven reserves.”662 Although it is possible that these production levels are, 
as argued by Nakov and Nuno, “consistent with its own profit-maximising objective,” 
these authors do not “reject additional explanations based on geopolitical reasons;”663 in 
fact, the nation has employed its “excess capacity to threaten or force other OPEC 
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members to comply with [its] demands” and “political reasons lead the Saudis to 
maintain secrecy about increases in excess capacity.”664 Thus, political factors play a 
major role in Saudi oil production, for example, “internal political stability” based on the 
Saudi rentier state model, “regional security,” “and foreign relations with oil producer 
and consumer countries.”665 
The Saudi government also controls the direction of the economy through 
development goals directed by the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), 
which employs development funds “to provide long-term loans to the vital sectors of the 
economy such as industry, agriculture and real estate, in addition to supporting 
professions and small businesses.”666 SAGIA’s role is to “oversee investment affairs in 
the kingdom, including foreign investment” and is considered “the driving force behind 
Saudi’s investment program.”667 Further, SAGIA is responsible for guiding the “‘10-by-
10’ initiative,” founded “by King ‘Abdullah in 2006,” “to enact reforms and promote 
targeted investments aimed at developing the Kingdom’s private sector” as well as “to 
position Saudi Arabia among the world’s Top 10 most competitive economies.”668,669 
Although these reforms may appear “liberal,” they have been pursued through 
“centralized decision-making” to achieve the national objectives of improving “job 
creation,” “income generation, and to qualify for membership in the World Trade 
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Organization.”670 Moreover, since SAGIA is state-run, its “employees, eager to please the 
king (and not least to receive the personal bonuses promised to them by King ‘Abdullah 
if they succeeded) are believed to have targeted their reform efforts to specific items 
which would most heavily affect their [competitiveness] ranking.”671 
Saudi Arabia also uses trade barriers to direct and intervene in its economy. For 
example, “as a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia applies the 
GCC common external tariff of 5 percent,” and “imposes a 5 percent import duty on most 
imported agricultural and food products.”672 The state also intervenes with a wide range 
of “import prohibitions,” such as on “alcohol, pork products, firearms, used clothing, 
automobiles and automotive parts over five years old;” moreover, “special approval is 
required for the importation of” numerous products, ranging from “live animals” to 
“natural asphalt,” “wireless equipment,” and “religious materials that do not adhere to the 
state-sanctioned version of Islam.”673 In its procurement practices, the government favors 
Saudi firms and nationals; for instance, it requires “contractors [to] subcontract 30 
percent of the value of any government procurement…to firms that are majority-owned 
by Saudi nationals” and “foreign suppliers are also required to establish a training 
program for Saudi nationals.”674 The state also “limits foreign ownership in commercial 
banks to 40 percent” and 60% for “investment banks and brokerages.”675 Lastly, the 
government curtails foreign investment; for example, “foreign investment is currently 
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prohibited in 16 manufacturing and service sectors,” “all foreign investment…requires a 
license from” SAGIA, and “direct foreign participation in the Saudi stock market is 
generally prohibited.”676 
Saudi Arabia also demonstrates an illiberal outlook through its significant 
investment in and influence over domestic firms. For instance, “the largest shareholders” 
in Saudi companies tend to be “families and the state;” family shareholders are also 
indicative of state involvement, since “well-connected families are better positioned than 
other types of block-holders to benefit the company…by using their political connections 
to influence both policy-making and government-controlled financing.”677 Further, 
SAGIA uses “state-owned development funds” to “offer subsidized loans to industrial 
projects,” which allows “families…to use their influence to divert funding to their 
companies.”678,679 Moreover, according to interviews with Saudi companies, “the pursuit 
of political and social objectives, rather than shareholder value maximization, was noted 
as the objective of the state when it has a controlling stake in companies.”680 Lastly, 
Saudi regulation neither encourages corporate transparency nor limits insider trading and 
fraud, since there are few “cases in which violations of disclosure rules, fraudulent 
accounting and ineffective auditing were detected and punished” and penalties are not 
“severe enough to deter future violation.”681 
Finally, Saudi Arabia utilizes a number of SWFs and SWF-like investment 
operations to direct national revenues. The country first launched an “official oil-
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dedicated” SWF in March 2009, called the “Sanabil Al Saudia fund,” however, “other 
investment vehicles performing much the same function of a SWF have been around for 
decades in the form of the Ministry of Finance’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) and the 
SAMA’s (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency) Foreign Holdings (FH) fund.”682 The FH 
fund, although managed by the Saudi central bank, is the second largest SWF “according 
to the value of assets under management” (at $670 billion), if the fund is considered an 
SWF.683 The fund primarily invests “in low-risk assets, such as sovereign debt 
instruments,” however, “some foreign holdings are being allocated to securities like fixed 
income and equities,” and the fund has a “transparency rating” of four out of ten.684 
Sanabil, which is “wholly owned by the [PIF],” invests “in assets consisting primarily of 
stocks, bonds, real estate, foreign currencies and commodities” and “employs a long-term 
investment strategy comparable to most traditional SWFs.”685,686 Saudi Arabia also 
announced a new SWF in 2009, called the Hassana Investment Company, which would 
have “greater independence from SAMA in asset management, in particular across 
international stock markets” and will “[target] investments in real estate and commercial 
projects and both foreign and domestic stock markets.”687 
India 
 India has historically exhibited an aversion to markets and support for state-
directed development policies, albeit with a less centralized and authoritarian government 
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structure than many developing nations. After gaining its independence from Britain in 
1947, “Indian leaders modeled their democratic parliamentary government after that of 
Britain;” however, the country also “adopted an inward-focused, socialist-style, economic 
framework.”688 This framework was “[modeled] on the pattern of the USSR and China,” 
including “five-year plans…with emphasis on fiscal measures to raise resources for 
investment and state-led investment planning.”689 Additionally, the government 
implemented industrial policies, in 1951 and 1956, “[that] explicitly stated that the role of 
government was to create industrial wealth” and affirmed “the principle that the state was 
to be the dominant industrializer” through the SOE “sector.”690 Combined with “the 
Second Five Year Plan…that decisively channeled resources to the industrial sector,” 
Indian policies “put in place a mind-set whereby the evolution of the economy was to be 
guided by conscious human action and choices that were to be made in New Delhi.”691 
Moreover, the Second Five Year Plan “specifically mentioned that industrial 
undertakings ought to behave in constraints with the social and economic policy 
objectives of the state, howsoever defined.”692  
 Following India’s initial move towards state-led development, “several new 
administrative ministries were set up” to expand the state’s ability to direct the economy 
and, “since 1956, every conceivable sub-sector of Indian industry has seen the presence 
of state-owned firms.”693 Additionally, while “the period from 1947 to 1968 were years 
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of moderate regulation…the years between 1969 and 1974 were characterized by 
stringent regulation of private and foreign companies.”694 During the latter period, the 
Indian state “nationalized private sector assets in areas such as insurance, banks, coal, 
wheat, and significant parts of the steel industry.”695 Moreover, throughout the 1950-1975 
period, “a self-interested bureaucracy, famously dubbed the ‘license-raj,’” enacted “a 
plethora of controls and restrictions on private sector expansion and exporting,” “a strict 
and cumbersome system of licensing and quotas” on imports, and “policies to foster 
indigenous technology.”696 Thus, the Indian economic regime from “the late-1950s…into 
the 1980s” is considered “one of the most highly protected and inward-oriented regimes 
in the developing world.”697 
 India began partial liberalization reforms from the late 1970s to 1991, such as a 
“licensing list that permitted limited imports of machinery and raw materials” and “a few 
measures to promote exports.”698 However, much more substantial economic 
liberalization began in 1991 when “a balance of payments crisis was seized by neoliberal 
reformers,” leading to “the election of Narashima Rao as president in 1991;” the new 
president “de facto abolished the extensive system of industrial licensing, opened up 
various segments of the public sector to private capital,” “reduced subsidies and price 
controls protecting agricultural producers,” and gained membership in the WTO.699 
Although such reforms have continued to the present day, much of the “developmental 
state infrastructure [was] retained and some new, if limited, large-scale social policy 
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instruments, like the National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme” were 
implemented.700 Despite liberalization, India remains protectionist, heavily regulated, and 
dependent on state economic involvement. Specifically, the state relies on SOEs, trade 
barriers, and investment barriers, to intervene in and protect its economy.  
 India retains a significant role for SOEs in developing and directing the economy. 
In spite of liberalization and “the policy shift in favour of the private sector, there are 
several sectors of the economy where SOEs continue to play a major role.”701 Many of 
these roles are vestiges of the previous economic regime; for example, “historically, 
Indian banks had been wholly owned by the government” and today “account for roughly 
76 percent of total assets and 84 percent of all bank branches” in India.702,703 Public firms 
also play a major role in “defense equipment,” “have the dominant share of the financial 
sector,” and “exclusively” control “generation of atomic and non-atomic power, 
manufacture of aircraft, heavy machinery, and equipment for rail and sea transport.”704 
Further, Indian SOEs “manufacture items such as nonferrous metals, chemical 
intermediates, iron and steel, drugs and fertilizers, and are involved in diverse activities, 
such as construction, engineering consultancy, farming, handicrafts retailing, shipping, 
coal mining, oil refining, and commodity trading.”705 Moreover, despite earlier efforts at 
SOE privatization, these were “discontinued” during the period from 2004-2009.706 Thus, 
as of 2009-2010, there were 217 “Central State-Owned Enterprises,” owned by the 
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central government, and, as of 2007, there were “about 838 [State SOEs] with investment 
above” 2.7 trillion rupees;707 these firms frequently receive special treatment, such as in 
government procurement practices and telecom spectrum sales.708 
 India also applies significant trade barriers to protect domestic industries and 
consumers, shielding them from market forces. For example, “many of India’s bound 
tariff rates on agricultural products are among the highest in the world, ranging from 100 
percent to 300 percent,” and “India also maintains very high tariff peaks on a number of 
goods.”709 Further, “India’s customs tariff and fees system is complex and characterized 
by a lack of transparency;” for instance, India imposes multiple “cumulative” duties on 
goods, extracting duties based on prices inclusive of previously paid tariffs, and the 
disparities between bound and applied tariffs provide “considerable flexibility to change 
tariff rates at any time.”710 
In addition to tariffs, “India maintains a ‘negative list’ of imported products 
subject to…nontariff regulation,” which bans the import of certain items, requires import 
licenses for others, and allows some products to be “importable only by government 
trading monopolies.”711 Moreover, India provides “several export subsidy programs, 
including exemptions from taxes” and “financing to exporters at a preferential rate.”712 
India also employs substantial food subsidies and agricultural support policies such as 
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“minimum support [prices]” and “input subsidies for fertilizer, power, and irrigation 
water.”713,714 Lastly, India “has steadily increased export duties on iron ore and its 
derivatives” and provides “preferential power rates” for “solar project developers” that 
source from India.715 
 India also supports indigenous industry via investment barriers and regulations; 
this support is largely due to India’s “historical colonial experience,” which often makes 
the nation “antagonistic toward foreign multinational enterprises.”716 In government 
procurement practices, “foreign firms are disadvantaged when competing for Indian 
government contracts due to preferences afforded to Indian [SOEs],” and “companies 
[must] invest 30 percent or more of the value of contracts above 3 billion rupees…in 
Indian produced parts, equipment, or services.”717 Other Indian procurement practices 
have been labeled “innovation mercantilist;” for instance, “in February 2012” India 
“announced a Preferential Market Access mandate for electronic goods…which imposes 
local content requirements on procurement by government and private sector entities.”718  
Beyond procurement practices, India limits foreign investment through strict 
regulations, which often benefit domestic firms. For example, foreign ownership of 
Indian banks “cannot exceed [74%]” and “foreign banks are not authorized to own more 
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than [5%] of an Indian private bank.”719 India also restricts foreign ownership of “news 
and current affairs” media channels “to [26%],” forbids foreigners from practicing law, 
and “[regulates] FDI (foreign direct investment) by sector.”720 Further, firms must obtain 
“state and central government permission on a range of issues” such as “land, labor, 
environment electricity, water, [and] taxation” before pursuing investments, and such 
“regulations often become a source of rent-seeking and patronage;” thus, “unless one 
finds a willing state government,” “India is not an easy place to begin business.”721  
Lastly, although India has not been a major player in terms of SWFs, the 
government has announced the creation of the “India Overseas Investment 
Corporation (INOIC) — under the finance ministry on the lines of a sovereign wealth 
fund to lend financial muscle for securing access to overseas natural resources.”722 This 
SWF will be funded by “rupee bonds of 15-20 years with sovereign guarantee,” allowing 
for a “marginally higher” return “than government securities,” which benefits investors; 
funds will be raised via “state-run entities, banks and financial institutions,” which will 
be directed to purchase the bonds.723 Thus, while India has not actively invested in SWFs, 
its proposed fund is designed for the political objective of securing natural resources 
rather than the economic objective of investment. 
Discussion 
China, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and India differ politically, economically, 
geographically, regionally, and by nearly every measure; however, all seem to exhibit an 
                                                
719 United States Trade Representative, National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers: India, 
4. 
720 United States Trade Representative, National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers: India, 
7, 9-10. 
721 Mukherji, "The State, Economic Growth, and Development in India," 97-98. 
722 Sanjay Dutta, "Govt plans sovereign wealth fund," The Times of India, September 17, 2013. 
723 Dutta, "Govt plans sovereign wealth fund."  
 148 
illiberal outlook in numerous areas of their economies. Hence, based on this chapter’s 
hypothesis and given that all four nations pursue food security LSLAs, it appears that 
nations using LSLAs likely share overarching economic outlooks and tendencies. 
Moreover, these shared tendencies appear markedly illiberal and nationalist, 
demonstrating an aversion to “free market,” liberal capitalism and a desire to “maximize” 
the value of the state.724 This section analyzes the specific economic outlook similarities 
shared by the case study nations. 
History and Current Policies 
 Each of the four nations examined in the Results section have a significant history 
of economic illiberalism. The specific type of illiberalism historically followed by each 
country differs; China and India adhered to socialist-communist central planning methods, 
Korea utilized an authoritarian state-led capitalism system, and Saudi Arabia employed a 
rentier model due to natural resource abundance. Nevertheless, each of these economic 
models avoids free market, individual-maximizing objectives and emphasizes the 
primacy of the state in economic direction, development, and planning. Moreover, in the 
past, each of these nations has either avoided markets altogether, in the case of China and 
India, or used markets to the state’s advantage, in the case of Korea and Saudi Arabia.  
 These shared histories are important because, as asserted in the Literature Review, 
institutionalized economic outlooks often create an “institutional inertia” [that] will 
inhibit change,” or at the very least influence current policymakers.725 This assertion 
appears to prove true, as each of the examined nations’ histories informs their economic 
policies today. For example, given their state-led background, China and South Korea 
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still “plan” or direct much of their economies; likewise, Saudi Arabia follows the rentier 
model in light of its nationally owned resources, and India has retained much of the 
bureaucratic, regulatory, and state-investment structure that limited liberalization after it 
gained independence, even despite liberalization efforts. Thus, nominal liberalization 
notwithstanding, each of the four nations provides a near ubiquitous role for the state in 
the economy, which appears to be directly “carried through” from these countries’ 
economic histories. 
The analyzed nations also share numerous current economic policies or tools to 
achieve national objectives. SOEs, which allow states to shift the direction of economic 
efforts, play a major role in each nation’s economy, often surviving short-lived attempts 
at privatization. These enterprises are also frequently employed for pursuing national 
economic objectives; for instance, Saudi Arabia uses ARAMCO to control oil resources, 
South Korea and China use SOEs to obtain resources, and Indian SOEs preclude foreign 
firms’ entry into Indian government contracting. Moreover, in each nation, the state is 
often a major investor in domestic firms and is frequently considered one of the core 
drivers of economic growth. 
All four nations also utilize trade and investment barriers to support indigenous 
economic development and limit foreign ownership. Thus, each has implemented 
expensive and/or opaque tariff rules, oppressive regulatory or other nontariff barriers to 
trade and investment, restrictions on foreign investment in the economy, subsidies on 
exports and domestic production, and preferential treatment for domestic firms. These 
policies reflect a mercantilist or nationalist outlook, as they are often intended to support 
domestic producers at the expense of potential foreign investors; it is likely that such 
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nationalistic policies are linked to the fact that each of these nations experienced colonial 
control by foreign powers.  
Further, each nation has developed or considered employing SWFs to gain 
investment returns on state funds as well as to assist the government’s “direct control of 
vital economic capital.”726 Such funds are often considered illiberal because they are 
frequently opaque, fail to provide transparent disclosure, and could be used for political 
objectives such as controlling or influencing strategic companies, assets, or overseas 
resources. Moreover, these funds demonstrate a view that believes the state should play 
the role of active, return-seeking, risk-taking investor in the economy; consequently, 
there has been a recent “shift” in government “investment strategies…from conservative 
holdings of government bonds to higher-risk/higher-return investments in equities or 
corporate acquisitions.”727 
Lastly, each nation uses mercantilist or nationalist strategies for natural resource 
acquisition or retention. Saudi Arabia is the clearest example, controlling its oil supply 
often to pursue national objectives. However, China, Korea, and India utilize state-owned 
companies for securing natural resources, often overseas or in foreign nations.728 Thus, 
these states exhibit a strong desire to circumvent or avoid markets (or, in the case of 
Saudi Arabia, to control the market for the state’s political and economic advantage).  
Analysis 
 As described previously, this chapter hypothesized that the states examined in the 
first two chapters of this thesis, which all utilize food security LSLAs, would share 
overarching economic outlooks and paradigms. Moreover, it asserted that this outlook 
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would likely follow an illiberal, nationalist, or mercantilist paradigm, consistent with 
LSLAs’ linkages to mercantilism, colonialism, and economic self-sufficiency. To test this 
hypothesis, this chapter analyzed the economic histories, policies, and outlooks of four 
nations examined throughout this thesis, China, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and India, all 
of which use food security LSLAs and share similar food security motivations for these 
LSLAs. This chapter postulated that if these nations shared similar illiberal economic 
outlooks, then such outlooks would likely be “secondary” contributors to the selection of 
LSLA food security policies.  
 Based on this chapter’s results, it appears that all four nations share similar 
economic outlooks. These outlooks, derived from similar economic histories and 
demonstrated by current policies, all adhere to an illiberal, nationalist, and mercantilist 
paradigm, emphasizing the state’s role in directing, influencing, or managing the 
economy. They support significant state intervention to promote national industrial, 
political, and social objectives, and view markets simply as a tool that can be directed to 
achieve these goals; when markets cannot provide desired outcomes, these states adhere 
to a paradigm that supports circumventing or manipulating them. Hence, such an outlook 
is consistent with food security LSLAs, which are pursued by nations to avoid the 
perceived risks or uncertainties of world import markets.  
 Although a nation’s economic outlook may not directly cause a particular policy, 
a national paradigm certainly sets the stage for the range of policies a country can follow. 
Thus, while economic illiberalism does not cause food security LSLAs, it appears to be a 
secondary motivation that, at the very least, encourages states to pursue such a food 
security strategy. Moreover, although additional case studies are beyond the scope of this 
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chapter, economic illiberalism appears to be a general trend among countries pursuing 
food security LSLAs. As described in the second chapter, Qatar, Kuwait, Japan, and 
Singapore all pursue food security LSLAs; Japan and Singapore both have been 
considered “developmental states” and both Kuwait and Qatar follow the “rentier” model 
of Saudi Arabia.729,730 
 Therefore, this chapter’s findings support the hypothesis that countries pursuing a 
LSLA food security strategy share similar economic paradigms and that these outlooks 
are illiberal, nationalist, and mercantilist in nature. While these outlooks are not a direct 
cause of LSLAs, they provide a fertile environment for such a policy to be considered. 
Moreover, given the significant disparities among the four case study nations described in 
the second chapter, it appears that the correlation between illiberalism and food security 
LSLAs is a general trend; this is especially likely in light of the findings regarding Japan, 
Singapore, Qatar, and Kuwait, although these cases have not been rigorously evaluated. 
 Finally, this topic offers many areas for future research. Although economic 
illiberalism appears correlated with food security LSLAs, further case studies, such as 
Japan, Qatar, Singapore, Kuwait, and Oman could be analyzed to confirm this trend. 
Scholars could also seek out cases in which nations with illiberal outlooks facing similar 
food security concerns as this thesis’ case study nations choose not to pursue food 
security LSLAs; such research could better clarify why these factors motivate LSLAs. 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to determine if national economic outlook could be 
considered a “secondary motivation” of states choosing LSLAs as a food security 
                                                
729 Kim, "Rethinking Colonialism and the Origins of the Developmental State in East Asia," 383. 
730 Hiba Khodr, "A Preliminary Comparative Study of Policy Making in Two GCC Countries—Qatar and 
Kuwait: Processes, Politics, and Participants," Politics and Policy 42, no. 2 (2014): 273. 
 153 
strategy. By comparing China, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and India’s economic 
histories and current policies, it established that these states, which pursue food security 
LSLAs and face similar food security “triggers,” all share an “illiberal,” “nationalist,” 
and “mercantilist” economic outlook. Thus, it appears that economic illiberalism can be 
considered an underlying motivation of food security LSLAs. Such findings are 
consistent with LSLAs’ description by scholars as driven by mercantilism and similar to 
colonialism; they are also consistent with the fact that nations employing LSLAs often do 
so to avoid markets and promote agricultural self-reliance. 
Moreover, given the range of nations analyzed by this study, it appears that 
economic illiberalism, like the findings regarding food security “triggers” in the previous 
chapters, is a general trend among nations using LSLAs. Hence, based on this chapter’s 
findings, it could confidently be predicted that a nation pursuing food security LSLAs 
will likely have a history of economic illiberalism (e.g. communism, socialism, 
authoritarian development, central planning, or state intervention), and many elements of 
this history will influence the nation’s current economic policies. For example, such a 
nation will likely promote domestic industries, prevent foreign investment, employ trade 
barriers, invest in opaque, nationalistic SWFs, control national resources, support a range 
of state-owned enterprises, and intervene heavily in the economy (despite the potential 
for nominal “liberalization” or use of liberal economic tools); fundamentally, such a state 
will attempt to “maximize” the value of the state in economic endeavors, instead of the 
individual or company.731 
This chapter’s findings further contribute to the academic literature on LSLAs and 
food security by establishing underlying national characteristics that encourage states to 
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pursue food security LSLAs. This chapter expands on the previous chapters’ analysis of 
LSLA drivers by determining one significant “secondary motivation” that sets the stage 
for such a policy choice. These findings are important, as they describe the characteristics 
of a nation that might pursue such a policy in the future; given projected increases in 
population and food demand, it is critical to know which states might pursue specific 
food security policies, especially if these policies circumvent the established world 
agricultural marketplace. Therefore, the more similar characteristics that can be 
discovered about LSLA-pursuing countries, the better such a policy can be predicted in 

















 The purpose of this thesis has been to analyze the recent trend of nations utilizing 
large-scale land acquisitions as a food security strategy and to uncover general conditions 
and motivations contributing to the selection of such a strategy. This paper found specific 
food security conditions as well as preferred national responses to these conditions that 
appear to generally apply to the diverse range of states pursuing food LSLAs; it also 
determined that food security LSLAs themselves are similar among these states. 
Moreover, this paper discovered that LSLA investor countries share common illiberal 
economic histories, policies, and outlooks, demonstrating that economic illiberalism 
plays a role in “setting the stage” for states opting to employ LSLAs. In essence, this 
thesis develops a framework for understanding the driving forces behind LSLAs, which 
could be applied to future nations and circumstances to predict in which countries this 
strategy might find favor.  
 In summary, the first chapter analyzed the food security concerns, objectives, and 
responses (including LSLA implementation styles) of two nations that both use food 
security LSLAs but otherwise share few similarities, China and South Korea. It found 
that both face rising and changing food demand, limits to domestic supply, dependence 
on food imports combined with a preference for self-sufficiency, and numerous similar 
food security response strategies. It determined that both encourage private or state-
owned firms to invest in agriculture abroad, in hopes that the food produced will be 
available to the home country.  
 Given that the nations analyzed in the first chapter are regionally located in East 
Asia, the second chapter examined additional case studies to ensure that region-based 
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factors did not account for China and South Korea’s food security conditions and strategy 
selection. Thus, to determine the first chapter’s generalizability, it investigated Saudi 
Arabia and India following the first chapter’s template; both nations are vastly different 
from each other as well as China and South Korea, and neither state is located in East 
Asia. With only minimal variation, this chapter ultimately found that these states share 
parallel concerns, conditions, responses, preferences, and LSLA styles with China and 
South Korea. Consequently, this chapter illustrates the general nature of the first 
chapter’s findings (outside East Asia). 
 Lastly, the third chapter examined secondary or underlying motivations of food 
security LSLAs. Due to the linkages noted in academic literature among LSLAs, 
colonialism, and mercantilism, as well as the general preference for self-sufficiency held 
by LSLA investor states, LSLAs appear to have a substantial “economic” element; hence, 
to indicate whether economic outlook could be considered a “secondary motivation” of 
LSLAs, this chapter examined if national economic outlooks are shared among countries 
employing food security LSLAs. This chapter analyzed the four case study nations from 
the previous chapters and found that each has significantly illiberal, nationalist, and 
mercantilist economic histories and current policies, demonstrating a shared illiberal 
paradigm among these nations. Thus, it appears that any nation employing food security 
LSLAs likely subscribes to such a paradigm. 
Fundamentally, this thesis finds that LSLA food security strategies lie at the 
center of a complex matrix of food security, economic, historical, and cultural factors, 
and that nations pursuing such a policy, even if different by most other measures, will 
likely share these factors. Further, this thesis corrects deficiencies in the literature, mainly 
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by describing the highly intricate and complex long-term conditions faced by LSLA-
pursuing countries and by examining how LSLAs fit within a broader set of food security 
objectives, responses, and strategies in these states. Moreover, this thesis demonstrates 
that LSLAs are certainly not solely short-term reactions to the Global Food Crisis, but 
rather a long-term effort by nations to secure food resources in response to projected 
enduring domestic food security challenges while minimizing the perceived “dangers” of 
market-based solutions to these concerns. Such policies are entirely consistent with these 
nations’ economic outlooks and mirror their strategies in additional areas, such as oil and 
other natural resources. 
This thesis and the LSLA issue in general raise a number of nuanced theoretical 
and applied questions, which, although beyond the scope of this study, are also 
exceptional areas for future research if there were to be additional chapters of this thesis. 
One of the most essential questions that should be analyzed in the future is: does this 
strategy make sense, from a global food security, an investor nation’s food security, and a 
host nation perspective? 
From a world food security perspective, it is possible that these land acquisitions 
could vastly increase food production. If national and industrial investment in agriculture 
can increase the amount of land in cultivation and raise the productivity of land, it is 
possible that such investments could expand overall food production and lower world 
food prices, increasing food security; even if the crops are entirely exported to investor 
nations and never see the world market, the consumption of these crops will inherently 
satisfy a portion of investor nations’ food demand, thus reducing their dependence on 
(and world demand of) import markets, decreasing world food prices. Given substantial 
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projected increases in food demand, such policies may have value if they can bring more 
land into cultivation and match world supply with demand. A valuable future study or 
potential future chapter could analyze how much land, at current production levels, might 
be necessary to match food supply with projected demand to stabilize world prices. 
One caveat to this potential benefit, however, involves the “type” of agriculture 
utilized to increase crop production, as unsustainable farming can lead to environmental 
degradation and a failure to produce crops. One key example is the American “Dust Bowl” 
phenomenon “during the 1930s;” as “agricultural production began to expand 
substantially on the American Plains, and native grasslands were increasingly plowed up 
for crops,” “severe drought…which led to widespread crop failures,” combined with 
“loss of ground cover,” “made farmland susceptible to self-perpetuating dust storms 
(wind erosion) and substantial runoff during occasional heavy rains (water erosion).”732 
More sustainable land uses, “where productivity was less affected by erosion and 
production was less likely to cause additional erosion,” such as for “hay and pasture” 
over “wheat and other row crops” was hindered by “land tenancy” practices, as “tenants’ 
short-term incentives were thought to encourage the overuse of land.”733 Thus, as cited by 
the “[U.S. government-established] Great Plains Committee,” unsustainable farming 
driven by a short-term focus played a major role in the crisis, including factors such as 
“high rates of farm tenancy and absentee landlords [causing] over-production of crops 
relative to livestock,” “[a] lack of farm improvement/long-term planning,” “expansion of 
                                                
732 Richard Hornbeck, "The Enduring Impact of the American Dust Bowl: Short- and Long-Run 
Adjustments to Environmental Catastrophe," American Economic Review 102, no. 4 (2012): 1479. 
733 Hornbeck, "The Enduring Impact of the American Dust Bowl," 1480. 
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farming into marginal areas,” “over-cultivation of small landholdings,” and “undue 
dependence on wheat as a cash crop.”734 
Given that LSLAs typically result in the expansion of agriculture and an increase 
in cultivated land, unsustainable farming techniques, as exemplified by the “Dust Bowl,” 
could exacerbate the conditions that LSLAs are employed to solve. Since industrial 
agriculture, which is used heavily in LSLAs, has been criticized by some scholars as 
“eroding biodiversity,” “polluting soil, water, and air” with “synthetic chemical 
pesticides and fertilizers,” “eroding [soil] much faster than it can be replenished – taking 
with it the land’s fertility and nutrients” and “[consuming water] at unsustainable rates,” 
failure to implement farming techniques that avoid these negative outcomes could cause 
crop failures and environmental damage.735 Under such conditions, LSLAs would lose 
their value while also harming host nation environments. However, since LSLAs tend to 
be long-term investments, designed to produce food to meet future demand, it is certainly 
possible that investors will take a long-run view and will not succumb to the “short-term 
incentives” of 1930s American tenant farmers.736 If investors do consider long-term 
effects, LSLAs could raise the world’s food supply, benefitting global food security; thus, 
future research should examine LSLAs’ farming practices to determine their current 
sustainability and suggest improvements. 
From an investor country’s food security perspective, the benefits of LSLAs are 
debatable. Investor countries could import a significant portion of crops from host nations 
                                                
734 Robert A. McLeman et al., "What we learned from the Dust Bowl: lessons in science, policy, and 
adaptation," Population and Environment 35, no. 4 (2014): 426-427. 
735 Leo Horrigan, Robert S. Lawrence, and Polly Walker. "How Sustainable Agriculture Can Address the 
Environmental and Human Health Harms of Industrial Agriculture." Environmental Health Perspectives 
110, no. 5 (May 2002): 445. 
736 Hornbeck, "The Enduring Impact of the American Dust Bowl," 1480. 
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through LSLAs, however, given the large populations of many investor countries (such as 
China and India), the benefit is likely marginal; for smaller nations, such as Saudi Arabia, 
South Korea, Singapore, or Qatar, the outcome of LSLAs is likely more optimistic, as 
these nations have to support the food consumption of much smaller populations. 
Nevertheless, as illustrated by this thesis, LSLAs are not the only food security policy 
employed by investor nations, indicating that even if their production benefit is marginal, 
this marginal advantage may be beneficial the future; LSLAs may “prime the pump” of 
further food production by bringing large-scale agriculture to unindustrialized nations 
with fertile farmland.737 Hence, future studies could be conducted to determine what 
proportion of investor nations’ food demand can be supplied by LSLAs as well as to 
investigate whether industrial agricultural investment in host nations can grow fast 
enough to support these nations’ demand. 
A further risk of LSLAs from an investor nations’ viewpoint is host-investor 
disputes, specifically legal recourse in response to such disputes. The law that backs 
LSLA deals is primarily “international investment law” and “many…land leases are 
governed by the terms of Bilateral Investment Treaties” between host and investor 
nations; these treaties “frequently include provisions promoting national treatment for 
foreign investors, and providing injured foreign investors with access to State-investor 
international arbitration.”738 In the event of a breach, such as if host nations enact policies 
contrary to the treaties’ terms, investors may seek arbitration at the International Centre 
                                                
737 Pearce, The Land Grabbers: The New Fight Over Who Owns the Earth, viii. 
738 Telesetsky,"Resource Conficts over Arable Land in Food Insecure States," 302. 
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for Settlement of Investment Disputes (at the World Bank), which could require 
compensation to be paid by the breaching party.739  
While arbitration may economically compensate for host policies encroaching on 
investors’ property, it would not benefit an investor country if, for example, host nations 
decide to ban food exports in response to a food crisis; further, there is always a risk of 
political unrest or land nationalization, which may be more likely during a crisis, 
potentially reducing investor nations’ ability to rely on LSLAs. Moreover, given that, as 
scholars such as Welzer have speculated, “the consequences of climate change 
are…shortages of water, declining food production, increased health risks and land 
degredation and floods that reduce living space,” there may be increased environmental-
based conflict and crises in the future.740 In any such crisis, the effectiveness of 
international arbitration may be dubious and would certainly not result in increased food 
production for the investor nation. Hence, future research could categorize past disputes 
or predict whether future disputes might lead to external international legal settlement, 
bilateral negotiations by host and investor nations, or even outright conflict, especially in 
the case of shifting environmental conditions.  
Furthermore, even if they perform exactly as intended, LSLAs may create 
additional challenges for investor nations. Each country analyzed in this thesis has 
promoted farm employment or farmers’ income as a key goal of its agricultural policies, 
in addition to absolute food production and security. If LSLAs become “too” successful, 
such that they produce a substantial proportion of an investor nation’s food, the entry of 
LSLA crops into the domestic food market could reduce prices and harm incomes in the 
                                                
739 Telesetsky,"Resource Conficts over Arable Land in Food Insecure States," 303, 305. 
740 Harald Welzer, Climate Wars: What People Will Be Killed For in the 21st Century (Cambridge, 
Malden: Polity Press, 2012), 73. 
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domestic agriculture industry, contradicting these nations’ farm income goals; the greater 
the percentage of crops “re-exported” to the host nation (which varies by nation and 
circumstances), the more dangerous this effect. Additionally, if the domestic market is 
flooded with LSLA crops, it may incent farmers to seek alternative employment, which 
would further exaccerbate these nations’ food security challenges of falling agricultural 
labor supply and urbanization. Thus, future scholarship could determine what level of 
LSLA crop “imports” would be sustainable for domestic agriculture and what policies 
could be implemented to mitigate this challenge. 
Lastly, the question of whether LSLAs benefit or make sense for host nations 
could be addressed by future research (and has been already analyzed substantially in the 
literature). In theory, LSLAs could bring investment and industry to developing nations, 
potentially raising economic growth, employment, food production, etc., while also 
providing rent from investors. Further, as noted previously, such investments could raise 
world food supplies, lowering prices (even if the crops are exported). However, LSLAs 
also have the potential to displace populations, since even “‘idle’ or ‘marginal’ land” can 
be owned or used by “groups such as nomadic herders who depend on land at certain 
times of the year;” moreover, marginal land can “be productive in other terms – for 
hunting, gathering, or pastoralism,” and LSLAs preclude these activities.741 Therefore, in 
the future, scholars could determine if and under what conditions LSLAs benefit host 
nations, what protections do and should exist for local landowners, and whether LSLAs 
are a net benefit for host nations and local populations. 
                                                
741 Thomas Molony and James Smith, "Briefing: Biofuels, Food Security, and Africa," African Affairs 109, 
no. 436 (2010): 493. 
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Beyond these broader questions, there exist myriad areas of additional future 
research that could be based on the specific findings of this thesis. For example, 
additional case study nations could be investigated to further determine the extent to 
which the results of this thesis can be considered general. For scholars conducting such 
an investigation, it would be valuable to select case study nations that reflect an even 
more diverse range of national circumstances; thus, Singapore would be beneficial to 
study, given its unique position as a city-state. Likewise, examining nations outside the 
“top 18” (see Appendix 5 and page 71) could establish whether these nations’ LSLAs 
differ from those within this group. 
In addition to strengthening these findings’ “generalizability,” further aspects of 
LSLAs could be explored. For example, scholars could study cases in which a nation 
faces the food security and underlying economic conditions described in this thesis but 
does not decide to pursue LSLAs; if such cases exist, their examination could explain 
why these conditions lead to LSLAs in some circumstances and do not in others. 
Moreover, the link between biofuels production and LSLAs could be developed more 
thoroughly, given the competition between food and “fuel” crops; this thesis’ results 
could be applied to biofuel LSLA investor nations to determine similarities. Finally, 
additional cultural, historical, social, environmental (water, climate, etc.), or political 
factors could be analyzed in case studies to determine if there are further direct or 
underlying motivations of food security LSLAs.  
Lastly, future research could use the results of this thesis to analyze varying 
“camps” of academic literature in greater depth. As touched on in the first and second 
Literature Reviews, there is a long history of diverse scholarly opinion on the links 
 164 
between population growth and food scarcity. For example, Malthus asserts that food 
scarcity provides “a strong and constantly operating check on population” while Ricardo 
maintains that when food is scarce, its price increases and populations will farm more or 
reproduce less.742,743 
These debates have continued into the present day. Hence, while neo-Malthusians 
such as Ehrlich have predicted massive famines due to overpopulation, other scholars 
have questioned this outcome;744 Boserup, for example, argues, “in many cases the output 
from a given area of land responds far more generously to an additional input of labor” 
and “population growth is…the independent variable which…is a major factor in 
determining agricultural developments.”745 Likewise, scholars such as Rosenberg, 
Hallam, and Eccleston cite technology as protecting against Malthusian famines; for 
instance, Rosenberg contends, “there is no obvious reason why the further growth of 
technological skills should not…continue the shift from dependence upon scarce sources 
of materials to dependence upon more abundant sources” and, Eccleston claims, “fear of 
hunger will undoubtedly drive scientific innovation.”746,747,748 Thus, future research could 
examine the selection LSLAs or their ultimate effects to determine if they support 
specific camps within scarcity scholarship.  
LSLAs for food security are a novel, yet historically and culturally based response 
to modern changes in food demand, supply, and distribution of agricultural resources. 
They raise numerous questions regarding world food production, the “commodification 
                                                
742 Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, 13. 
743 Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy & Taxation, 278. 
744 Ehrlich, The Population Bomb, 3. 
745 Ester Boserup, The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change under 
Population Pressure (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005, 1965), 14, 11. 
746 Rosenberg, "Innovative Responses to Materials Shortages," 117. 
747 Hallam, "International Investments in Agricultural Production," 31. 
748 Eccleston, "Peak Food?" 16. 
 165 
of sovereign national territory,” the benefits of industrial agriculture, resource 
nationalism, and the welfare of developing nations’ populations.749 As described 
throughout this thesis, they can also lead to political strife or policy shifts, and can create 
a negative or colonial perception of investor nations, making them risky and potentially 
volatile policy tools.  
However, given massive projected increases in world food demand and 
population growth, nations that fear international market mechanisms for supplying 
agricultural products may have an incentive to pursue such a policy, at the very least as a 
marginal support of additional food security strategies; LSLAs will become especially 
valuable for these countries if food producing nations follow past trends during future 
crises and implement agricultural export restrictions or other barriers to trade. Moreover, 
if market mechanisms ever fail (possibly due to such restrictions) during this period of 
rising demand, traditionally import-dependent nations may become concerned over their 
reliance on import markets; in such a circumstance, it is likely that LSLAs will become 
increasingly prevalent. Therefore, by examining and uncovering the core and secondary 
motivations driving these investments, this thesis should provide insights to policymakers 
and scholars that may prove helpful in predicting which nations might select this strategy, 
especially during a rapidly approaching period of increased food demand coupled with 
potential limits to supply expansion. 
 
                                                
749 Margulis, McKeon, and Borras Jr., "Land Grabbing and Global Governance: Critical Perspectives," 18. 
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APPENDIX 3: Land Matrix Data – Saudi Arabia Agricultural LSLA Deals752 
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APPENDIX 4: Land Matrix Data – India Agricultural LSLA Deals753 
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APPENDIX 5: Land Matrix Data – Top LSLA-Pursuing Nations by Number of Deals754 
 










1 Malaysia 68 2311301 No 
2 China 62 674541 Yes 
3 United Kingdom 46 1619400 No 
4 Viet Nam 41 275679 No 
5 United States of America 36 1498290 No 
6 Singapore 33 910730 Yes 
7 India 32 909066 Yes 
8 Republic of Korea 21 1021945 Yes 
9 Thailand 17 271913 No 
10 Italy 17 199000 No 
11 France 16 411878 No 
12 South Africa 16 187974 No 
13 Canada 15 395332 No 
14 Saudi Arabia 14 1203686 Yes 
15 United Arab Emirates 13 183974 Yes 
16 Belgium 11 182544 No 
17 Netherlands 10 211914 No 
18 Japan 10 155100 Yes 
 
Note: The values in this table are approximate and may include closed or cancelled 
deals; since this chart is only meant to depict which nations (as a total) are most active in 
LSLAs (of any type), some data have been omitted, such as Hong Kong-specific LSLAs. 
For a more robust analysis of the values and specific land deals for the case study 
nations covered in this thesis, please see nation-specific appendices and case study 
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– 2010 (%) 
China 2.2 78.14 17.8 34.55 
South 
Korea 73.2 90.41 79.72 83.59 
Saudi 
Arabia 82.9 No FAO Data 92.84 107.56 
India 0.5 ~0 14.37 46.85 
 
Note: All values except the “Cereal Import Dependency Ratio” are self-calculated using 
FAOSTAT “Food Balance Sheets” data. Thus, all other values are approximate and, 
while calculated using the same formula as described by the FAO for the “Cereal Import 
Dependency Ratio”(Quantity Imported/(Quantity Produced + Quantity Imported – 
Quantity Exported)), may not account for all factors included in FAO official 
calculations.756 Each ratio is based on a three-year average, with the year displayed 
being the “middle” year. Lastly, the crops analyzed have been chosen for their 
importance to the case study nations; as noted in the Results sections of the first two 
chapters, staple cereal grains are critical to all four states, soybeans are used heavily in 
China, pulses are vital for India, and vegetable oils play a major role in agricultural 
demand in many nations, but especially in India. A key factor to note when viewing these 
data is that a smaller ratio for a larger population nation may be, in absolute terms, a 
larger dependency than a larger ratio for a smaller population nation; national income 
levels may also influence the perceived challenges of dependency. 
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